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1 Introduction 
The subject of Japan’s economy became a matter of burgeoning interest to the world 
during the 1970s and 1980s for two reasons. Firstly, Japan’s economic success loomed 
increasingly larger on the international stage, with Japanese goods showing up 
everywhere. Secondly, the trade surpluses Japan enjoyed with a number of countries, 
and especially the bilateral trade imbalance between the United States and Japan, 
became a potent political topic (see Mosk, 2008: 351ff). Political friction over Japan’s 
continuing trade surpluses became an “ongoing drone, a rhythmic drumbeat” for 
American diplomacy in terms of its relationship with Japan (Mosk, 2008: 325). 
However, it was not the trade imbalance that was the crux of the matter but the 
perceived lack of reciprocity at play: that Japan’s economic success was due in some 
degree to anticompetitive practices that protected Japan’s domestic market and granted 
an unfair advantage to Japanese companies as they expanded abroad (see Kotabe and 
Weiler, 1996: viii). 
In 1989, the United States initiated broad talks concerning Japan’s anticompetitive 
practices and structural factors inhibiting manufactured imports into Japan during the 
Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks. These talks addressed such areas as the 
law restraining the growth of large retail stores in Japan, weak antitrust law 
enforcement, land taxation that encouraged inefficient farming, and high real estate 
prices. The talks also addressed Japan’s distribution system, which was identified as a 
key factor in shielding existing participants in the Japanese market from newcomers, 
especially their foreign counterparts (see Maguire, 2001). According to United States 
representatives, the Japanese distribution system with its large number of small 
retailers, long and complex distribution channels, distribution keiretsu1 and specific 
trade practices, inhibited competition, denied Japanese consumers the full benefits of a 
                                                
1 Ishida (1983: 322) defines a vertical keiretsu in distribution as: “Systematic or interrelated efforts by 
manufacturers (and wholesalers) to force retail dealers to organize in order to promote cooperation as well as 
to force them to carry out producer-determined policies at the retail level.”  
 5 
free and strong economy, and limited product availability as well as American 
businesses’ opportunity to sell competitive products (see Verity, 1988). 
The final report of the Structural Impediments Initiative listed five consensual measures 
for Japan to use to improve its distribution system and to make its market more 
accessible to its foreign counterparts. These measures included the break-up of vertical 
keiretsu in distribution, the speeding up of import clearance procedures (see Mosk, 
2008: 327)2, and the revision of the law restraining the growth of large retail stores, the 
Large-Scale Retail Stores Law (daitenh!). 3  The expectations of the government, 
business and academic community both inside and outside Japan grew based on the 
developments that the revised statute had promised, and an imminent revolution in the 
Japanese distribution system was anticipated (see for example Goldman, 1991: 171-
172). The number of large retailers would increase, small retailers would be driven out 
of business, wholesale channels would shorten, and direct sourcing between retailers 
and manufacturers would increase; in other words, Japan’s distribution system would 
finally be modernized. 
1.1 Literature review 
There is a limited number of Japanese and non-Japanese studies on the effect of the 
revision of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law on the Japanese distribution system. The 
majority of studies focus almost entirely on the effect of this law on the retail sector.  
Lothia and Subramaniam (2000) discuss the changes in the Japanese retail structure 
between 1985 and 1994 and the expected changes after 1994. They examine structural 
characteristics such as the total number of retail establishments, the number of retail 
                                                
2  Japan demanded that the United States clarify its anti-dumping measures, end language-based 
discrimination in international patent agreements, and reform product liability law. 
3 The Japanese term for the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law is daikibo kouri tenpo ni okeru kourigy! no jigy! 
katsud! no ch!sei ni kansuru h!ritsu (Law Concerning the Adjustment of Retail Business Activities of 
Large-Scale Retail Stores). It is abbreviated as daitenh!. 
For more on the daitenh!, see chapter 3. 
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formats, catalog mail order sales, and computer mail order sales. These authors 
expected the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law to continue the increase in the number of 
large stores and the decrease in the number of small retail stores. Demographic trends 
fueled the increase of large stores. For instance, more women began working outside 
the house and thus took advantage of the convenience of one-stop shopping. Increased 
car ownership also had an impact.  
Riethmuller and Chai (1999) examine the effect of the revised statute on foreign food 
exporters. They conclude that in theory, the removal of the Large-Scale Retail Store 
Law facilitates the efforts of large companies to open new stores. There are, however, 
no grounds for believing that the spoils of deregulation should go exclusively to new 
foreign players. The Japanese food processing industry is a large industry that has 
advantages over its foreign competitors. In addition, the cost and availability of land 
and the profitability of large supermarket operations relative to other investment 
alternatives may cause some firms to decide that not expanding is the best policy.  
Davies and Itoh (2001) study the effect of the revised statute on retail structure in 
Japan. They conclude that the change in legislation could be associated with a change 
in the Japanese retail structure and thus with more large stores; however, the change has 
occurred more slowly than might have been expected.  
There have also been studies of the issue published in Japanese, including that of Mineo 
(2008), who examined government regulation of large retail stores in Japan and found 
that the increase in the number of large stores (defined as stores with over 500 m2) 
accelerated after the revision of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law. In an earlier study, 
Mineo (2004) examined the changes in retail structure with regard to sales floor space. 
She found that in 2002, 80% of all stores were still very small, with sales floor space 
between 30 m2 and 50 m2. In 1979, 92% of all stores were of this size. In contrast, only 
0.3% of all stores were mega-stores with more than 3’000 m2 sales floor space, though 
this figure was up from 0.1% in 1979. Except for the smallest stores, all stores also 
showed positive growth rates between 1979 and 2002.  
Tamura (1992) studies the impact of the revised statute on the location of large retail 
stores with data for the period between June 1990 and February 1991. He analyzes the 
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number of applications for large stores submitted to the MITI (Ministry of Trade and 
Industry)4 and finds that, for planned large-store openings, there was a shift away from 
the three metropolises (Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya) to other regions in Japan and a shift 
away from the commercial centers of prefectures to the suburbs of those prefectures. 
Nogata (1998) writes that the increase in the number of large stores can be attributed to 
the revised statute, though he finds that the decrease in the number of small stores was 
caused by a general decline in prices and more imported goods. He also discusses the 
effect of the revised statute on retail prices and concludes that there is not always a 
positive relationship between retail prices and the number of large stores.  
We do not know of any studies examining the effects of the revised statute on the 
structure of the Japanese distribution system more broadly. This study is intended to fill 
this gap by not only analyzing the developments in the retail sector after the revision of 
the statute but also by examining the developments in the wholesale sector (that is, the 
number of wholesale establishment and wholesale circuity5) and in direct sourcing. In 
addition, this study aims to contribute to the body of research on the impact of 
legislation on the retail sector, and, more broadly, on the distribution sector in general. 
1.2 Research objective and research hypothesis 
This study investigates the effects of the revision of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law 
in 1991 and its enactment in 1992 on the Japanese distribution system. The objective of 
this study is to assess whether the anticipated developments, as roughly outlined in the 
introduction, actually took place in the years after the revision of the Large-Scale Retail 
Stores Law. Our research hypothesis is presented below. 
If the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law has shaped the structure of the Japanese retail 
sector with respect to its large number of small retailers, then its revision should have 
                                                
4 In 2001, MITI was reorganized and renamed the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). 
5 Wholesale circuity refers to the number of separate title-holding intermediaries between a manufacturer and 
a retailer or individual demander. 
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led to the following developments in the Japanese distribution system: 
• More large stores: The number of large stores should have increased because 
regulatory constraints on size were relaxed. 
• Fewer small stores: The number of small stores should have declined because they 
were faced with increased competition from large stores and the loss of regulatory 
protection. 
• Shorter distribution channels: With the number of large retailers increasing, trade 
flows between manufacturers and retailers should have increasingly gone through 
one level of wholesalers only. Wholesale circuity should have improved.6 
• More direct sourcing: Direct sourcing between manufacturers and retailers should 
have increased due to large retailers’ channel power.7 Large retailers, because of 
their size, should have been able to force manufacturers to supply them directly. In 
addition, large retailers should no longer have depended on wholesalers as order 
placing and processing nodes because of the implementation of inter-firm EDI 
(electronic data interchange) systems linking manufacturers and retailers, and POS 
(point of sales) systems enabling retailers to make the right sourcing decision based 
on their analysis of the sales-related information gathered by POS systems. 
• Fewer wholesale establishments: The number of wholesale establishments should 
have declined as a result of the decline in the number of small retailers and because 
of shorter distribution channels and more direct sourcing. 
The main period of interest spans the years 1992 (the year the revised statute was 
enacted) to 2000 (the year the revised statute was replaced with the Law Concerning 
Measures by Large-Scale Retail Stores for Preservation of the Living Environment). 
However, to obtain a broader perspective, we take into account data from all years 
                                                
6 It is generally assumed that the number of separate title-holding intermediaries between a manufacturer and 
a retailer increases when the retailer is smaller. See also chapter 2. 
7 In this study, channel power is understood as the ability or the potential of a particular channel member to 
control or influence the decision-making and behavior of one or several other channel member(s). See more 
on channel power in chapter 2. 
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available, namely 1960 to 2004. 
1.3 Structure, main findings and limitations 
1.3.1 Structure and main findings 
We begin by presenting the theoretical background necessary for one to understand the 
discussion concerning the revision of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law (chapter 2). 
This background includes a discussion of the external factors shaping retailer size, 
including legislation, and the factors influencing the ability of retailers to either 
internalize wholesale functions or shift them to manufacturers. Based on the findings in 
the secondary literature, we develop a conceptual framework that is helpful for our 
analysis. Chapter 2 also includes an overview of the salient features of Japan’s postwar 
distribution system (1945-1990) and how other scholars explain them. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the role of the distribution system and the Large-Scale Retail 
Stores Law in Japan’s trade disputes with the United States. We review the history of 
the statute and introduce a number of developments, so-called associated changes, 
which have been assumed to further contribute to the changes in Japan’s distribution 
system. 
In chapter 4, we look for quantitative evidence to support our research hypothesis. We 
find that based on the statistics obtained for this study, the growth in the number of 
large retail establishments may be associated with the revision of the statute in 
question. However, the rate of change is found to be relatively small, and the causality 
between the revision of the statute and the change in the structure of the retail market is 
questioned. 
In considering the decline in the number of small, traditional retailers, we find that the 
revised statute cannot be identified as the primary reason for the change. The decline 
had already begun between 1982 and 1985: that is, before the implementation of the 
revised statute. 
Furthermore, we find that the number of wholesalers in all wholesaler categories except 
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one decreased after the implementation of the revised statute. However, there was a 
significant increase in the number of intermediate wholesalers that cannot be explained 
as a consequence of the implementation of the revised statute. 
With regards to wholesale circuity, we find that the ratios frequently used to assess the 
length of the distribution channels are not adequate to determine the internal structure 
of the wholesale sector. 
Due to a lack of data, we are unable to quantitatively confirm that developments in 
direct sourcing were related to the application of the statute in question. 
In chapter 5, we discuss those data analysis results that question or do not support our 
research hypothesis. These include the following results:  
(1) The slow rate of change in the number of large retail stores. 
(2) The initiation of a decrease in the number of small retailers prior to the 
implementation of the revised statute during the years 1982 – 1985. 
(3) The increase in intermediate wholesalers during the years studied. 
(4) Developments with respect to direct sourcing. 
The details of these four results are as follows: 
Result (1): We analyze the revised statute and associated changes in more detail and 
find that there are still a number of factors that limit the expansion of large stores. 
Result (2): We find that the decline in the number of small traditional retailers was 
caused by certain retail formats’ establishing competitive advantage over traditional 
small-scale retailers that traditionally had enjoyed the advantage. 
Result (3): We find that the end of Japan’s bubble economy led several businesses to 
assess their business profiles, which in turn led to an increase in intermediate 
wholesalers. 
Result (4): We conclude based on our qualitative analysis that direct sourcing did not 
significantly increase after the implementation of the revised statute. 
With these findings in mind, we suggest that the optimistic evaluations of the improved 
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ability of the Japanese distribution system to cater to the needs of large-scale retail 
establishments have been based on a number of misconceptions regarding the Japanese 
distribution system. 
1.3.2 Limitations 
The focus of this study is the Japanese distribution system for consumer goods sold to 
consumers through physical outlets. The study aims to analyze the impact of the revised 
statute on independent distribution channels including legally independent entities such 
as wholesalers and retailers. The impact of the revised statute on the number of agents 
or brokers is not studied. In addition, the impact of the revised statute on distribution 
keiretsu, intra-company distribution channels, mail order channels, and e-commerce 
channels is not a focus of this study. 
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2 Theoretical background 
Chapter 2.1 gives the reader the necessary theoretical background to understand the 
discussion concerning the revision of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law. The revision 
of the statute was expected to lead to an increase in the number of large retailers, which 
would force small retailers out of business, thereby causing the number of small 
retailers to decline, shorten distribution routes and initiate more direct sourcing.  
With regard to our research hypothesis, we focus on two questions. First, what 
(external) factors affect retailer size? Secondly, what factors influence the ability of 
retailers to alter sourcing routes (for example, by initiating direct sourcing)? Based on 
the evidence in the secondary literature, we then develop a framework that is useful for 
assessing these two questions, which are central to our research hypothesis. 
To apply the findings from chapter 2.1 to the Japanese context, we introduce Japan’s 
postwar distribution system and its salient features in chapter 2.2. This section is 
followed by an overview of the various explanations and theories proposed regarding 
these features. 
2.1 Determinants of retailer size and wholesaler channels 
The term “distribution system” refers to a system of interdependent organizations that 
carry out marketing activities to create and deliver value in the form of products and 
services to intermediate and ultimate customers or clients. For Stern and Reve (1980: 
55), the primary function of a distribution system in a society is to bridge the gap 
between production and consumption. 
Distribution systems are also referred to as marketing channels, distribution channels, 
business channels, and value chains.  
The participants in almost any distribution system can be classified as follows: 
• Retailers – These are individuals (or groups) who ultimately sell a product or 
service to end users or customers. They can be grouped according to ownership 
type (i.e., independent, franchise or chain store ownership), pricing philosophy (i.e., 
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discounts versus full-price offerings), product assortment (i.e., breadth and depth of 
product lines), and service level. 
• Wholesalers – These are intermediaries or middlemen who buy products from 
manufacturers and sell them to retailers. They take the same type of financial risk as 
retailers because they purchase the products, keep them in inventory until they are 
resold to retailers, and may arrange for shipment to those retailers. 
• Agents and/or brokers – These are intermediaries who connect suppliers to retailers. 
They do not take ownership of the products that they sell, and they are independent 
sales representatives who typically work on commission, with commissions based 
on sales volumes. They may sell to both wholesalers and retailers. 
Manufacturers can choose between various distribution arrangements to reach the end 
consumer. Retailers also have the option to source directly from the manufacturer or 
through wholesalers. The various types of distribution system structures can be 
distinguished from one another based on how participants are involved in the 
distribution channel: 
• Direct channel: The same company that manufactures a product sells it directly to 
the consumer or end user. 
• Retailer channel: The producer sells directly to retailers, who then sell the products 
to consumers. 
• Wholesaler channel: Manufacturers sell to wholesalers, who might sell either to 
other wholesalers or directly to retailers, who then sell to consumers. 
• Agent or broker channel: This type of arrangement can include producers selling to 
agents or agents selling to wholesalers, who sell to retailers, who then sell to 
consumers. 
Why and when do manufacturers and retailers include wholesalers in their distribution 
arrangement? According to marketing theory, manufacturers and/or retailers will 
include wholesalers in their distribution arrangement if the latter perform certain 
functions with higher levels of efficiency and/or effectiveness. Functions that 
wholesalers can perform for manufacturers include the following (see Stern, El-Ansary, 
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and Coughlan, 1996: 116-117). 
• Market coverage: If customers are spread over large geographic areas, 
manufacturers can achieve good market coverage and ensure the ready availability 
of products when needed at reasonable cost by relying on wholesalers instead of 
building up their own outside sales force. 
• Sales contact: If a manufacturer’s products are sold to a large number of customers 
spread over a large geographic area, manufacturers may be able to significantly 
reduce the cost of outside sales contacts by using wholesalers to cover all or a 
substantial portion of their customers. Manufacturer sales forces would then only 
need to call on a relatively small number of wholesalers rather than on a much 
larger number of customers. 
• Inventory holding: Manufacturers can reduce both their financial burden and the 
risk associated with holding large inventories by using wholesalers that take title to 
and stock the products by the manufacturers that they represent. Moreover, 
wholesalers can help manufacturers to better plan their production schedules by 
providing an available outlet for manufacturer products. 
• Order processing: Many customers buy in very small quantities regardless of the 
size specified by the manufacturer. Processing a large number of small orders can 
be too costly for manufacturers. When wholesalers carry products by many 
different manufacturers, the order-processing costs for wholesalers can be absorbed 
via the sale of a broader array of products than would be available from a single 
typical manufacturer. 
• Market information: Wholesalers are in a good position to learn about customer 
product and service requirements because they are often geographically quite close 
to their customers and because they often have regular contact with their customers 
through frequent sales calls. If the information that they thereby cull from their 
customer relationships is passed on to manufacturers, it can prove valuable for 
product planning, pricing, and developing competitive marketing strategies. 
• Customer support: In addition to buying products, customers may require many 
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kinds of service support (e.g., product exchange or return, set-up and adjustment, 
repairs, and technical assistance). For manufacturers to provide all of these services 
directly to large numbers of accounts can be very costly and ineffective. The 
alternative is for wholesalers to assist manufacturers in providing these services to 
customers. 
Manufacturers are not the only players who can potentially benefit from wholesaler 
actions. Retailers can also benefit from including wholesalers in their sourcing 
arrangements. 
• Product availability: Wholesalers are usually close (or closer than manufacturers) 
to retailers and sensitive to their needs. They can provide retailers with a level of 
product availability that would be hard for many manufacturers to match. 
• Assortment convenience: Wholesalers can bring together an assortment of 
products from a variety of manufacturers and thereby greatly simplify a retailer’s 
ordering tasks. Instead of having to order from a large number of manufacturers, 
retailers can limit their orders to a few general lines of specialty wholesalers that 
can provide them with the products they need. 
• Bulk breaking: Retailers most often do not need large quantities of particular 
products as part of a given order. Manufacturers, however, find it costly to sell 
directly to small-order customers; often they discourage small orders by 
establishing minimum order requirements. Wholesalers provide retailers with the 
ability to buy only in the quantities they need by purchasing large quantities from 
manufacturers and breaking these bulk orders into smaller quantities as required by 
the retailers. 
• Credit and finance: Wholesalers can assist retailers financially in two ways. First, 
they can extend open account credit on products sold. Second, they can stock and 
provide readily available products, thereby greatly reducing the financial inventory 
burden on their customers. Wholesalers sometimes also extend long-term credit, as 
in the toy industry (see Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan, 1996: 119). 
• Customer service: Wholesalers can save their retailers considerable effort and 
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expense by providing services such as delivery, repairs, and warranties to end-
consumers. 
• Advice and technical service: Wholesalers can support their customers by 
providing proper product use assistance to end-consumers through trained outside 
sales forces (see Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan, 1996: 117-118). 
• Merchandise management: High-performance wholesalers are very 
knowledgeable about retail merchandise management. Because they know precisely 
what to buy, they can minimize handling and inventory costs. 
• Sales activities: Wholesalers can support the sales activities of their retail 
customers by granting price concessions on featured items, providing POS 
promotional material, and designing cooperative advertising. Sometimes, unsold 
merchandise can be returned to wholesalers for full credit. 
• Store design: Wholesalers can support retailers in establishing store layout, 
building design, and material specifications. 
• Management functions: Wholesalers can offer retailers guidance regarding public 
relations, housekeeping and accounting methods, information systems, and 
administrative procedures. 
• Storage function: Reliance on wholesalers allows the conversion of storage space 
devoted to merchandise storage into profit-making sales or customer service space. 
• Access to a large number of manufacturers: Wholesalers can provide retailers 
with access to a large group of products from small manufacturers that might not 
otherwise be accessible to them. If large retailers were to decide to source such 
products directly, they might lose access to a wide range of small manufacturers 
because of retaliations from wholesalers.  
Stern and Reve (1980) note that the distribution of functions within a distribution 
channel among channel participants is the outcome of a process referred to as a channel 
internal economic process or decision mechanism. Agreement on the division of 
channel functions among members can be reached in impersonal, routine or habitual 
ways, via bargaining, or via centralized planning processes. Channel power, defined as 
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the potential to influence, is considered to play to a central role in the decision-making 
process (see Frazier, 1999). In this study, channel power is understood as the ability or 
potential of a particular channel member to control or influence the decision-making 
and behavior of one or several other channel member(s).8 
While wholesalers can be eliminated within a channel, the functions that they perform 
cannot be eliminated but must instead be shifted either forward or backward in the 
channel and assumed by other members (Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan 1996: 8). Such 
a shifting of function(s) leads to an increase in costs and requires the channel 
participant(s) assuming the functions to have the necessary resources (financial 
resources, know-how, and personnel). The increase in cost is justifiable to the extent 
that it may be necessary to provide the right quantity goods to customers at the right 
time and in the right place. 
The implications for our research hypothesis are as follows. When retailers internalize 
wholesaler functions, they need to have the necessary resources to efficiently and 
effectively perform those functions. When retailers want to shift wholesaler functions to 
manufacturers and make them bear the additional costs, they need to have the necessary 
power to do so. 
Retailer size (in terms of sales floor space) is viewed as an important factor in 
influencing both resources and power. The smaller the retailers, the more likely they are 
to include wholesalers in their sourcing arrangement because they probably lack the 
resources necessary to internalize wholesaler functions and the power to shift 
wholesaler functions to manufacturers (see, for example, Ito and Maruyama, 1990). 
Large retailers, on the other hand, may have the necessary resources and are viewed as 
having the necessary power by virtue of their size (see Galbraith, 1952) because they 
can threaten to deny manufacturers access to retailers’ markets (see Etgar, 1976). 
Retailer power can also stem, for example, from a favorable image or information 
advantage. 
                                                
8 See more on channel power in chapter 2.2. 
 18 
To summarize, retailers, to be able to internalize wholesaler functions, need to have the 
necessary resources. Furthermore, to be able to shift wholesaler functions to 
manufacturers, they need to have power to do so. Power and resources are assumed to 
increase with size. Resources, however, cannot only be the result of size but are also 
considered a prerequisite for it. Both resources and power affect wholesale circuity, 
defined as the number of separate title-holding intermediaries between a manufacturer 
and a retailer. It is assumed that the more resources and power retailers possess, the 
more wholesaler functions are either internalized or shifted to manufacturers by 
retailers and the smaller wholesale circuity is. In the case of direct business transactions 
between the manufacturer and retailers, wholesale circuity is zero. 
One important factor shaping retailer size is, as our research hypothesis suggests, 
legislation (in the Japanese case, the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law). The impact of 
legislation on retailer size and retail structure9 in various countries is well documented 
(e.g., Leunis and Francois, 1988; Hollander and Ohmura, 1989; Davies and Harris, 
1990; Treadgold and Sanghavi, 1990; Davies and Itoh, 2001). Such legislation is 
usually intended to restrict large-scale retailing businesses. Planning legislation restricts 
the ability of retailers to build larger outlets, while pricing legislation affects the ability 
of large retailers to use their purchasing power to gain competitive advantage by 
offering lower prices. In the United States, the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits sales 
that use price to discriminate between the sales of goods to different, equally situated 
distributors when the effect of such sales is to reduce competition. The act grew out of 
practices in which chain stores were allowed to purchase goods at lower prices than 
other retailers. Laws such as the Loi Royer in France, the Loi Cadenas in Belgium, and 
Germany!s Baunutzungsverordnung limit retail development to a certain size. In The 
Netherlands, the number of stores in each area is limited by population size (see Lyle, 
1995). Both planning and pricing legislation restrict the power of large-scale retailers to 
                                                
9 We define this as the ratio of the total number of fixed shops to that of the population. Such a measure 
reflects retail concentration (often the market share of the top 5 or top 10 retailers) and store size, the two 
targets of the revised statute. 
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use any economies of scale or scope10 that can be derived from the nature of their 
operations (see Davies and Itoh, 2001: 83).  
In a market unrestricted by any regulations (or in one that is only limitedly or vaguely 
regulated), the number of small-scale retail businesses is expected to fall over time 
because larger retail stores are more economical and cost-efficient to operate due to 
economies of scale. Furthermore, because small-scale retailers tend to purchase via 
wholesalers more often than their larger rivals (which, in an unconstrained market, can 
negotiate preferential discounts in direct negotiation with suppliers), legislation directed 
toward the retail sector can have an indirect, unintentional impact on the wholesale 
sector as well (see Davies and Itoh, 2001: 84-85). The greater the number of large 
retailers, the less dependent the retail sector becomes on the wholesale sector and the 
greater the power of retailers within the distribution channel. 
The concept of power is a major research area not only in research on distribution 
systems, but also in the study of organizations and the interactions of organization 
members in general. Gaski (1984) defines power simply as the ability to get someone to 
do something he/she would not have done otherwise. 
Distribution channel power theory was developed in the 1960s based on the behavioral 
sciences (see, for example, Beier and Stern, 1969; Hunt and Nevin, 1974). This field 
experienced a revival with the development of information technology (IT) (see, for 
example, Gaski, 1984). Channel power, then, refers to the extent of one channel 
member’s ability to influence decision variables of another channel member at a 
different level of distribution (see Stern, El-Ansary, and Coughlan, 1996).  
Sources of power are those resources that firms can use to influence one another in 
channel relationships. Power can stem from heavily demanded products, access to 
target markets, or size. A large retailer has more power than many of its suppliers by 
virtue of its size because it can, for example, make large-volume purchases (see Keh 
                                                
10 Economies of scale are cost advantages that a firm enjoys due to expansion. Economies of scope refer to 
the reduction of per-unit costs through the production of a wider variety of goods or services. 
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and Park, 1998: 103). 
There are various classifications of sources of power. French and Raven (1959) suggest 
a taxonomy comprised of coercive, reward, legitimate, expert, and referent power: 
• Coercive power is the ability to mete out punishment. 
• Reward power is the ability to bestow rewards. 
• Legitimate power is based on the target’s belief that the actor exercising its power 
has the right to do so. 
• Expert power is based on the target’s belief that the actor exercising its power has 
special knowledge. 
• Referent power is based on the target’s identification with the power holder. 
Applied to distribution channels, such sources of power could stem from the following 
sources: 
• Coercive power: A large retailer, for example, might force a small manufacturer to 
offer a price discount, indicating that otherwise, no further orders would be made 
and the small manufacturer’s products would not be accepted anymore. 
• Reward power: A channel member can positively reinforce another member’s 
performance by providing a price break, paying a fee for additional shelf space, or 
granting a bonus if a certain goal is met. 
• Expert power: Channel members possessing special expertise can persuasively 
argue about likely sales volumes, market trends, or price levels. 
• Legitimate power: Legitimate power usually involves the government granting 
certain rights to a certain group of channel members. 
• Referent power: Referent power stems from the desire to be associated with a 
certain channel member. A manufacturer may, for example, be highly motivated to 
ensure the availability of its product at a renowned department store. 
Sibley and Michie (1981) dichotomize power sources into two groups: coercive (i.e., 
punishment-related) and non-coercive (i.e., reward-related) sources. Coercive sources 
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tend to be potential punishments meted out by one firm as perceived by another 
(receiving) firm. Coercive power sources are potential and not necessarily actual 
punishments. These punishments can be used to achieve greater channel member 
performance. However, there is an inherent danger that they will lower performance 
levels. The use of coercive power also tends to provoke increased conflict in a dyad. 
Non-coercive sources are characterized by a firm’s willingness to yield to the influence 
of another firm. Non-coercive sources often manifest in the form of assistance from one 
channel member to another channel member, helping the latter perform better. For 
example, if a manufacturer successfully helps a dealer to administer his/her business, 
the former establishes him/herself as an expert in the eyes of the latter and thus 
legitimizes his/her efforts in the channel. The dealer will be more receptive to rewards 
by the manufacturer. 
Brown, Lusch, and Nicholson (1995) adopt a mediated and non-mediated typology. 
This dichotomy reflects whether the source of power does or does not control the 
reinforcements guiding a target’s behavior. Mediated power sources include rewards, 
coercion and legal legitimacy, while non-mediated sources of power include expertise, 
references, information and traditional legitimacy. The use of mediated power will 
foster instrumental commitment or extrinsic motivation. Empirical evidence suggests 
that more powerful firms more frequently use mediated power; it also suggests that the 
excessively frequent use of mediated power is likely to damage the relationship, 
causing channel conflict. The use of non-mediated power enhances positive attitudes 
toward channel relationships, elevating normative commitment. Intrinsic factors 
become more central, whereas extrinsic factors become less important. 
A firm does not necessarily have to exercise its influence to have power; it must only 
possess the ability to do so. The power of a channel member is not a given. Certain 
structural and industry variables affect the distribution of power, as does the legal and 
regulatory framework. As Etgar (1976) points out, the dynamics of power relationships 
can create situations of interdependency. For example, individual retailers that are too 
small to constitute a threat on their own can form a coalition, threaten to boycott 
manufacturers and counterbalance those manufacturers’ power. 
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Channel power theory, however, is not universally accepted. Gaski (1984) points out 
several related methodological problems and conceptual issues as follows. 
• Poor operationalization: Power may be an inherently difficult attribute to measure. 
The idea of the “ability to alter behavior” is hard to operationalize. 
• Insufficient evidence of reliability and validity: Most of the research reviewed by 
Gaski (1984) provides content validity but little else. 
• Informant bias: Nearly all research reviews collected data based on key informants. 
In this methodology, the scientist obtains information about the group under study 
through a member who occupies a certain role to gain information. Such 
methodology is, however, extremely undependable, and it may produce biased 
results. 
Nevertheless, the concept of power in distribution channels is frequently encountered in 
studies of the Japanese distribution system and is therefore worth introducing. In this 
study, channel power is understood as the ability or potential of a particular channel 
member to control or influence the decision-making and behavior of one or several 
other channel member(s). 
Returning to the question of what factors influence retailer size, we see that legislation 
is only one of a number of factors (see, for example, Treadgold, 1990). Other factors 
mentioned in the secondary literature are the geographic environment, including 
available space for building retail establishments and roads (see, for example, Flath and 
Nariu, 1996); shopping habits, shaped by consumer preferences, consumption patterns 
and shopping frequency (see, for example, Fahy and Taguchi, 1991); and technology, 
e.g., the technology of mass production, which has necessitated the establishment of 
large-scale retailers, or information technology (IT), that can only be efficiently 
adopted by large-scale retail operations (see, for example, Miwa, 2002). 
Shopping habits and technology can also be a source of power. When consumers favor 
certain retail formats or certain retailers, then the retailers’ channel power increases 
because their importance as gatekeepers increases. Information technology can also 
increase retailers’ power. For example, when retailers collect and analyze data on their 
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customers, they can deduce potentially profitable information from these data and gain 
an information advantage over manufacturers and wholesalers. 
Needless to say, the list of factors affecting retailer size mentioned above is not 
exhaustive. Firm-specific factors such as decision-making processes, strategy, or 
organization are not considered at all. While every theoretically reasonable suggestion 
for a factor can probably be shown to have the predicted impact in some context, the 
level of complexity at play increases with the number of factors taken into 
consideration. One way to deal with this complexity (and the approach we take in this 
study) is to focus on a smaller set of specific factors, as outlined in the framework 
below, rather than attempting a full explanation. 
Graph 1: Conceptual framework 
 
Source: Own graph. 
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2.2 Research on the Japanese distribution system 
2.2.1 Research on distribution systems11 
The earliest systematic theories regarding the structure and coordination of distribution 
channels date back to the early 20th century. Between 1900 and 1950, early 
institutional economists such as John Commons, Joseph Schumpeter, and Ronald Coase 
contributed some of the basic concepts and principles that became a foundation for 
subsequent research. In addition to these more general concepts regarding the structure 
and coordination of networks, a number of economic principles were defined during 
that period. These include Margaret Hall’s principle of minimized total transaction and 
Edith Penrose’s theory of firm growth. 
In the 1960s, two main streams of research emerged, namely studies of the economic 
structure of distribution channels and studies of the characteristics and evolution of 
distribution systems and institutions. Towards the end of the 1960s and in the 1970s, 
the focus of channel research shifted to channel control and the behavioral dimensions 
of channels. This shift reflected new phenomena in distribution, such as competition 
among manufacturers and large retailers for channel control or conflicts in franchised 
distribution systems. 
The 1980s introduced a second wave of behavioral studies. The focus was on 
transaction costs and the nature of the costs of inter-organizational governance. 
Scholars such as Dixon and Wilkinson linked behavioral dimensions such as power, 
trust and conflict and economic dimensions to a framework of political economy 
comprised of multiple actors: internal and external channel polities and an economy 
that all interacted in various ways. 
Last but not least, a number of institutional studies were undertaken that examined the 
structure and performance of business networks and relationships in different cultural 
                                                
11 The following overview is based on Wilkinson (2001). 
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and economic contexts. 
The 1990s saw greater integration of various research traditions. Interest in the area of 
relationships and networks exploded as relationship marketing in industrial and 
consumer markets emerged, and greater emphasis was placed on cooperative rather 
than adversarial relations. 
Today, we have a better understanding of the efficiencies or economic rationale 
underlying the division of tasks and the assortment of activities within and between 
firms in a given distribution system. Governance structures12 in marketing channels can 
be analyzed in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. Existing network structures can be 
understood in terms of trade-offs within and between the efficiencies of alternative 
operating and governance structures (Wilkinson, 2001: 40-41). 
Most models and theories of business networks focus on a comparative static analysis, 
on the nature of economic equilibriums and on the factors affecting such equilibriums. 
It is assumed that in the long term, under competitive conditions, an efficient 
equilibrium structure will somehow emerge. If conditions change and lead to the 
development of another equilibrium, the network will shift to that new equilibrium in 
the long run. However, the duration of the “long run” is unclear, and we do not know 
whether a network will ever reach such an equilibrium or how many possible equilibria 
may exist. 
With the emergence of the Asian economies as world players, research on the nature 
and role of relationships and networks in Asian cultures has increased, where such 
features have been assumed to play a prominent role in business (see Wilkinson, 2001: 
37). These studies suggest that in networks in Asia, especially in Japan, additional 
dimensions of relationships are important. 
 
                                                
12 Governance structures are specialized institutional arrangements that arise depending on emergent scope 
and scale efficiencies. 
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2.2.2 Salient features of the postwar Japanese distribution system 
While there is a wide range of research topics in the area of distribution systems, 
studies of the Japanese distribution system have centered on understanding and 
justifying its uniqueness. 
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To review the research on the postwar Japanese distribution system, it is necessary to 
first introduce and outline the salient features of the Japanese distribution system in 
more detail, namely the large number of small retailers, the multi-layered wholesale 
sector, distribution keiretsu and specific trade practices. 
1. A large number of small retailers 
One of the most frequently cited characteristics of the Japanese distribution system as 
compared to those of other advanced countries is its large number of small retail stores 
(see Goldman, 1991: 156). Flath (1990) reports that in 1982, there were 145.3 retail 
stores per 10’000 persons in Japan compared to 82.9 in the United States, 62.7 in the 
United Kingdom, 74.8 in France and 67.0 in West Germany. 
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Small-scale retailers are especially prevalent in the food sector, and leading retailers 
dominate the market much less heavily than they do in the United States and the United 
Kingdom (Jetro, 2004: 6). 
Having a large numbers of small retail stores is regarded as backward and unusual for 
an economy as advanced as Japan’s. As Kikkawa and Takaoka (1998: 102) write, the 
Japanese retail business structure retains features of quasi- or less-developed 
economies, featuring many small-sized retail stores that are often family-owned. 
2. A multi-layered wholesale sector 
The second salient feature of the Japanese distribution system is its multi-layered 
wholesale sector. Japanese distribution channels are generally longer and involve more 
participants than their Western equivalents (see Fahy and Taguchi 1995: 50). 
Wholesale organizations not only are large in number but also tend to exhibit an 
extremely wide range of sizes. Very large and highly integrated general wholesale 
organizations co-exist with small organizations engaged in the local distribution of one 
product only. The large and highly integrated general wholesale organizations are also 
commonly referred to as general trading companies (s!g! sh!sha). The basic functions 
of s!g! sh!sha include trade promotion, market consulting, inventory maintenance, 
freight forwarding, information gathering, and technology acquisition (Dowd 1959: 
260). 
Ito and Maruyama (1990) distinguish between primary, secondary and tertiary 
wholesalers (see Graph 2). 
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Graph 2: The multi-layered Japanese distribution system 
 
Source: Based on Ito and Maruyama, 1990. 
Primary wholesalers may be manufacturer’s subsidiaries that deal exclusively with the 
manufacturer’s brand or that deals with brands from various manufacturers. General 
trading companies (s!g! sh!sha) are also considered primary wholesalers.  
Secondary wholesalers are typically regional distributors. They consolidate a variety 
of goods purchased from primary wholesalers and distribute the merchandise to 
medium-sized retail outlets and/or to a vast network of sub-wholesalers (i.e., tertiary 
wholesalers). Although many secondary wholesalers are sizeable, they fail to buy 
directly from manufacturers because of the exclusive rights of primary wholesalers (see 
Kikuchi, 1994: 2). 
Tertiary wholesalers are typically local distributors. They deliver a wide assortment of 
goods in small quantities to so-called “mom-and-pop” stores. They also maintain large 
inventories, make quick deliveries, accept unsold goods, and send some of their 
employees to help promote special sales for mom-and-pop stores (see Ito and 
Maruyama, 1990; Fahy and Taguchi, 1995). 
Table 1 shows the official classification system developed by the Japanese Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which distinguishes between primary and 
secondary wholesalers. Direct trade wholesalers and source wholesalers are sub-
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categories of primary wholesalers, while direct trade wholesalers and direct trade 
wholesalers that serve retailers in particular are sub-categories of direct trade 
wholesalers. Intermediate wholesalers and final wholesalers are sub-categories of 
secondary wholesalers. 
Table 1 and Graph 3 provide an overview of the official classification of Japanese 
wholesalers and the distribution routes. The terminology adopted in this work matches 
this official classification.  
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Table 1: The official classification of Japanese wholesalers and distribution routes 
Wholesale level Distribution route (sourcing from) Distribution route (selling to) 
1.Primary wholesale  
第一次卸 
1.1 Direct trade wholesalers 
直取引卸 
  
Sourcing from producers 
生産業者から仕入れ 
Selling to industrial users 
生産使用者へ販売 
Sourcing from producers 
生産業者から仕入れ 
Selling to overseas 
国外へ販売 
Sourcing from overseas 
外国から仕入れ 
Selling to industrial users 
生産使用者へ販売 
1.1.1 Direct trade wholesalers 
他部門直取引（取引先が他の産業であ
る直取引卸） 
Sourcing from overseas 
外国から仕入れ 
Selling overseas 
国外へ販売 
Sourcing from producers 
生産業者から仕入れ 
Selling to retailers 
小売業者へ販売 
1.1.2 Direct trade wholesale to retailers 
小売直取引（販売先が小売業者である
直取引卸） Sourcing from overseas 
外国から仕入れ 
Selling to retailers 
小売業者へ販売 
Sourcing from producers 
生産業者から仕入れ 
Selling to wholesalers 
卸売業者へ販売 
1.2 Source wholesalers 
元卸 
Sourcing from overseas 
外国から仕入れ 
Selling to wholesalers 
卸売業者へ販売 
2. Secondary wholesale level 
第二次卸 
2.1 Itermediate wholesalers 
中間卸 
Sourcing from wholesalers 
卸売業者から仕入れ 
Selling to wholesalers 
卸売業者へ販売 
Sourcing from wholesalers 
卸売業者から仕入れ 
Selling to industrial users 
生産使用者へ販売 
Sourcing from wholesalers 
卸売業者から仕入れ 
Selling overseas 
国外へ販売 
2.2 Final wholesalers 
最終卸 
Sourcing from wholesalers 
卸売業者から仕入れ 
Selling to retailers 
小売業者へ販売 
3. Other wholesalers 
その他の卸 
Sourcing from producers 
生産業者から仕入れ 
Selling to the head office / branches of their own 
company 
同一企業内の本支店へ販売 
Sourcing from the parent company  
生産業者のうち親会社から仕入れ 
Selling to to the head office / branches of their 
own company 同一企業内の本支店へ販売 
Sourcing from other producers 
生産業者のうちその他の生産業者から仕
入れ 
Selling to to the head office / branches of their 
own company 同一企業内の本支店へ販売 
Sourcing from wholesalers 
卸売業者から仕入れ 
Selling to the head office / branches of their own 
company 
同一企業内の本支店へ販売 
3.1 Wholesalers selling goods to their own 
company 
販売先が同一企業である卸 
Sourcing from overseas 
外国から仕入れ 
Selling to the head office / branches of their own 
company 
同一企業内の本支店へ販売 
Sourcing from the head office or branches of 
their own company 
同一企業内の本支店から仕入れ 
Selling to the head office or branches of their own 
company 
同一企業内の本支店へ販売 
Sourcing from the head office or branches of 
their own company 
同一企業内の本支店から仕入れ 
Selling to wholesalers 
卸売業者へ販売 
Sourcing from the head office or branches of 
their own company 
同一企業内の本支店から仕入れ 
Selling to retailers 
小売業者へ販売 
Sourcing from the head office or branches of 
their own company 
同一企業内の本支店から仕入れ 
Selling to industrial users 
生産使用者へ販売 
3.2 Wholesalers purchasing goods from 
their own company 
仕入先が同一企業内である卸 
Sourcing from the headquarter or subsidiary 
同一企業内の本支店から仕入れ 
Selling overseas 
国外へ販売 
Sourcing goods produced in own establishment 
自店内製造品を仕入 
Selling goods to head office or branches their own 
company 
同一企業内の本支店へ販売 
Sourcing goods produced in own establishment 
自店内製造品を仕入 
Selling to wholesalers 
卸売業者へ販売 
Sourcing goods produced in own establishment 
自店内製造品を仕入 
Selling to retailers 
小売業者へ販売 
Sourcing goods produced in own establishment 
自店内製造品を仕入 
Selling to industrial users 
生産使用者へ販売 
3. 3 Wholesalers selling goods 
manufactured in own establishment 
自店内製造品の販売 
Sourcing goods produced in own establishment 
自店内製造品を仕入 
Selling abroad 
国外へ販売  
Source: The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). 
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Graph 3: The official classification of Japanese wholesalers and distribution routes 
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Source: The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). 
Fahy and Taguchi (1995: 50) have reported that in the 1980s, Japan featured an average 
of 2.21 wholesaler steps between producers and retailers, while the United States, 
France, and the former West Germany averaged 1.0, 0.73, and 0.90, respectively. This 
means that Japanese wholesalers sold their goods twice as frequently to other 
wholesalers as did their counterparts overseas. Therefore, total wholesaler sales volume 
was larger in Japan than in other countries. Min (1996: 23) reports that in 1988, total 
wholesaler sales volume in Japan was estimated to be 3.1 times total retail sales 
volume, while United States’ wholesaler sales volume was about the same as retail 
sales volume. 
Longer wholesale marketing channels with more participants than in the Western 
 32 
countries translate into a larger number of wholesale steps13 and more frequent trading 
between wholesalers (see Nariu and Flath, 1993: 95; Fahy and Taguchi, 1995: 50; Min, 
1996: 23). 
The contribution of each player’s additional margin is frequently cited as one reason for 
elevated consumer prices in Japan (see Fahy and Taguchi, 1995: 50).  Frequent trading 
among wholesalers is also considered to represent a major entry barrier for Japanese 
and foreign players. According to Min (1996: 23), unlike the typical US distribution 
channel, which is open, independent, and margin-driven, the Japanese distribution 
channel can be characterized as a long, complicated network of relationship-driven 
middlemen who closely interact with fellow-trade wholesalers, brokers, manufacturers, 
importers, and retailers.  
3. Distribution keiretsu 
The tendency of manufacturers to play a more dominant rule in the distribution of their 
products was accentuated in a number of industries after World War II and resulted in 
what is referred to as distribution keiretsu. Distribution keiretsu prevail, although not 
exclusively, in consumer electronics, household appliances, and pharmaceuticals (see 
Fahy and Taguchi 1995: 50-51). Overall, however, independent or non-keiretsu 
distribution channels are more common than keiretsu distribution channels. 
According to Kunitomo (1997: 887), keiretsu manufacturers sell products only to 
wholesalers that belong to their own business groups, and the wholesalers sell mainly to 
retail outlets in their business group.  
Ishida (1983: 322) defines distribution keiretsu as: 
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13  The concept of the ”number of wholesale steps“ refers to the number of separate title-holding 
intermediaries interposed between a manufacturer and retailers or between industrial purchasers. See Nariu 
and Flath (1993: 91-92). 
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Distribution keiretsu exist in multiple industries, not just in the consumer goods 
industry. Some manufacturers of industrial goods also set up keiretsu groupings to 
distribute their goods. Ishida (1983: 323) has defined a distribution keiretsu in the 
consumer goods market as opposed to an industrial or horizontal keiretsu14 as follows: 
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According to Niida (2002), the formation of the keiretsu distribution system in the 
consumer goods industry system took place between 1955 and 1965. One of the best-
known distribution keiretsu is the Matsushita distribution keiretsu. Matsushita, together 
with Sany", Sharp, Hitachi, T"shiba, Mitsubishi, and Fuji, belonged to the group of so-
called “general appliance manufacturers.” These manufacturers produced a wide range 
of appliances, including the three highly sought-after appliances (washing machines, 
refrigerators, and black-and-white TV sets) that became popular from 1953 onwards 
(see Niida 2002: 81). All manufacturers were successful in establishing mass 
production systems by building specialized factories for each different product, 
strengthening a subcontractor system for module-based production (also called 
production keiretsu), and continuing to develop new appliances. However, they found it 
difficult to market these new products (see Niida 2002: 82-83). Most (though not all) of 
the general appliance manufacturers set up keiretsu distribution systems to cope with 
this challenge. 
Manufacturers have adopted different strategies to organize distributors at the 
wholesale and retail levels:  
                                                
14 Horizontal keiretsu are usually organized around a bank and consist of a variety of companies that perform 
different functions in diverse fields. 
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• Exclusivity at the wholesale level: Manufacturers incorporate existing wholesale 
establishments into their exclusive distribution system by (a) becoming major 
shareholders, (b) offering financial support, and (c) providing temporary staffing. 
Wholesalers are consolidated by district and are operated as exclusive sales outlets 
that will not handle the products of other manufacturers. 
• Non-exclusivity at the retail level: A keiretsu retailer can sell another 
manufacturer’s products, but the ratio of keiretsu product sales generally exceeds 
60%. The retailer has to display the manufacturer’s signage to be easily identified 
as a keiretsu store (see Niida, 2002: 83ff). Manufacturers generally have two 
requirements, namely that retailers: 
! Make a conscious effort to increase sales volume for the manufacturer’s brand. 
! Increase customer satisfaction. 
When the United States tried to correct its trade imbalance with Japan, distribution 
keiretsu became one focus of attention. Japanese manufacturers were blamed for 
excluding foreign manufacturers by locking up existing distributors in their keiretsu. It 
was argued that through these networks, they maintained extraordinarily opaque 
relationships characterized by customary norms involving trade support, price 
concessions, return policies, and even seconded employees; in addition, they imposed 
contractual terms that excluded rivals, both foreign and domestic (see Miwa and 
Ramseyer, 2001: 3-4). 
Various studies have confirmed that the existence of distribution keiretsu has had an 
effect on the ability of foreign companies to enter the Japanese market and has 
influenced their means of entry (see, for example, Nagaoka and Goto, 1997). Lawrence 
(1991) identifies both horizontal and vertical types of keiretsu as reducing imports.15 
                                                
15 The vertical keiretsu is usually composed of a major industrial corporation and its suppliers or distributors 
and/or retailers in a particular industry, such as automobiles or electronics. Vertical keiretsu can be further 
subdivided into supply keiretsu and distribution keiretsu. Supply keiretsu are groups of companies that are 
integrated along a supply chain dominated by a major manufacturer such as Toyota, Nissan, T"shiba, or 
Hitachi. In contrast to supply keiretsu, which share interlocking interests with their upstream suppliers, 
distribution keiretsu develop a web of relationships with their downstream distributors and retail outlets. 
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Flath (2002b) identified an empirical relationship between foreign direct investment 
(FDI)16 in Japanese wholesaling, distribution keiretsu and import penetration. The same 
applies to the Japanese retail market: wholesale marketing channels for consumer 
products tend to employ more foreign wholesale affiliates, and those that feature more 
retail outlets tend to have lower import penetration rates. This indicates that 
impediments to foreign exporters in Japanese wholesaling may still be present in 1997. 
Flath (2002b) further reports that about one-third of the 1’372 large foreign subsidiaries 
operating in Japan in 1997 were primarily engaged in wholesaling. Wholesale affiliates 
of foreign firms comprise a significant portion of the stock of foreign direct investment 
in Japan. At the same time, import penetration itself is less likely in these markets. 
Almost 90% of imports into Japan involve foreign purchases by Japanese wholesale 
establishments. Foreign purchases by general trading companies amounted to 19 trillion 
yen and accounted for a little more than half of all foreign purchases by Japanese 
wholesalers in 1997. 
Flath (2002b) concludes that marketing channels in Japan with a higher incidence of 
distribution keiretsu are more likely than others to include wholesalers that are 
subsidiaries of foreign manufacturing companies. In other words, the foreign 
penetration of Japanese product markets that feature distribution keiretsu is likely to be 
accompanied by direct investment. Foreign affiliates in Japan’s wholesale industries are 
heavily concentrated in a few lines of business, including machinery, medical 
instruments, precision instruments, automobiles, automobile parts, electric appliances, 
and toiletries.  
                                                
16 In comparison with that of other industrial countries, the foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing into 
Japan in recent years has been very limited in proportion to the gross national product (GNP). It is also very 
limited in comparison to the outflow of FDI from Japan. From a cumulative table indicating the outflow of 
FDI during the years from 1990 to 1996, we see that Japan is in fourth position behind the United States, the 
U.K., and France, but in a cumulative table for inflowing FDI during the same period, Japan ranks 21st 
behind countries like New Zealand, Switzerland, Portugal, Poland, and Hungary. A study by the Japan 
Development Bank shows that the outflow of FDI from Japan in the 1990s was 15.5 times greater than the 
inflow of FDI into Japan. 
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4. Specific trade practices and symbiotic relationships 
The fourth salient feature of the Japanese distribution system is the use of certain trade 
practices by channel participants. Fahy and Taguchi (1995: 50) have listed the 
following most common trade practices: 
• Henpin is a liberal return policy that extends not only to damaged goods but also to 
products that are not selling well. Retailers can return goods to manufacturers 
through wholesalers. 
• Tegata (or promissory notes) are a form of buyer credit that is good for up to 120 
days.  
• Tatene (or resale price maintenance, RPM) is a mechanism through which 
manufacturers determine the final price that retailers must charge consumers.  
• Rebates are issued to wholesalers and retailers for meeting sales targets, paying on 
time, following manufacturer pricing policies, or adopting certain marketing 
techniques. They may also be offered as compensation for loyalty to a 
manufacturer. Rebates are negotiated privately with each intermediary and are not 
based on objective criteria. 
Trade practices are applied within both distribution keiretsu and independent or non-
keiretsu distribution channels. They have attracted substantial attention both from the 
Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC)17 and from Western countries. While these 
practices are regarded as potentially advantageous for the Japanese parties involved, 
foreign firms consider them a disadvantage when doing business in Japan. Sletmo and 
Ibghy (1991) write that distribution in Japan relies extensively on practices that are 
viewed as illegal under North American and European competition legislation. 
The practice of tatene (or resale price maintenance agreement, RPM) has been heavily 
criticized in particular. In Japan, resale price maintenance falls under the category of 
                                                
17 The Japan Fair Trade Commission enforces the Antimonopoly Act to maintain fair and free competition in 
Japan. See www.jftc.go.jp. 
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unfair trade practices prohibited by Section 19 of the Antimonopoly Act (AMA, the 
Japanese Competition Law) and is therefore illegal (see OECD, 1997). The AMA 
exempts certain cases under specific conditions from the general prohibition on RPM. 
The system for exempting certain types of RPM was introduced in 1953 (see Yoshino 
1971: 119ff). Since the middle of the 1960s, the JFTC has at several times repealed 
some of the designated commodities. As the JFTC began to reduce the number of 
products for which resale price maintenance was allowed, some producers of these 
products began to develop and strengthen distribution keiretsu arrangements as a means 
of maintaining vertical price-fixing on a de facto basis (see Ishida 1983: 323).18  
Tatene is seen as a potent weapon for manufacturers to establish and maintain control 
over distribution channels. Yoshino (1971: 120) writes that large manufacturers engage 
in covert attempts to control prices and terms of sales at various levels in the channel, 
even in those industries in which RPM is not legally permitted. He further writes that 
the power of large manufacturers in comparison with distributors is substantial and that 
they are in the position to exert strong pressure on recalcitrant companies. They can 
even refuse to sell to non-responsive distributors. Enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly 
Act is generally low, but the JFTC has intervened in some cases, as in 1967 when it 
accused Matsushita Electric of specifying the wholesale price and rebate structure to be 
followed by the outlets under its control and refusing to ship products to violators (see 
Yoshino, 1971: 123). 
According to Fahy and Taguchi (1995: 52), manufacturers exert pressure on channel 
participants if necessary. Manufacturers’ emphasis, however, is on maintaining friendly 
and close personal relationships with channel members. These relationships are 
nurtured by frequent visits, gifts, and support in difficult times. The maintenance of the 
relationship is considered more important than sales levels. Such close relationships 
represent a particularly difficult barrier for new or foreign suppliers to overcome. 
Kennedy (1993) concludes that distribution channels in Japan, with their multiple 
                                                
18 For an explanation of the economic logic behind resale price maintenance, see Flath and Nariu (2000). 
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layers of wholesalers that have developed close, personal relationships with other 
wholesalers, manufacturers, importers, and retailers, are as inefficient as they are 
complex. For Verity (1988), the Japanese distribution system is essentially a product of 
Japan’s traditional way of doing business; it includes an emphasis on close personal 
contact, trust in initiating business dealings, and meticulous after-sales service. Because 
they seek to maintain friendly ties with their suppliers, retailers hesitate to disrupt their 
longstanding personal relationships with Japanese suppliers, even when foreign 
companies offer superior products or price differentials. They fear a perceived lack of 
sincere commitment, breakdowns in communication, or reprisals from long-term 
partners if they are found to sell foreign products (see Martin, Howard, and Herbig, 
1998). 
2.2.3 Explaining the Japanese distribution system 
Studies of the Japanese distribution system - both in Japanese and in other languages - 
are too numerous to be reviewed. Research on the Japanese distribution system can 
roughly be divided into two major perspectives, namely the cultural view and the 
economic view. The economic view interprets the Japanese distribution system (or 
certain aspects of it) as an efficient adaptation to Japan’s legal, social, economic and/or 
geographic environment. For proponents of the cultural view, the structure and inner 
workings of the Japanese distribution system are a result of Japanese tradition and 
culture. Japanese trade practices, for example, are seen as being heavily shaped by 
tradition and culture (see Marvel, 1993: 156ff). Although inefficient, they are 
immutable and slow to change (see Kitchell, 1995: 199). These practices have survived 
because group harmony, long-standing hierarchical relationships, and social obligations 
are more important in Japan than short-term profitability.  
Samiee and Mayo (1990: 48) write that social considerations encompass personal 
relationships that frequently precede commercial transactions. According to Martin, 
Howard, and Herbig (1998), strong personal relationships between channel members 
and the pooling and sharing of information have their roots in traditional rural village 
life, where the planting, irrigation and harvesting of rice were activities that had to be 
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collaborative. The channel members are part of a family (ie) and are as tightly 
interlocked by tradition as they are by emotion. Eliminating a channel member is 
regarded as a traumatic and tragic decision. The eliminated channel members may be 
unable to bear the social consequences of the resultant damage to their pride. Thus, 
small and inefficient channel members are often retained and tolerated. Goldman 
(1991: 165) writes that in Japan, distribution activities are viewed as a subset of social, 
personal and political activities rather than as a separate sphere. Non-economic 
considerations are a legitimate part of decision-making. Performance is not exclusively 
evaluated in economic-functional terms. Because of the importance of tradition, the fact 
that a certain practice or arrangement exists in itself justifies its continuation. Goldman 
attributes the dominance of manufacturers to the various types of social and economic 
power that are rooted in Japanese values. In accordance with the Chinese- and 
Confucianism-inspired four-tiered caste system (shin!k!sh!) introduced in Tokugawa 
Japan (1603-1868)19, not only did the manufacturing class enjoy higher prestige than 
the merchant class, but the hierarchical-vertical authority structure and group loyalty 
also further strengthened the position of manufacturers as channel leaders. 
According to Samiee and Mayo (1990), Japanese culture emphasizes friendship, trust, a 
                                                
19 In 1615 a Chinese-inspired four-tiered caste system known as shin!k!sh! (“warrior-peasant-artisan-
merchant”) was introduced in Japan. At the top was the samurai class, responsible for all military and 
political functions and accounting for about 6% of the population. Peasants were regarded as the essential 
producers, and consequently, they ranked higher than artisans and merchants. The justification for this higher 
ranking was that peasants nurtured the country and thereby provided income for the samurai. Peasants 
accounted for the bulk of the population. The artisans produced material objects and were therefore seen as 
more useful than the merchants. Because merchants “only” moved objects around and made them available 
for purchase, they were considered the least important of the classes (see Henshall, 1999: 51). Within each 
class, there were various sub-rankings. Court nobles, priests, nuns, doctors, and professional teachers were 
outside the classes (see Crawcour, 1989: 571), and below the four aforementioned classes were two outcast 
sub-classes, namely, the eta (roughly translated as “great filth”) and hinin (i.e., non-people).   They engaged 
either in “impure” activities such as butchering or burial or in suspicious activities such as peddling and 
acting (see Henshall, 1999: 51). To maintain social order, movement between the classes was prohibited, and 
status was hereditary (see Sheldon, 1983: 477). Movement between classes, however, was not impossible as 
popularly believed (see Henshall, 1999: 51). Regulations dictated the details of everyday life, such as type 
and place of work or residence, type of clothing, what type of gift a person of a particular class could give to 
others, and what types of food he/she could eat.  In theory, the feudal restrictions were the most far-reaching 
for the peasant class and most restrictions affected their daily lives. Peasants were not allowed to move, 
change professions, sell arable land, partition holdings into parcels smaller that a certain minimum, or change 
their crops at will; in addition, they were ordered not to eat much rice and never to use silk, never to purchase 
tea and sake, and never to live in a luxurious home (see Miyamoto, Sakudo, and Yasuba, 1965: 542). Each 
individual was expected to play the role that was consistent with his or her birth and occupation. 
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long-term view of events and relationships, respect for seniority, and the maintenance 
of harmony. Long-term relationships are cultivated by deeply rooted tradition and 
reciprocity in gift-giving, including practices such as och"gen and oseibo.20  
Samiee and Mayo (1990) also write that in the context of the distribution system, the 
various forms of distribution channel rebates are also governed by reciprocity.  
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More generous rebates commensurate with the channel member’s level of dedication to 
manufacturers or wholesalers.21 Long-term relationships are encouraged by Japanese 
customs despite the fact that there may be high costs in the short term. Decision-making 
is socially rather than economically driven, and historical practices are perpetuated into 
the future (see Pirog III and Lancioni, 1996: 56). 
Because cultural variables are immutable or slow to change, the proponents of the 
cultural view argue that market entrance can only be secured through coercion (see 
Kitchell, 1995: 199). Czinkota and Woronoff (1991) write that import promotion 
policies are implemented by the Japanese government to appease trade partners and 
target Japanese corporations and individual consumers as buyers of imported products 
and foreign firms as potential sources of exports to Japan. However, these policies 
                                                
20 Och"gen refers to the custom of gift giving at midsummer and to the gifts themselves. Traditionally an 
occasion upon which offerings to the souls of the deceased were distributed to a family and others to share 
symbolically divine qualities among the mortals, this custom has since become secularized. Gifts are no 
longer offerings to the souls of the deceased but are instead purchased at a store and directly delivered to a 
family. Och"gen gifts are never given within a family. Similarly, oseibo refers to the custom of giving year-
end gifts. The gifts are an expression of appreciation for favors received in the past year. Och"gen and oseibo 
are formally prescribed expressions of social obligations, and although the gifts are voluntary, the givers 
know that they are given under social obligation. 
21 The analogy drawn between the custom of gift giving and distribution channel rebates, however, is not 
correct. Neither och"gen nor oseibo is reciprocal as Samiee and Mayo suggest (1990). Gifts flow one way 
only, from “inferiors” to “superiors.” There are no mutual exchanges, and there is no expectation of specific 
returns. In the corporate world, the flow of gifts also follows hierarchical principles. Large companies 
receive gifts from their subsidiaries, while small business give gifts to large companies upon which they 
depend (see Creighton, 1991: 679-680). 
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make little sense because distribution impediments are deeply rooted in the political, 
social and economic institutions in Japan, where little change can be expected (see 
Greaney, 2001: 254). Changing the Japanese distribution system would first and 
foremost require a change in customs and tradition. 
The cultural view has been criticized as overly simplistic, over-used and outdated (see 
Kitchell, 1995: 199-200). Marvel argues (1993: 156ff) that if the Japanese distribution 
system had simply survived as a result of custom and tradition, Japanese manufacturers 
would not have established similar distribution arrangements in geographically 
unfamiliar and culturally different markets such as the United States. There must be an 
economic logic behind the structure and trade practices of the Japanese distribution 
system because, as Miwa and Ramseyer (2001: 3) write, other firms (including foreign 
firms) should earn large profits by replacing wholesalers and retailers if the latter two 
act inefficiently. 
Based on this reasoning, the proponents of the economic view offer a wide range of 
explanations for the salient features of the Japanese distribution system: 
1. Explaining the large number of small retail stores: The main explanation 
proposed for this is that the Japanese distribution system has been shaped by its 
institutional framework and, specifically, the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law. Tamura 
(1986) can be viewed as the main proponent of this view. His work is regarded as one 
of the most outstanding Japanese studies of the Japanese distribution system. He is also 
widely considered to have set the standard for inquiries into Japan’s distribution system 
from the perspective of commercial science (see Kikkawa and Takaoka, 1998: 102). 
According to Tamura (1986), the structure of the Japanese retail business, with its 
abundance of small retail stores, was shaped and maintained by the presence of 
institutional mechanisms: i.e., the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law. 
According to Patrick and Rohlen (1987), the Japanese tax system of the 1980s further 
favored the continued operation of small stores, even when their operation was not 
profitable. Firstly, several loopholes in the Japanese tax system allowed family-run 
stores to substantially reduce their income tax burden. A licensed tax accountant was 
not required when shop owners reported their business income. This was believed to 
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result in inflated expenses and under-reported sales. Secondly, taxes could be avoided 
because of the ambiguous distinctions between household consumption and business 
expenses. The actual income of shop owners was probably much higher than reported. 
Third, tax deductions for inherited land (if less than 200 m2) used for business purposes 
were higher than those for land used for residential purposes. For a store adjacent to a 
residential space (as is the case for most family-run stores), 40% could be deducted for 
store space and 20% could be deducted for residential space. This rate generated a 
considerable difference in tax savings, especially in the 1980s, when land prices 
skyrocketed. 
Proponents of the applied microeconomic theory explain the structure of the Japanese 
distribution system in terms of consumer behavior or the limited ability of consumers to 
perform distributive tasks.  
• Frequent and small purchases: Shopping habits in Japan differ from those in 
Europe and the United States. A food shopper in the United States is likely to visit a 
retail store approximately 1.8 times per week, while his/her Japanese counterpart 
visits five times a week. Japanese consumers purchase goods in small quantities and 
at frequent intervals because of the relatively small size of conventional Japanese 
dwellings, which makes stockpiling at home extremely expensive. Consumers must 
replenish perishable stocks of food and other products frequently and therefore 
demand convenient local (and hence, small) outlets (see Flath and Nariu, 1996: 
190). In addition, Japanese consumers place a significant emphasis on freshness and 
quality (see Fahy and Taguchi, 1991: 50). Japanese households value next-door 
shopping, which enables them to make more frequent shopping trips, maintain low 
household inventories, and economize on scarce living space (see Flath and Nariu, 
1996: 190). 
• Meeting high service demands: Small mom-and-pop stores provide excellent 
personal service. Customers expect guidance from retailers in product selection and 
other pre- and post-sale services (see Fahy and Taguchi, 1995). 
• The low prevalence of private motor vehicles versus the high number of 
commercial vehicles: The number of private motor vehicles per person in Japan is 
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among the lowest of all developed countries. The low incidence of private car 
ownership contributes to the high costs of transporting goods from stores to 
dwellings and promotes a greater density of retail outlets. In contrast, Japan has the 
greatest number of commercial vehicles per person. According to Flath and Nariu 
(1996), the superabundance of commercial vehicles implies that the added 
transportation costs of restocking multiple small stores as opposed to a smaller 
number of large outlets are less substantial in Japan than they would be in other 
nations. The costs of restocking are also low because most of the population resides 
along the coastal plains, which further contributes to the profusion of retail stores. A 
retail structure dominated by large superstores would waste resources and not 
economize as many have claimed (see Flath and Nariu, 1996: 190-191). 
A further explanation is that the distribution sector absorbs a large share of the surplus 
labor force. During the pre-war and early postwar years, unemployment was one of the 
most serious and persistent problems in Japan. A large number of unskilled laborers 
that would have been otherwise unemployed entered the commercial sector, especially 
the retail sector. This greatly increased the number of small establishments, both 
wholesale and retail (see Yoshino, 1971: 24). 
2. Explaining the multi-layered wholesale sector: A conventional explanation for the 
multi-layered wholesale structure is the large number of small-scale retail stores (see 
Flath, 2003: 3). Both the proponents of the institutional approach and those who 
support the applied microeconomics approach view the multi-layered structure of the 
wholesale sector as being linked to the high density of retail stores. 
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Others attribute the continued existence of long distribution channels to the dominance 
of wholesalers and their use of control mechanisms such as vertical integration, 
financial linkage, and reciprocal dealings (see Min, 1996: 23). According to Torii and 
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Nariu (2004: 5), this view implicitly and wrongly presumes that middlemen provide no 
valuable services and merely add to the cost of marketing. 
Japanese wholesalers reportedly serve the following functions: 
• Bridging the information gap between manufacturers and small retailers: 
Wholesalers mediate between producers and retailers and bridge the information 
gap between the two. Retailers, for example, do not necessarily know which 
producer is providing each commodity. Neither do producers know the specific 
requirements of each retailer (see Torii and Nariu, 2004: 6). Wholesalers in 
particular are required to bridge the information gap when producers and retailers 
are small and numerous, as is frequently the case in Japan. In contrast, when a 
large-scale producer establishes its own brand and most of the retailers come to 
know the merchandise it produces, the information gaps between producers and 
retailers becomes small, and wholesaling has little to contribute. For large-scale 
retail stores, wholesaling also loses its importance, and information bridging 
between producers and retailers need not to be accomplished by wholesalers (see 
Torii and Nariu, 2004: 6).  
• Standardizing production output: The majority of manufacturers producing 
consumer goods in Japan are small. Due to a lack of reliable production schedules 
and uniform quality standards, a large number of middlemen are needed to supply 
small manufacturers according to their needs and to assemble and distribute their 
products (see Yoshino, 1971: 24-25). 
• Serving the large number of small retailers: Because the majority of Japanese 
retail stores is small and suffers from severe space constraints, the sector demands 
and relies on timely, frequent deliveries and minimal inventories.  
! Small deliveries: Through a multi-layered channel, downstream final 
wholesalers can afford to make small deliveries of less-than-truckload quantities 
on a frequent basis via non-conventional modes of transportation such as 
bicycles and motor scooters.  
! Rapid deliveries: The multi-layered wholesale channel links wholesalers to 
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single-store retailers throughout the Japanese islands and, through quick 
negotiations and bulk breaking, helps move the product rapidly from production 
to retail and consumption. 
! Streamlined customer services: The close linkages between multi-layered 
channel members encourage the sharing of information on product trends, 
innovations, competition, and overall market opportunities. This helps the 
Japanese retailer to provide more streamlined customer service (see Torii and 
Nariu, 2004). 
3. Explaining the distribution keiretsu: The explanations offered for the existence of 
distribution keiretsu are as follows. 
• Minimizing transaction costs: Distribution keiretsu provide an effective system 
for minimizing transaction costs. Dealing with well-known partners reduces the cost 
of gathering information, monitoring, and negotiation (see Fahy and Taguchi, 1995: 
52).  
• Lower competition: Distribution keiretsu are a response to intense competitive 
pressures. Through keiretsu networks, manufacturers control prices and re-impose 
stability on the market. Through the so-called “keiretsufication” of external 
wholesalers and retailers, manufacturers encourage exclusivity. In addition, the 
provision of information, training, and monetary assistance solidifies the formation 
of close business relationships. The needs of manufacturers in terms of market share 
and stable prices match the needs of weak wholesalers and retailers in terms of 
protection from price wars (see Shimotani, 1995). 
• Curbing agent opportunism: Distribution keiretsu are effective and efficient 
structures for monitoring agent behavior (see Lassar and Kerr, 1996: 615). 
• Capitalizing quickly on new market opportunities: Distribution keiretsu are 
effective in responding to new market opportunities by sharing and transferring 
information and technology among members (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1994). 
• Stabilizing supply: Keiretsu manufacturers can assure their downstream 
distributors and retailers a constant supply of the necessary merchandise through 
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exclusive contracts. Such merchandise often includes high-quality brand-name 
products that many Japanese consumers tend to favor over non-branded options. 
Furthermore, keiretsu distributors and retailers are likely to adapt their delivery 
schedule to the requirements of their customers on a stable basis (see Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1994). 
• Sharing financial risk: Through mutual shareholding, distribution keiretsu 
encourage their members not to worry about hostile takeovers and thus focus on 
long-term interests such as new product marketing and distribution. Also, many 
manufacturers traditionally provide keiretsu members with several forms of 
financial assistance, such as credit extensions, the acceptance of promissory notes 
with deferred payments, discretionary rebates, and return privileges for unsold 
products at no cost. Such assistance helps keiretsu members survive tough financial 
times (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1994). 
• Mass marketing of mass-produced products: Manufacturers organize keiretsu 
distribution channels to mass-market their mass-produced products. Establishing 
one’s own distribution keiretsu is profitable, even if it involves a large investment 
(see Ishida, 1983: 323). 
• Differentiating through customer service: By providing comprehensive 
marketing and technical services such as product-information provisions and after-
sales services, distributors can build customer loyalty regarding new or unfamiliar 
products from their manufacturers, thereby better differentiating the manufacturer’s 
brand from that of its competitors (see Niida, 2002, 82ff). 
Being part of a manufacturer’s keiretsu network involves various incentives for 
wholesalers and retailers as follows. 
• Marketing and technical assistance from manufacturers: Wholesalers depend 
on marketing and technical assistance from manufacturers to offer product 
information and sufficient after-sales services to customers for a large number of 
new products.  
• Attractive preferential treatment: Manufacturers grant attractive sales 
 47 
commissions, financial assistance in the form of advertising, and/or rebates based 
on the manufacturer’s product sales as a percentage of total sales to all the 
wholesalers that are part of their keiretsu network. 
• Enhanced consumer confidence and loyalty: Retailers can enhance consumer 
confidence and loyalty by relying on the products of a well-known manufacturer 
(see Niida, 2001: 85). 
4. Explaining specific trade practices: Specific trade practices increase the overall 
efficiency of the distribution system in various ways (see Fahy and Taguchi, 1995: 50). 
• Reduce risks: The retailer can return unsold goods to the wholesaler (henpin). This 
eliminates the risks and costs of unsold stock for local small-scale shops. Small 
retailers can offer a wide product range without the risk of large, unsold inventory. 
• Avoid cash flow problems: Tegata (or promissory notes) help the buyer to avoid 
cash flow problems for slow-selling products. 
• Stabilize the system: The recommended resale prices (tatene) set by the 
manufacturer incorporate given profit margins for each intermediary, thereby 
providing stability for the system. 
• Incentivize channel members: Rebates encourage wholesalers and retailers to 
reach particular sales targets, pay on time, follow manufacturer pricing policies, 
and/or adopt marketing techniques; in short, these rebates compensate for loyalty to 
the manufacturer (see Fahy and Taguchi, 1995: 50; Marin, Howard, and Herbig, 
1998). 
2.2.4 Summary 
In this section, we have reviewed the vast body of research describing and explaining 
the salient features of the Japanese distribution system. We find the idea that the 
postwar Japanese distribution system has been heavily shaped by Japan’s institutional 
framework, above all the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law, provides the dominant 
explanation both inside and outside Japan. The statute that allegedly protected a large 
number of small retailers serviced by multiple layers of wholesalers laid the foundation 
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both for the United States’ demands that Japan revise the statute and the expectations 
that grew out of its revision, as we will see in Chapter 3. 
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3 Japan’s distribution system: From outdated to modern? 
3.1 The postwar distribution system as barrier to trade 
When Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945, the Japanese economy was near collapse. 
Industrial output was at 10% of the prewar level, and the country faced a serious food 
shortage (see Hanneman, 2001: 84). Japan was forced to ultimately accept foreign 
occupation by the Allied Powers. The occupation lasted over six years, a period of 
more than double the originally envisaged three-year duration. The Allied Occupation, 
formally under the direction of the 11-nation Far Eastern Commission, was in fact 
almost totally in American hands. General Douglas McArthur, the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), had broad authority in directing its course. 
The United States believed that despotic rulers were imposing a culture of militarism on 
Japan and that no free people would of their own accord choose the course of military 
aggression. Thus, they believed that the surest path to demilitarization was through 
democratization. 
The main goal of the occupation’s reforms was to foster democracy by redistributing 
wealth. The reforms included several elements. The first task was to demilitarize the 
country and dismantle the Japanese war machine. Then, the new constitution was 
positioned as the cornerstone of political reforms and democratization. It provided the 
legal setting for social reforms that would foster the democratization of Japanese 
society. The complete revision of the civil code, however, was the central element of 
these social reforms. Last but not least, economic reforms were seen as crucial to 
bringing democracy to Japan. 
At the center of the economic program was land reform. Rural poverty had been a 
serious problem during the prewar period, when plans for land reforms had existed but 
were never implemented. Certain landowners, such as absentee landlords, owner-
operators cultivating more than the maximum amount of land permitted, and lessors 
that were either owner-operators or resident landlords holding more land than was 
allowed, were forced to sell land to the government, which then resold the land to new 
farmers. Between 1946 and 1949, approximately three million households bought land 
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from the government (see Campbell, 1952: 362). 
The second element of the economic reforms was the break-up of the zaibatsu. 
Zaibatsu were large financial concerns that were believed to have fueled Japanese 
military aggression. The Anti-Monopoly Law of 1947 outlawed zaibatsu companies 
and required 325 companies to be split into their constituent companies and zaibatsu 
stock to be sold to the public (see Hanneman, 2001: 94). 
The third pillar of the economic reforms focused on the industrial labor force. In 1947, 
the Labor Standards Act was enacted, regulating working hours, guaranteeing worker 
compensation, establishing safety and sanitation standards, and limiting child labor. 
Labor unionization grew rapidly (see Hanneman, 2001: 84).  
The Allied Powers had originally planned to contain Japan by allowing it to become a 
peaceful, relatively weak agrarian nation. The eventual success of the communist 
revolution in China prompted the occupation policy to take a so-called “reverse 
course.” After 1948, the occupation policy was revised to shift its focus to building 
Japan into an economic powerhouse that would serve as a bulwark against communism 
in East Asia (see Hanneman, 2001: 84-85).  
By the 1950s, the economy had stabilized (see Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008: 4). The 
Korean War, which began in the early hours of June 25, 1950, when North Korean 
troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea, triggered Japan’s postwar 
economic growth. With its untapped resources and potential workforce, Japan could 
easily supply the United States army with steel and the resources required to support 
other heavy industries – and it continued to do so even after the war ended in a 
stalemate in July of 1953 (see Hanneman, 2001: 96). 
The Japanese economy exhibited impressive economic up-trends that shifted the 
country’s position as a third-world country, allowing it to rival the United States in 
terms of economic development. Historical data reveal that Japan’s economy exhibited 
growth percentages of approximately 9% a year during the 1950s, approximately 10% a 
year in the early 1960s, and more than 13% a year in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
(see Henshall, 1999: 154). With the emergence of Japan as a major power, books 
started to appear analyzing its route to success; one such example is Herman Kahn’s 
popular 1971 work “The Emerging Japanese Superstate”, which sang Japan’s praises. 
 51 
The Japanese also proposed theories explaining their success and usually followed a 
line of argument indicating that Japan was somehow unique and special, with national 
characteristics such as loyalty, harmony, and group orientation. They also claimed, 
although with questionable evidence, that Japanese interpersonal relations were unique 
and stronger than in other societies (see Henshall, 1999: 161-162). Others viewed the 
origin of Japan’s economic success as rooted in its political economy, which was 
characterized by interinstitutional cooperation and included a myriad of formal and 
informal relationships between bureaucracy, politics (i.e., the Liberal Democratic Party, 
LDP22) and the private sector, also called the “Iron Triangle” (see, for example, 
Colignon and Usui, 2001). The Iron Triangle allegedly produced a homogenous outlook 
and a common orientation on the part of institutional elites based on the belief that 
interinstitutional cooperation produces the best outcome for all (see Colignon and Usui, 
2001: 865-866). Johnson (1982) labeled Japan a “developmental state” and located the 
driving force behind Japan’s economic development at the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI), which dominated the economy and actively and 
successfully directed its course. 
By 1973, Japan was the third largest economy in the world, ranking just behind the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 23 The country had become the largest producer of 
ships, radios, and televisions. It was also the second-largest producer of cars and the 
third-largest producer of steel. Although Japanese exports seemed to dominate globally, 
the ratio of Japanese exports was below that of most nations (see, for example, 
Lawrence: 1987). Because the Japanese Gross National Product (GNP) had grown so 
substantially, exports seemed to dominate in absolute terms. The tendency to 
exclusively compare Japan with the United States (which had a low export-to-GNP 
ratio), together with the United States’ massive trade imbalance with Japan, has fueled 
                                                
22 In 1955, two conservative parties merged to form the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), and the left- and right-wing 
socialist parties merged to become the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). The new party system built around the two parties 
formed the basis for the so-called 1955 system. In this system, the LDP ruled without interruption until 1993 (see 
Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008: 7). 
23 The 1973 oil crisis began on October 17, 1973, when the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OAPEC), which consisted of the Arab members of OPEC plus Egypt and Syria, announced 
that they would no longer export oil to nations that had supported Israel in its conflict with Syria and Egypt in the 
context of the ongoing Yom Kippur War. This included the United States, its allies in Western Europe, and Japan. 
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this misconception (see, for example, Henshall, 1999: 154-156). 
The Japanese commercial sector recovered in tandem with the rebuilding of Japan’s 
economy. Between 1954 and 1969, the number of establishments in the commercial 
sector increased by 30%, a percentage slightly higher than the percentage of growth of 
all business establishments during the period. 82% of wholesale establishments and 
72% of retail establishments operating in 1968 were established after 1945; nearly half 
of these retail and wholesale establishments were established after 1955. The majority 
of these new establishments was small in size and had only limited capital (see 
Yoshino, 1971: 15). The labor force in the distribution sector nearly doubled. This 
increase was considerably greater than the 21% increase in the overall labor force. 
Combined sales in the wholesale and retail sectors increased by almost five times 
between 1960 and 1969 (see Yoshino, 1971: 10). 
The entry of large-scale firms into the consumer industry was a significant factor for 
the rapid development of the commercial sector. Until the end of World War II, most 
large-scale firms were engaged in the production of strategic industrial goods. After 
Japan’s defeat, these firms were compelled to shift to peacetime industries, and many 
entered the consumer market. New products were launched at a remarkable rate in the 
1960s. In consumer durables, for example, virtually every product was new, including 
television sets, washing machines, refrigerators, air conditioning units, transistor radios, 
and vacuum cleaners. In the food industry, new products ranged from instant coffee, 
breakfast cereals, and frozen foods to ready-to-eat packaged foods. Similar patterns can 
be identified in automobiles, apparel, cosmetics, and pharmaceuticals.  
Between 1953 and 1968, private consumption expanded by more than five times and 
reached over JPY 26.6 trillion in 1968. This valuation accounted for slightly more than 
50% of the Gross National Product (GNP). In 1968, the growth in personal 
consumption expenditure alone accounted for nearly half of the 14% real growth of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the preceding year. Between 1960 and 1967, 
incomes doubled (see Yoshino, 1971: 30-31). 
Foreign companies trying to tap into Japan’s growing consumer markets found that 
making inroads was not as easy as projected. Whereas Japan ran trade deficits with 
countries like Canada and Australia, from which it imported raw materials, it ran 
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considerable trade surpluses with both the United States and the European Union 
during the 1980s (see Maguire, 2000). Studies concluded that the prices of foreign-
produced goods were noticeably higher in Japan than they were in other countries in the 
1970s and 1980s; in addition, the prices of Japanese goods in Japan were not 
substantially higher than in non-domestic markets at that time. This adverse effect was 
taken as empirical and conclusive evidence that the Japanese market was relatively 
closed and that competition was restricted. Knetter (1994), for example, examined the 
behavior of foreign firms exporting both to Japan and other destinations and tested 
country-specific differences in the prices charged by exporters to buyers in different 
destinations. He found that the data for 37 German export industries clearly showed 
that for the vast majority of industries examined, the prices of German exports to Japan 
were systematically higher than the prices of German exports to the United States, the 
U.K., and Canada. Because neither the effect of differences in the composition of 
export unit values nor the possibility of non-linear pricing (potentially leading to lower 
average prices for higher-volume importers) could explain his findings, he concluded 
that higher relative non-tariff barriers in Japan contributed to higher relative retail 
prices (see Knetter, 1994: 16). A joint survey of the prices of goods in Japan and the 
United States in 1991, conducted by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) and the United States Department of Commerce, reported that prices 
for two-thirds of the 112 surveyed products were higher in Japan. On average, Japanese 
prices exceeded United States prices by 37%. High distribution costs due to Japan’s 
inefficient distribution system were seen as an important cause of the relatively high 
final goods prices there (see Knetter, 1994: 4).  
In light of this finding, both Japan and a number of foreign countries identified the need 
to address the restrictions on foreign products in Japan’s market. To facilitate the 
importation of foreign products, the G5 Nations (France, West Germany, Japan, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom) signed an agreement called the Plaza Accord 
in 1985 that would devalue the U.S. dollar in relation to the Japanese yen and German 
Deutsche Mark by intervening in currency markets. Devaluing the dollar would make 
the United States’ exports cheaper for its trading partners, which in turn meant that 
other countries would buy more American-made goods and services. In addition, a 
stronger yen would lead foreigners to establish distribution networks in Japan and alter 
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distribution structures (see Lawrence, 1987: 547). 
The United States trade deficit with Western European nations decreased. However, the 
primary objective of reducing the trade deficit with Japan was not achieved. Even 
though Japanese imports of manufactured goods were found to be fairly responsive to 
relative price changes, devaluing the dollar did not result in significant inroads for 
American products and services (see Lawrence and Krugman, 1987: 547). 
Thus, it was concluded that the low level of manufactured imports must have been due 
to impediments such as buyer preferences and a lack of competitiveness in the 
distribution system. The latter was identified as a key factor in the apparent failure of 
foreign firms to establish major market participation in Japan and portrayed as an 
almost insurmountable barrier to firms from outside Japan. Both Japanese and foreign 
observers viewed Japanese distribution, particularly for physical consumer goods, as 
outdated, inefficient, unnecessarily complex and a drag on competition (see, for 
example, Riethmuller, 1994: 517; Dewey Ballantine LLP and Cyberworks Japan, 2001: 
15).  
In the final report of the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks, which were held 
to identify specific areas impeding the adjustment of the trade imbalance between the 
United States and Japan, five consensual measures were listed for Japan that were 
intended to help make its market more accessible to its foreign counterparts and 
especially to American products and services. These measures included the 
improvement of import-related infrastructure, the acceleration of import clearance 
procedures, the continuous expansion of imports and the relaxation of distribution-
related regulations (see Kikkawa and Takaoka, 1998: 101). In 1991, Japan revised the 
Large-Scale Retail Stores Law in response to the SII talks. 
The Large-Scale Retail Stores Law and its history are outlined in the next chapter. 
3.2 The Large-Scale Retail Stores Law 
The history of regulations limiting the size of retail shops in Japan dates back to 1937, 
when the first Department Store Law was enacted. The law was a reaction to 
complaints from small shop owners, who constituted a strong pressure group and feared 
the expansion of large department stores. The law was abolished in 1947 under foreign 
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occupation. It was re-enacted under the same name in 1956 and was legislated to 
legalize a special procedure by which one could obtain a license to expand an existing 
retail business and/or open new stores with an area larger than 1’500 m2 (see Guner, 
Ventura, and Yi, 2006: 304-305). The law, however, did not prevent the opening of 
large stores. First, the law only applied to department stores and did not cover other 
types of retail companies such as supermarkets, which were introduced to Japan after 
World War II and expanded rapidly from the 1950s onwards. Secondly, the legislation 
focused on retail businesses, meaning individual entities. This opened up a loophole 
because large department stores could be divided into several separate business entities 
(with each individual business entity not exceeding 1’500 m2) within the same building 
(see Guner, Ventura, and Yi, 2006: 304-305). 
Complaints by small retailers led to a major revision of the law in 1974. The new law, 
called the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law (daitenh!), focused on retail stores rather than 
businesses and included retail formats other than the department store model. 
Formulated based on a French law and an adaptation of the Department Store Law of 
1956, the new law restricted the growth of large stores such as supermarkets. It 
protected family-operated mom-and-pop stores and existing large stores from new 
competitors (see Riethmuller, 1994). Large stores were now required to follow a 
specified application process if they exceeded 1’500 m2, except in large cities, where 
stores with an area of up to 3’000 m2 were exempt from this special process (see Guner, 
Ventura, and Yi, 2006: 305). 
In 1979, the law was reformed again. Two types of stores were now subject to 
restrictions.  
• Stores larger than 1’500 m2 (3’000 m2 in large cities) (Type-1 stores): 
Applications to open this type of store had to be made to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry (MITI). 
• Stores between 500 and 1’500 m2  (Type-2 stores): For these stores, applications 
were accepted at the prefectural (that is, local) level (see Guner, Ventura, and Yi, 
2006: 305). Firms or individuals planning to open a store with an area larger than 
the stipulated area were required to obtain the approval of several regulatory 
committees (see Lothia and Subramaniam, 2000). In addition to prefectural officials, 
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consumers, and academics, the committees also included retailers that would face 
competition from the planned stores. The application process was very slow. 
Obtaining approval could sometimes take up to ten years, assuming an application 
was approved at all (see Tsuchiya and Riethmuller, 1997).  
The law was altered again only three years later in 1982. These changes affected Type-
1 stores. The local government now had the authority to ban the opening of new stores 
in certain regions. In addition, a new stage of the application process was created that 
required a consensus among all parties involved, including those potentially affected by 
the opening of the large stores (see Guner, Ventura, and Yi, 2006: 305).  
In 1991, the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law was significantly relaxed in favor of large 
retailers. Formal and informal rules were changed. The revised law took effect in 
January 1992. Procedures were simplified, and the maximum process duration was set 
at one year. By May 1994, new stores with floor space between 500 m2 to 1’000 m2 
were no longer subject to the regulation. Store closing times were extended to 8 p.m., 
and the number of regulated holidays was decreased to 24 days a year (see Guner, 
Ventura, and Yi, 2006: 305). According to Tsuruta and Yahagi (2002: 142), the 
revision of the statute limited the regulatory parameters of the system and increased its 
transparency. The revision also raised expectations regarding an imminent revolution in 
the Japanese distribution system that it was believed would be triggered by a sharp 
increase in the number of large stores once the revised statute was enacted (see Stern 
and Weitz, 1997). It was also further anticipated that the increase in the number of large 
stores would unleash the power of a number of technological and socio-economic 
developments, further accelerating change. These developments, which we call 
associated changes, are outlined below. 
3.3 Associated changes 
3.3.1 Distributional IT  
Two innovations in distributional IT were expected to significantly change the 
distribution of power in the Japanese distribution system by reducing retailer 
dependence on both wholesalers and manufacturers. These innovations were the 
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introduction of point-of-sale (POS) systems and the increasing use of the Internet for 
business transactions. 
POS systems gather sales-related information. The information is automatically 
acquired as a consumer’s purchases are scanned at the register. POS systems track 
which products are bought at what prices and when and where the transactions take 
place. POS data can be used to tailor offerings and merchandise to match demand, plan 
sales campaigns, and improve pricing or product development. The possession of such 
information is regarded as conferring expert power to retailers. Retailers can use such 
information to decide which brands to stock and to develop and market their own 
brands, thereby increasing their power vis-à-vis upstream suppliers (see Stern, El-
Ansary, and Coughlan, 1996: 424). Many experts agree that retailers that control POS 
data are better equipped to coordinate channel-wide decisions regarding inventory, 
delivery schedules, the nature of product assortments and product specifications (see 
Fahy and Taguchi, 1995; Larke, 1994; Ailawadi, Borin, and Farris, 1995; Lohtia and 
Subramaniam, 2000; Messinger and Narasimhan, 1995). Goldman (1991: 173) writes 
that large retailers in Japan that have implemented POS-based assortment monitoring 
systems have been giving up the privilege of returning unsold goods, thereby 
decreasing their dependence on manufacturers. They no longer need wholesalers and 
manufacturers for product assortment and merchandising. In addition, in developing 
their own private brands, they become serious competitors for manufacturers of 
branded products. 
The use of the Internet for business transactions led to even more enthusiastic 
predictions.  
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The use of the Internet for business transactions was predicted to make wholesalers 
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redundant, lower the price of products for end-consumers, and ultimately put an end to 
the Japanese distribution system: 
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Thus, a direct Internet link through which retailers could place their orders with 
manufacturers based on their analysis of POS data would make wholesalers redundant. 
3.3.2 Private label products 
Japanese consumers crave brand-name products and are willing to pay a premium for 
them. According to Martin and Herbig (2002: 175-176), older Japanese individuals rely 
on branded products because they feel secure when buying them. This emotional 
response is perceived to have its origins in World War II and the postwar period of 
poverty, when goods were scarce. Younger Japanese individuals prefer brand names 
because they are fashion conscious. They locate group identity and economic pride in 
brand names. Individuals tend to buy foreign imports only if the price differential is 
high or if the imported item is considered to be of higher quality or higher status (see 
Rajaratnam and McKinney, 1995). 
Increased consumer sophistication, however, has led Japanese consumers to demand 
products that are high in quality but low in price (see Lothia, Xie, and Subramaniam, 
2004). Retailers have reacted to this trend by developing private brand products. They 
have increased the number of private brands that they market at the expense of national 
brands (see Tsuchiya, 1997), and they import foreign-branded products at discount 
prices. 
Furthermore, while private brands were once the domain of large-scale retailers, 
smaller chain stores have started developing their own private brands as well. Even 
though brand names remain important, price consciousness among Japanese consumers 
has increased (see Lothia, Xie, and Subramaniam, 2004). 
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3.3.3 Increase in car ownership 
In the 1960s, shopping for convenience goods was performed on foot within a 300-
meter radius of one’s dwelling (see Yoshino, 1971: 23). Shopping by car was the 
exception, in part because the number of private cars per person in Japan was lower 
than in other nations. During the 1970s, the growth in the number of passenger cars per 
person in Japan averaged 9% per year (see Lothia and Subramaniam, 2000). Growth 
rates were 16.2% between 1980 and 1985, 23.1% between 1985 and 1990, and 18.8% 
between 1990 and 1995. After 1995, the growth rate slowed to 7.2% (for the period 
between 1995 and 2000). Between 2000 and 2004, the figure was a mere 0.3%. 
Nevertheless, between 1980 and 2004, the number of passenger cars for private use 
almost doubled (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Total passenger cars for private use in Japan, 1980-2004 
     
Year 
Total passenger  
cars for private use 
(in 1’000s) 
Population  
(in 1’000s) 
Passenger cars for  
private use  
per person 
Growth in % 
          
1980 21’293 117’060 0.182 - 
1985 25’595 121’049 0.211 16.2 
1990 32’177 123’611 0.260 23.1 
1995 38’846 125’570 0.309 18.8 
2000 42’108 126’926 0.332 7.2 
2004 42’506 127’687 0.333 0.3 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Japan, 2006. 
It was predicted that with the increase in the number of private passenger cars per 
person, cars would be used more frequently for shopping trips outside one’s local 
neighborhood. As more households came to rely on cars, small stores might lose much 
of their inherent advantage over large stores. 
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3.3.4 Larger dwellings 
Japanese homes, especially in urban areas, are legendary for their small size:  
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Sir Roy Denman, the general director of external relations of the EC Commission in 
1979, reportedly referred to the Japanese as “workaholics living in rabbit hutches” (see 
Eggers, 2006: 1). However, the housing situation improved, and Japanese homes 
became larger. Between 1988 and 2003, average dwelling space increased by 6.2% (see 
Table 3). 
Table 3: lncrease in the size of dwellings, 1988-2003 
      
Year 
Total number  
of dwellings  
(in 1’000s) 
Dwelling rooms  
per dwelling 
Area of floor  
space per  
dwelling (m2)  
Increase in % Increase in %  1988-2003 
      
1988 37'413 4.86 89.29 -  
1993 40'773 4.85 91.92 2.9  
1998 43'922 4.79 92.43 0.6  
2003 46'863 4.77 94.85 2.6 6.2 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Japan 2006. 
In addition, the size of the average Japanese household shrank. From the 1920s to the 
mid-1950s, the average Japanese household had about five members. By 1970, the 
average number of people per household decreased to 3.41, reflecting the progressive 
decline in the birth rate through the 1960s. The size of the average household continued 
to shrink thereafter, consistent with the increase in nuclear family units of the 1970s. In 
the 1980s, the average number of members per household continued to decline, while 
the number of one-person households grew steadily. By 2000, the average household 
 61 
had shrunk to 2.67 members. Of 46.78 million households, private households 
consisting of one or two persons accounted for 52.7%.24 
Larger dwellings accommodating fewer people usually offer more storage space. 
Therefore, households are able to maintain a larger stock and need to shop less 
frequently for daily necessities. This has further eroded the value of close neighborhood 
shops to Japanese consumers and increased the attractiveness of large stores. 
3.4 Summary 
The revision of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law and the associated changes were 
expected to substantially increase the number and channel power of large stores.  
• The revision of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law was expected to increase the 
number of large retailers. The number of small retailers would decline as they faced 
competition from large stores and the loss of regulatory protection. 
• Distributional IT was expected to provide large retailers with access to POS sales 
data and independence from wholesalers for product merchandising and 
procurement. 
• Changes in shopping habits were expected to increase the attractiveness of large 
stores to Japanese consumers, thereby increasing the channel power of large 
retailers. Due to an increase in dwelling size and private car ownership rates, 
Japanese consumers would buy less frequently and in larger quantities because they 
could store more goods at home. In addition, increased consumer sophistication led 
consumers to demand products that are high in quality but low in price. Retailers 
reacted to this demand by developing private brand products, thereby reducing their 
dependence on manufacturers. 
Changes in retail structure and channel power were expected to trigger the following 
                                                
24 See the Statistics Bureau of Japan. According to current projections, this average is expected to keep declining in 
the years ahead, reaching 2.37 in 2025. With the size of the average household shrinking further, the number of 
households is expected to continue to increase even after the Japanese population starts to decline. The number of 
households is projected to peak in 2015 and decrease thereafter. 
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developments: 
• Shorter distribution channels: With the number of large retailers increasing, trade 
flows between manufacturers and retailers were expected to increasingly involve 
one level of wholesalers only. Wholesale circuity was predicted to improve. 
• More direct sourcing: Direct sourcing between manufacturers and retailers was 
expected to increase due to retailers’ channel power. Large retailers would force 
manufacturers to supply them directly. In addition, large retailers would no longer 
depend on wholesalers as order placing and processing nodes due to the 
implementation of inter-firm EDI (electronic data interchange) systems linking 
manufacturers and retailers and POS (point of sales) systems enabling retailers to 
make the right sourcing decision based on the analysis of sales-related information 
gathered by POS systems. 
• Fewer wholesale establishments: The number of wholesale establishments was 
expected to decline as a result of the decline in the number of small retailers, the 
shorter distribution channels, and the more direct sourcing patterns. 
In the next chapter, we will quantitatively assess the impact of the revised statute and 
the associated changes in the Japanese distribution system. 
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4 THE IMPACT OF THE REVISED LARGE RETAIL-
STORES LAW ON THE JAPANESE DISTRIBUTION 
SYSTEM 
4.1 METHODOLOGY 
This study uses quantitative and descriptive data that were collected and analyzed for 
the sole purpose of reassessing the research hypothesis and the expected developments 
of the study as outlined above.   
• The population of large-scale stores. The study uses raw empirical data on the 
number of large-scale retail stores in Japan from 1960 to 2004 from the database of 
the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. We 
initially defined a large-scale store as one with fifty employees or more, employing 
a workforce perspective to distinguish such enterprises from their smaller 
counterparts. However, other characteristics, such as annual retail sales and floor 
space, were also taken into account. Moreover, we conducted a comparative 
analysis of the large-scale stores based on workforce population, annual retail sales, 
and floor space. As a result, we decided to use these factors to indicate the number 
“large-scale” stores. However, the sample does not allow us to investigate stores 
that shift from “small-scale” to “large-scale” or vice versa. We also decided to 
retrieve quantitative data pertaining to the number of retail establishments with 
sales floor space of 500 m2 or more from 1982 to 2004 from the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). To address the change in the number of 
stores with sales floor space of 3’000 m2 or more, we determined the number of 
applications to open new large-scale stores filed from 1974 to 1996. 
• The population of small-scale stores. This study collected empirical data on the 
number of small retail establishments from 1962 to 2004 from the Statistics Bureau 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Before the data collection 
process began, we initially defined a “small-scale store” as a store with one or two 
employees.  
• Wholesale establishments. This study obtained data on the number of wholesalers 
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from 1960 to 2004 from the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications. The study aimed to observe the effects of the statute in question 
on the wholesale industry. In collecting the data, we isolated wholesalers that were 
directly trading to retailers and final wholesalers that sourced from wholesalers and 
sold to retailers. In addition, we obtained supporting data that may explain 
developments with respect to the categories of wholesalers studied. 
• Wholesale circuity. This study used figures calculated by Nishimura (1993), the 
METI (2005), and Maruyama (2004) to indicate the length of the pre-
implementation and post-implementation periods of the statute. The w/W ratio as 
used by Nishimura (1993) to indicate wholesaler circuity is calculated as follows:  
 
w/W ratio = ! = (sales from wholesalers to other wholesalers) / (total wholesale 
sales)  
 
Note that ! indicates the existence of multiple stages (i.e., more than two stages) 
and that S represents the number of wholesaler stages.  
! If S=1, !=0/1=0.00 in the M-W1-N structure. 
! If S=2, !=1/2=0.50 in the M-W1-W2-N structure. 
! If S=3, !=2/3=0.66 in the M-W1-W2-W3-N structure. 
! If S=4, !=3/4=0.75 in the M-W1-W2-W3-W4-N structure. 
 
Another helpful formula that we used was introduced by Maruyama (2004) as the 
wholesaler use ratio (W / U ratio):  
 
W/ U ratio = (retail direct wholesalers sales) + (source wholesalers sales) / total retail sales 
 
One adequate proxy for this ratio is the natural logarithm of the total mark-up 
divided by the natural logarithm of the average mark-up, as introduced by Nariu 
and Flath (1993): 
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NS = [In (Pn/Po)] / [In (Pj/Pj-1)] 
Although the final quantitative data has its shortcomings, the wholesale/retail sales 
ratio is often used to note trends in the circuitous structure of the wholesale sector. 
• Direct Sourcing. This study explores the relationship between retailers and 
manufacturers with regard to direct sourcing. Although the data and studies on 
direct sourcing are limited, we intend to find supporting data to either disprove or 
prove that this type of development has occurred in response to the implementation 
of the statute in subject. 
4.2 DATA ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we look for quantitative evidence of the following expected 
developments. 
• An increase in the number of large stores. 
• A decrease in the number of small traditional retailers. 
• A decrease in the number of wholesalers. 
• Improved wholesale circuity. 
• More direct sourcing between retailers and manufacturers. 
4.2.1 An increase in the number of large stores 
The average sales floor area for all retail establishments increased continuously 
between 1960 and 2004 (see Table 4). In 1999, the average Japanese retail 
establishment (including all stores) had a sales floor space of about 95.2 m2. As 
compared to the average sales floor space of 69.1 m2 in 1991, this corresponds to 
growth of almost 38%. By 2004, the average sales floor space for Japanese retail 
establishments had grown further to 116.4 m2. As compared to the average of 24.1 m2 
in 1960, this increase represented a near-fivefold gain. Although the annual growth 
rates exhibit significant differences, the largest amount of positive growth was recorded 
in 1994, when the average sales space increased by over 17% as compared to the 
previous figure for 1991. 
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Table 4: Average sales floor space (m2) per retail establishment, 1952-2004 
          
Year Total number of establishments 
Sales floor space  
(m2)  
Average sales floor  
space (m2) per  
establishment 
Growth in %  
(compared to the  
previous year) 
     
1952 1'079'728 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1954 1'189'045 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1956 1'201'273 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1958 1'244'629 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1960 1'288'292 31'081'224 24.1 n.a. 
1962 1'271'975 33'005'295 25.9 7.6 
1964 1'304'536 39'081'705 30.0 15.5 
1966 1'375'394 44'840'620 32.6 8.8 
1968 1'432'436 47'583'151 33.2 1.9 
1970 1'471'297 54'723'980 37.2 12.0 
1972 1'495'510 61'108'675 40.9 9.9 
1974 1'548'184 67'405'931 43.5 6.6 
1976 1'614'067 74'973'890 46.5 6.7 
1979 1'673'667 85'736'815 51.2 10.3 
1982 1'721'465 95'430'071 55.4 8.2 
1985 1'628'644 94'506'983 58.0 4.7 
1988 1'619'752 102'050'766 63.0 8.6 
1991 1'591'223 109'901'497 69.1 9.6 
1994 1'499'948 121'623'712 81.1 17.4 
1997 1'419'696 128'083'639 90.2 11.3 
1999 1'406'884 133'869'296 95.2 5.5 
2002 1'300'057 140'619'288 108.2 13.7 
2004 1'238'296 144'190'054 116.4 7.7 
Source: Based on Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; 
Historical Statistics of Japan, Chapter 13, Domestic Trade. 
Analyzing large stores alone, the Statistics Bureau of Japan provides metrics for retail 
outlets that are classified as large-scale stores. The term “large-scale store” refers to 
locations with 50 employees or more. In addition to indicating the number of 
employees, the data include information about the sales floor area, annual revenues, and 
the value of the commodity stocks of large-scale retail stores from 1972 to 2002 (see 
Table 5). According to this data, 
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• The number of stores with 50 or more employees increased constantly both between 
1992 and 2000 and between 1972 and 2002, although there was a very small decline 
in 1988-1989. Between 1992 and 2000, the largest increases took place between 
1993 and 1994 (9%) and between 1997 and 1998 (8%). On average, the number of 
large stores increased by 5% between 1992 and 2000. Interestingly, the largest 
increases between 1972 and 2002 did not take place after the revision of the Large-
Scale Retail Stores Law but instead were recorded in 1973 (18%) and 1977 (11%).  
• The number of people employed in retail establishments with 50 or more employees 
increased constantly between 1992 and 2000 and between 1972 and 2002, although 
there was a very minimal decline in 2001. The largest increase (16%) took place in 
1973. Growth rates after 1992 were slightly higher than the pre-1992 numbers but 
were still moderate. The discrepancies between the growth rates in terms of the 
number of stores and the number of employees may be due to the greater 
productivity of larger stores as compared to traditional mom-and-pop stores. 
• The total sales floor space for retail establishments with 50 or more employees 
steadily increased between 1992 and 2000 and between 1978 (the first year for 
which data are available) and 2001. The first negative growth rate of -2% appeared 
in 2002. Substantial growth occurred in 1981 (9%) and between 1994 and 1998, 
during which growth was 6% or more annually. 
• The total value of annual sales at retail establishments with 50 or employees 
exhibited the greatest amount of growth for 1979 (8%), 1980 (11%), 1981 (8%), 
1988 (7%), 1989 (8%), and 1990 (8%). Growth rates were slightly negative from 
1998 to 2002, as is consistent with the overall trend of declining retail sales during 
that period. However, the decline in sales by retail establishments with 50 or more 
employees was less dramatic than the overall trend (see Table 6). 
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Table 5: Number of large stores, number of employees, sales floor area, and value of 
annual sales, 1972-2002 
         
Year Number of stores* 
Change  
in % 
Number of 
employees* 
Change  
in % 
Sales floor  
space*  
(1’000 m2) 
Change 
in % 
Value of  
annual  
sales ** 
Change  
in % 
         
1972 1'099  -  238'256  -   -   -  4'094'391  -  
1973 1'295 18% 276'275 16%  -   -  5'355'049  -  
1974 1'394 8% 296'446 7%  -   -  6'652'145  -  
1975 1'463 5% 291'788 -2%  -   -  7'566'387  -  
1976 1'524 4% 310'095 6%  -   -  8'396'922  -  
1977 1'694 11% 325'621 5%  -  - 9'310'669 - 
1978 1'764 4% 338'105 4% 11'484 - 10'230'283 - 
1979 1'824 3% 347'374 3% 11'849 3% 11'019'794 8% 
1980 1'938 6% 362'545 4% 12'592 6% 12'185'251 11% 
1981 2'071 7% 377'573 4% 13'685 9% 13'163'727 8% 
1982 2'175 5% 387'114 3% 14'147 3% 13'733'834 4% 
1983 2'235 3% 391'379 1% 14'639 3% 14'146'265 3% 
1984 2'273 2% 391'338 0% 14'851 1% 14'743'909 4% 
1985 2'291 1% 390'767 0% 15'164 2% 15'281'467 4% 
1986 2'331 2% 398 2% 15'585 3% 15'977 5% 
1987 2'343 1% 402 1% 15'928 2% 16'754 5% 
1988 2'346 0% 411 2% 16'258 2% 17'884 7% 
1989 2'341 0% 422 3% 16'820 3% 19'376 8% 
1990 2'358 1% 424 0% 17'343 3% 20'942 8% 
1991 2'429 3% 444 5% 17'739 2% 22'164 6% 
1992 2'451 1% 463 4% 18'269 3% 22'204 0% 
1993 2'486 1% 468 1% 19'008 4% 21'490 -3% 
1994 2'720 9% 485 4% 20'442 8% 21'793 1% 
1995 2'871 6% 489 1% 21'591 6% 22'340 3% 
1996 3'000 4% 509 4% 22'942 6% 22'976 3% 
1997 3'185 6% 536 5% 24'450 7% 23'413 2% 
1998 3'439 8% 552 3% 25'851 6% 23'248 -1% 
1999 3'644 6% 562 2% 27'209 5% 23'124 -1% 
2000 3'792 4% 581 3% 28'686 5% 22'634 -2% 
2001 3'898 3% 579 0% 28'974 1% 22'341 -1% 
2002 4'013 3% 597 3% 28'488 -2% 22'033 -1% 
Value in billions of yen. Until 1985, in millions of yen. Number of stores and persons engaged in  
thousands. Until 1985, in persons. *At the end of the year. **Beginning 1990, including consumption tax. 
Source: Based on Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; 
Historical Statistics of Japan, Chapter 13, Domestic Trade. 
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 Table 6: Annual sales in the Japanese retail industry, 1952-2004 
    
Year Total number of retail stores Annual sales of goods  (in millions of  yen) Growth in % 
    
1952 1'079'728 ... ... 
1954 1'189'045 ... ... 
1956 1'201'273 ... ... 
1958 1'244'629 3'548'626 ... 
1960 1'288'292 4'315'387 22% 
1962 1'271'975 6'148'961 42% 
1964 1'304'536 8'349'588 36% 
1966 1'375'394 10'683'623 28% 
1968 1'432'436 16'507'256 55% 
1970 1'471'297 21'773'438 32% 
1972 1'495'510 28'292'696 30% 
1974 1'548'184 40'299'895 42% 
1976 1'614'067 56'029'077 39% 
1979 1'673'667 73'564'400 31% 
1982 1'721'465 93'971'191 28% 
1985 1'628'644 101'718'812 8% 
1988 1'619'752 114'839'927 13% 
1991 1'591'223 140'638'104 22% 
1994 1'499'948 143'325'065 2% 
1997 1'419'696 147'743'116 3% 
1999 1'406'884 143'832'551 -3% 
2002 1'300'057 135'109'295 -6% 
2004 1'238'296 133'278'631 -1% 
Source: Based on data from the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications; Historical Statistics of Japan, Chapter 13, Domestic Trade. 
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) provides data on retail 
establishments with sales floor areas of 500 m2 or greater for an extended period (see 
Table 7). The data exhibit the following trends: the total number of retail 
establishments with sales floor area of 500 m2 or more constantly increased between 
1991 and 1999 and between 1982 and 2004. The largest growth rate (24%) was 
recorded between 1994 and 1997; between 1991 and 1994, the growth rate was 14%, 
while the growth rate was 10% between 1985 and 1988.  
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For retail establishments with sales floor area of 3’000 m2 or more that therefore fell 
into either the Type-1 or the Type-2 category according to the revised Large-Scale 
Retail Stores Law, the following developments took place between 1994 and 2004: 
• Retail establishments with sales floor area of between 3’000 m2 and 6’000 m2 
(Type-1 stores) exhibited the largest increase (42%) between 1994 and 1997. 
During the same period, Type-2 stores (6’000 m2 or larger) also showed two-digit 
area growth rates: 15% for retail establishments with sales floor area of 6’000 m2 to 
10’000 m2 and 26% for both retail establishments with sales floor area of 10’000 m2 
to 20’000 m2 and retail establishments with sales floor area of over 20’000 m2. 
• Between 1997 and 1999, retail establishments with sales floor area of more than 
20’000 m2 reported the largest growth rates (26%). Retail establishments with sales 
floor area of more than 3’000 m2 also exhibited double-digit or close to double-digit 
growth rates. Retail establishments with sales floor area of 3’000 m2 to 6’000 m2 
exhibited a growth rate of 14%, retail establishments with sales floor area of 6’000 
m2 to 10’000 m2 exhibited a growth rate of 9%, and retail establishments with sales 
floor space of 10’000 m2 to 20’000 m2 recorded a growth rate of 14%. 
• Between 1999 and 2004, the number of retail establishments with sales floor area 
between 1’500 m2 and less than 3’000 m2 increased by 36%, while the number of 
retail establishments with sales floor space of 6’000 m2 or more decreased by 
22%.25  
                                                
25 This decrease may be attributed to the retreat of foreign retailers that had opened large stores in suburban areas 
that ultimately proved unprofitable (see, for example, Sato, 2004b). One example is Carrefour, a French retailer that 
opened an outlet in December 2000 in the Makuhari district of Chiba, northeast of Tokyo. In the same month, 
Costco, a United States wholesaler, opened a store just a kilometer away.  
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Table 7: Number of stores with sales floor space of 500 m2 or more 
                 
 1982 Change in % 1985 
Change  
in % 1988 
Change  
in % 1991 
Change  
in % 1994 
Change  
in % 1997 
Change  
in % 1999 
Change  
in % 2004 
Change  
in % 
                 
Total 
stores 13'124 - 13'286 1% 14'632 10% 15'511 6% 17'643 14% 21'892 24% 23'897 9% 24'329 2% 
500 m2 - 
1'000 m2 - - - - - - - - 5'817 - 7'836 35% 8'671 11% 24'329 181% 
1'000 m2 - 
1'500 m2 - - - - - - - - 5'296 - 5'366 1% 5'249 -2% 5'992 14% 
1'500 m2 - 
3'000 m2 - - - - - - - - 2'908 - 3'984 37% 4'627 16% 6'294 36% 
3'000 m2 - 
6'000 m2 - - - - - - - - 1'593 - 2'255 42% 2'574 14% 2'819 10% 
6'000 m2 - 
10'000 m2 - - - - - - - - 977 - 1'128 15% 1'226 9% 
10'000 m2 - 
20'000 m2 - - - - - - - - 773 - 972 26% 1'106 14% 
Over 
20'000 m2 - - - - - - - - 279 - 351 26% 444 26% 
2'154 -22% 
                 
*All stores over 
6'000 m2                
Source: Based on various statistics from the METI. 
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The increase in the number of retail establishments with sales floor area greater than 
3’000 m2, all of which fell under the Large-Scale Retail Law even after its revision in 
the early 1990s, is also indicated by the number of applications to open large stores. 
Graph 4 shows the number of applications to open new stores lodged with the MITI. 
Graph 4: Applications to open new large-scale retail stores, 1974-1996 
 
Source: Riethmuller and Chai, 1999: 4. 
Overall, the number of large stores increased after the revision of the Large-Scale 
Retail Stores Law. However, two questions remain unanswered regarding changes in 
the number of large stores during the period following the revision of the Large-Scale 
Retail Stores Law. 
• There seems to be a correlation between the revision of the Large-Scale Retail 
Stores Law and the number of large retail stores, but is the revision of the Large-
Scale Retail Stores Law specifically a driver of the increase in the number of large 
retail stores? 
• How does the rate of change or the increase in the number of large stores compare 
with that in other countries? 
 73 
Regarding the first question, Riethmuller and Chai (1999) have concluded that the 
change to the revised statute probably did make a difference in the number of 
applications to open new stores. However, they point out that the late 1980s and the 
early part of the 1990s were the years of the bubble economy and that retailers’ 
expectation that the boom would last forever led, at least partly, to the large number of 
applications (see Riethmuller and Chai, 1999: 3). 
In considering the second question, Davies and Itoh (2001: 93) have assessed the 
change in the Japanese retail market as being relatively small and slow compared to 
reasonable expectations. They compare Japan to the United Kingdom, using the 
rationale that the United Kingdom is at roughly the same latitude as Japan and that the 
two countries share the same climate and have similar population densities and car 
ownership rates. Although they reject the null hypotheses that no change in structure 
occurred when the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law was liberalized, they stress that 
correlation is no guarantee of causality and that many things can affect retail structure. 
4.2.2 A decrease in the number of small traditional retailers  
In tandem with increased competition from larger stores, the number of small 
traditional retailers was expected to decline. This reasoning is based on the notion that 
the ubiquity of small mom-and-pop stores was related to the long history of 
government protection of small stores from the competition of large stores (see Flath 
and Nariu, 1996: 182).  
According to the data, the total number of retail establishments peaked in 1982 at 
1’721’465. Thereafter, it declined continuously, reaching 1’238’049 in 2004. Hence, 
the decline in the total number of retail establishments started at some point between 
1982 and 1985 (see Graph 5). 
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Graph 5: Total number of retail establishments, 1952-2004 
 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; Historical 
Statistics of Japan, Chapter 13, Domestic Trade; METI Census of Commerce 2004. 
In analyzing the number of retail establishments in each size category (see Table 8), we 
find that the decline was mainly caused by almost 100’000 retail establishments with 
one to two employees going out of business. This is the category of retail store that was 
expected to be most severely affected by changes in the regulatory environment. 
Between 1982 and 1985, the total number of retail establishments decreased by 5.4% or 
92’821 stores. During this period, 9.3% or 96’023 retail establishments with one to two 
employees and 1.1% or 4’523 retail establishments with three to four employees went 
out of business. Retail formats with more than five employees exhibited single-digit 
growth rates between 1982 and 1985. 
After 1985, retail establishments with one to two employees showed negative growth 
for the period under analysis. All categories except for establishments with three to four 
employees or more than 100 employees exhibited double-digit growth rates in 1988 and 
then again in 1994 and 1999. Between 1997 and 1999, retail establishments with more 
than 100 employees grew by 31.3%.  
These growth rates may be attributable to the revision of the Large-Scale Retail Stores 
Law, but the decrease in the number of small retail establishments starting in 1985 
cannot be similarly linked to this legislation. Hence, it is not clear why the number of 
small retail establishments started to decline between 1982 and 1985. 
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Table 8: The number of retail establishments based on numbers of employees, 1952-2004 
Number of retail establishments with  
Year 
 
Total  
number 
of  
retail  
establish- 
ments 
Change 
in 
% to  
previous  
year 
1-2  
employees 
Change  
in % to  
previous  
year 
3-4  
employees 
Change  
in % to  
previous  
year 
5-9  
employees 
Change  
in % to  
previous  
year 
10-19  
employees 
Change  
in % to  
previous  
year 
20-29  
employees 
Change  
in % to  
previous  
year 
30-49  
employees 
Change  
in % to  
previous  
year 
50-99  
employees 
Change  
in % to  
previous  
year 
100  
employees  
or more 
Change  
in % to  
previous  
year 
                   
1952 1'079'728 - 1'029'213 - - - 41'077 - 7'247 - 1'222 - 559 - 410 - - - 
1954 1'189'045 10.1% 1'113'873 8.2% - - 59'873 45.8% 11'599 60.1% 2'092 71.2% 992 77.5% 616 50.2% - - 
1956 1'201'273 1.0% 862'620 -22.6% 244'545 - 77'027 28.7% 13'267 14.4% 2'173 3.9% 1'002 1.0% 639 3.7% - - 
1958 1'244'629 3.6% 871'764 1.1% 266'347 8.9% 85'013 10.4% 15'949 20.2% 3'081 41.8% 1'531 52.8% 640 0.2% 304 - 
1960 1'288'292 3.5% 914'676 4.9% 247'743 -7.0% 97'373 14.5% 20'548 28.8% 4'234 37.4% 2'326 51.9% 966 50.9% 426 40.1% 
1962 1'271'975 -1.3% 907'005 -0.8% 240'154 -3.1% 91'970 -5.5% 23'039 12.1% 5'043 19.1% 2'941 26.4% 1'269 31.4% 554 30.0% 
1964 1'304'536 2.6% 916'835 1.1% 250'897 4.5% 98'240 6.8% 26'318 14.2% 6'221 23.4% 3'730 26.8% 1'609 26.8% 686 23.8% 
1966 1'375'394 5.4% 939'987 2.5% 280'395 11.8% 110'827 12.8% 29'867 13.5% 7'316 17.6% 4'316 15.7% 1'893 17.7% 793 15.6% 
1968 1'432'436 4.1% 942'759 0.3% 305'046 8.8% 131'184 18.4% 36'560 22.4% 8'260 12.9% 5'032 16.6% 2'388 26.1% 1'207 52.2% 
1970 1'471'297 2.7% 940'808 -0.2% 330'612 8.4% 141'672 8.0% 39'105 7.0% 9'223 11.7% 5'707 13.4% 2'826 18.3% 1'344 11.4% 
1972 1'495'510 1.6% 927'728 -1.4% 348'919 5.5% 156'939 10.8% 41'778 6.8% 9'909 7.4% 5'980 4.8% 2'886 2.1% 1'371 2.0% 
1974 1'548'184 3.5% 967'185 4.3% 360'761 3.4% 158'218 0.8% 41'311 -1.1% 10'115 2.1% 6'088 1.8% 2'962 2.6% 1'544 12.6% 
1976 1'614'067 4.3% 999'622 3.4% 382'184 5.9% 165'852 4.8% 43'627 5.6% 11'113 9.9% 6'808 11.8% 3'282 10.8% 1'579 2.3% 
1979 1'673'667 3.7% 1'022'103 2.2% 401'188 5.0% 175'951 6.1% 47'591 9.1% 12'943 16.5% 8'188 20.3% 4'021 22.5% 1'682 6.5% 
1982 1'721'465 2.9% 1'036'046 1.4% 412'701 2.9% 187'898 6.8% 54'156 13.8% 14'776 14.2% 9'494 16.0% 4'519 12.4% 1'875 11.5% 
1985 1'628'644 -5.4% 940'023 -9.3% 408'178 -1.1% 190'434 1.3% 57'911 6.9% 15'340 3.8% 10'035 5.7% 4'764 5.4% 1'959 4.5% 
1988 1'620 -0.5% 874 -7.0% 422 3.4% 214 12.4% 70 20.9% 19 23.9% 12 19.6% 5.4 13.4% 2.1 7.2% 
1991 1'591 -1.8% 847 -3.1% 417 -1.2% 214 0.0% 72 2.9% 20 5.3% 13 8.3% 5.9 9.3% 2.3 9.5% 
1994 1'500 -5.7% 765 -9.7% 371 -11.0% 223 4.2% 90 25.0% 26 30.0% 16 23.1% 7.2 22.0% 2.9 26.1% 
1997 1'420 -5.3% 709 -7.3% 350 -5.7% 212 -4.9% 93 3.3% 28 7.7% 16 0.0% 7.9 9.7% 3.2 10.3% 
1999 1'407 -0.9% 685 -3.4% 317 -9.4% 227 7.1% 112 20.4% 34 21.4% 18 12.5% 9.9 25.3% 4.2 31.3% 
2002 1'300 -7.6% 603 -12.0% 298 -6.0% 219 -3.5% 115 2.7% 33 -2.9% 18 0.0% 10 1.0% 4.5 7.1% 
2004 1'238 -4.8% 569 -5.6% 284 -4.7% 208 -5.0% 112 -2.6% 33 0.0% 17 -5.6% 10 0.0% 4.5 0.0% 
Source: Based on Historical Statistics of Japan, Chapter 13, Domestic Trade; METI, Census of Commerce. 
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4.2.3 A decrease in the number of wholesalers  
According to data from the Japan Statistics Bureau, the total number of wholesale 
establishments peaked in 1991 at approximately 476’000.  Except for the years 1962, 
1968, and 1985, when the total number decreased by 1%, 17%, and 4%, respectively, 
the total number of wholesale establishments steadily increased until 1991. Between 
1991 and 1994 and between 1994 and 1997, the number declined by about 9% and 
10%, respectively. Between 1997 and 1999, the total number increased again by about 
9% before it decreased again by almost 11% between 1999 and 2002. In the last 
recorded year (2004), negative growth was at 1%. Thus, there has been an overall 
negative trend since 1991 except for the increase of 9% between 1997 and 1999 (see 
Graph 6 and Table 9). 
Graph 6: The total number of wholesale establishments, 1952-2004 
 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; Historical 
Statistics of Japan, Chapter 13, Domestic Trade. 
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Table 9: The total number of wholesale establishments, 1952-2004 
   
Year Number of wholesale establishments Change to previous year 
   
1952 141'457 - 
1954 166'725 18% 
1956 179'856 8% 
1958 192'653 7% 
1960 225'993 17% 
1962 223'409 -1% 
1964 229'248 3% 
1966 287'208 25% 
1968 239'507 -17% 
1970 255'974 7% 
1972 259'163 1% 
1974 292'155 13% 
1976 340'249 16% 
1979 368'608 8% 
1982 428'858 16% 
1985 413'016 -4% 
1988 436'000 6% 
1991 476'000 9% 
1994 429'000 -10% 
1997 392'000 -9% 
1999 426'000 9% 
2002 380'000 -11% 
2004 375'378 -1% 
Source: Historical Statistics of Japan, Chapter 13, Domestic trade; METI, Census of 
Commerce, 2004. 
The above figures, however, include wholesalers with sales that did not go through the 
retail market, such as wholesalers that would sell to industrial users, export overseas, 
and/or execute transactions between headquarters and branch offices of the same 
company. The data from the Japan Statistic Bureau are not separated based on the 
various categories of wholesalers. The 2002 Census of Commerce published by METI, 
however, includes a “Report by Distribution Route” for the years 1994, 1997, and 2002 
(see Table 10). 
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Table 10: Establishments conducting the wholesale trade of consumer goods, ordered by distribution level and distribution route 
Sourcing from Selling to 1994 1997 2002 1994 1997 2002 1994 - 1997
1997 - 
2002
1994 - 
2002
163'275 151'288 148'270 100% 100% 100% -7.3% -2.0% 9.2%
1.Primary wholesale
第一次卸
1.1 Direct trade wholesalers
直取引卸
1.1.1 Direct trade wholesalers
他部門直取引（取引先が他の産業であ
る直取引卸）
Sourcing from producers Selling to industrial users
生産業者から仕入れ 生産使用者へ販売
Sourcing from producers Selling to overseas
生産業者から仕入れ 国外へ販売
Sourcing from overseas Selling to industrial users
外国から仕入れ 生産使用者へ販売
Sourcing from overseas Selling overseas
外国から仕入れ 国外へ販売
1.1.2 Direct trade wholesale to 
retailers
小売直取引（販売先が小売業者である
直取引卸）
Sourcing from producers Selling to retailers
生産業者から仕入れ 小売業者へ販売
Sourcing from overseas Selling to retailers
外国から仕入れ 小売業者へ販売
1.2 Source wholesalers
元卸
Sourcing from producers Selling to wholesalers
生産業者から仕入れ 卸売業者へ販売
Sourcing from overseas Selling to wholesalers
外国から仕入れ 卸売業者へ販売
2. Secondary wholesale level
第二次卸
2.1 Itermediate wholesalers
中間卸
Sourcing from wholesalers Selling to wholesalers
卸売業者から仕入れ 卸売業者へ販売
2.2 Final wholesalers
最終卸
Sourcing from wholesalers Selling to industrial users
卸売業者から仕入れ 生産使用者へ販売
Sourcing from wholesalers Selling overseas
卸売業者から仕入れ 国外へ販売
Sourcing from wholesalers Selling to retailers
卸売業者から仕入れ 小売業者へ販売
3. Other wholesalers
その他の卸
Rate of change (%)
-21.1%
-27.3%
-22.2%
33.5%
-15.1%
36.3%
-14.3%
10'838 9'735 8'434
No. of establishments Composition
25.0%
-24.9%
-37.6%
44.9%
-4.8%
-6.3%
-4.6%
-11.4%20.3%
91.4%
-29.1%
-32.5%
41.5%
-3.8%
35'651 31'598 30'090 21.8% 20.9%
22.7%22.5%
-7.5%
-16.0%
43.6%
4.5%
23.1% -8.3%
33.1%
33.1%
-4.4%
4.6%3.9%
20.1%28.2%0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
10.8%9.4% 10.5%
33.7%31.9%
15'291 15'894 15'999
174 163 209
36'668 34'970 33'624
33.6%
-15.6%
10.5% 20.4%14.6%
-2.1% -2.3%
0.7%
11.8%
52'133 51'027
9.9%
49'832
16'211 17'918 21'579
0.9%
10.5% 20.4%
48.2%
11.8% 14.6%
41.9% 45.6%
16'211 17'918 9.9%21'579
-3.0% 48.0%
68'344 68'945 71'411 3.6%
-1.9%
2'639 2'561 3'789 1.6% 1.7% 2.6%
9.0% -14.4%
-12.7% 6.0%
15'843 13'566 13'302 9.7% 9.0%
10.7% 11.5%16'127 17'091 11.3%18'482
2.9% 37.4%
-17.9% -17.8%
1.0% 1.4%
15.5% 13.0%17.5%
18.3%
0.9%
28'525 23'406 19'241
1'435 1'477 2'030
37.0%
-16.9% -14.6%
39.6%
29'960 24'883 21'244 16.4% 14.3%
-12.4%
32.9%
81 111 155 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
0.4%529 9.0%
-28.8%
0.2% 0.3%
0.2%
-16.1%
396 282 247 0.2% 0.2%
5.1% -10.5%7'503 6.1% 5.9%9'996 8'944
365 398
-10.2% -13.4%6.6% 6.4% 5.7%
-7.8%
40'798 34'618 29'678 22.9% 20.0%
-14.4%
Wholesale level
Distribution route
31.5%
Total wholesale sector (consumer goods)
59'280 50'745 46'769
 
Source: METI, 2004: 14. 
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The figures in Table 10 still include trade flows from wholesalers to overseas and 
industrial users. We therefore look only at the categories of direct trade wholesalers 
who serve retailers and final wholesalers, sourcing from wholesalers and selling to 
retailers. Wholesalers not selling to retailers or other wholesalers are ignored. For the 
categories of source wholesalers and intermediate wholesalers, we assume that a 
significant fraction sells to wholesalers who do not then supply industrial users or 
overseas markets. The findings are as follows. 
1. Primary wholesalers 
• The number of direct trade wholesalers to retailers sourcing from Japanese 
producers and selling to retailers decreased from 28’525 in 1994 to 19’214 in 2002. 
These values represent a decrease of 32.5% between 1994 and 2002. 
• The number of direct trade wholesalers sourcing from overseas and selling to 
retailers increased from 1’435 in 1994 to 2’030 in 2002. These values represent an 
increase of 41.5% between 1994 and 2002. 
2. Source wholesalers  
• The number of source wholesalers buying from producers and selling to 
wholesalers decreased from 15’843 in 1994 to 13’302 in 2002. These values 
represent a decrease of 16.0% between 1994 and 2002. 
• The number of source wholesalers buying from overseas and selling to wholesalers 
increased from 1’435 in 1994 to 2’030 in 2002. These values represent an increase 
of 43.6% between 1994 and 2002. 
3. Secondary wholesalers 
• Intermediate wholesalers: The number of intermediate wholesalers increased from 
16’211 in 1994 to 21’579 in 2002. These values represent an increase of 33.1% 
between 1994 and 2002. 
• Final wholesalers: The number of final wholesalers sourcing from wholesalers and 
selling to retailers decreased from 36’668 in 1994 to 33’624 in 2002. These values 
represent a decrease of 8.3% between 1994 and 2002. 
The results of the data analysis match our expectations except for the increase in the 
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number of intermediate wholesalers by 33.1% between 1994 and 2002, which stands in 
contrast to all expectations.26 
4.2.4 Improved wholesale circuity  
One measure that is frequently used to define wholesale circuity is the W/R ratio, 
which is the ratio of total wholesale sales (W) to total retail sales (R). A low W/R ratio 
indicates short marketing channels, while a high W/R ratio indicates extended 
marketing channels.  
Based on total retail sales and total wholesale sales, wholesale circuity was calculated 
to range from 4.9 in 1966 to 3.0 in 2004. Between 1991 and 1994, the W/R ratio 
dropped from 4.1 to 3.6 and then to 3.2 in 1997. In 2004, there were still as many as 
three wholesale steps on average between the manufacturer and the consumer (see 
Table 11). 
                                                
26 This is even more surprising because total sales within this wholesaler category remained more or less stable; 
between 1994 and 2002, sales decreased by 1.5%. See METI (2004). 
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Table 11: The W/R ratio, 1958-2004 
    
Year Total wholesale sales* Total retail sales* W/R ratio 
    
1958 13'986'607 3'548'626 3.9 
1960 18'468'273 4'315'387 4.3 
1962 27'473'567 6'148'961 4.5 
1964 38'830'071 8'349'588 4.7 
1966 52'082'304 10'683'623 4.9 
1968 62'816'763 16'507'256 3.8 
1970 88'330'893 21'773'438 4.1 
1972 106'780'082 28'292'696 3.8 
1974 173'113'132 40'299'895 4.3 
1976 222'315'445 56'029'077 4.0 
1979 274'545'131 73'564'400 3.7 
1982 398'536'234 93'971'191 4.2 
1985 427'750'891 101'718'812 4.2 
1988 446'483'972 114'839'927 3.9 
1991 573'164'698 140'638'104 4.1 
1994 514'316'863 143'325'065 3.6 
1997 479'813'295 147'743'116 3.2 
1999 495'452'580 143'832'551 3.4 
2002 413'354'831 135'109'295 3.1 
2004 405'646'439 133'278'631 3.0 
    
*In mio. JPY   
Source: Based on the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications; Historical Statistics of Japan, Chapter 13, Domestic Trade, 13-1; 
METI, Census of Commerce 2004. 
There are two basic problems with the W/R ratio when it is used to determine the 
structure of the wholesale industry. The W/R ratio was originally used to capture the 
relationship between two economic sectors, namely the wholesale sector (W) and the 
retail sector (R). It is, however, not adequate to determine the internal structure of the 
wholesale market. Japan’s wholesale sales include exports, direct sales to industrial 
users that do not pass through the retail market, and transactions between headquarters 
and branch offices of the same company. Nishimura (1993) writes that because of this 
classification, the ratio of wholesale to retail sales in Japan seems large when compared 
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with similar metrics for the United States and European countries (see Nishimura, 
1993: 104). 
In addition, as Ito and Maruyama (1990) have pointed out, a high W/R ratio may be the 
result of the following: 
!"#$%&'()*+) %,&)-,*.&$'.&)/&0#1)23.%04.'5&6&(7) %,&)6&%'0.)&$%'/.0$,2&#%$)2'5)/&)
&$8&90'..5)$2'..)$0:&;)"+)%,&)6&%'0.)$'.&$)8&6)&$%'/.0$,2&#%)<=>)'6&)$2'..)(3&)%*)0%$)
$2'..4$9'.&)*8&6'%0*#$)<=>7)%,&#)'),01,)?@A)6'%0*)-*3.()/&)*/%'0#&(;)B,&6&+*6&7)
%,&)?@A)6'%0*)'.*#&)0$)#*%)9*#9.3$0C&)&C0(&#9&)*+)%,&)23.%04.'5&6&()#'%36&;D)<"%*)
'#()E'635'2'7)FGGHI)FJ>))
Due to this apparent weakness of the W/R ratio, Nishimura (1993) has advocated the 
use of the w/W ratio to measure wholesale circuity. Used as an indicator for the degree 
of circuity or the length of wholesale marketing, the w/W ratio is defined as 
 
w/W ratio=!=(sales from wholesalers to other wholesalers)/(total wholesale sales) 
 
Note that ! indicates the existence of multiple stages (i.e., more than two stages), while 
S indicates the number of wholesaler stages (see also Graph 7):  
If  S=1, then !=0/1=0.00 in the M-W1-N structure. 
If S=2, then !=1/2=0.50 in the M-W1-W2-N structure. 
If S=3, then !=2/3=0.66 in the M-W1-W2-W3-N structure. 
If S=4, then !=3/4=0.75 in the M-W1-W2-W3-W4-N structure. 
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Graph 7: Wholesaler stages  
 
Source: Nishimura, 1993. 
Nishimura’s findings suggest that the length of Japan’s wholesale channels does not 
warrant the strong criticism from European countries and the United States. According 
to his calculations, the average number of wholesale stages in Japan from 1968 to 1988 
was 1.57, while the average number of steps in wholesale channels in the United States 
from 1972 to 1987 was 1.30. 
METI (2005) has published w/W ratios for various types of wholesalers (see Table 12). 
The w/W ratio across all wholesale types peaked in 1979 at 1.74, whereas the average 
w/W ratio for the years 1976 to 2002 was 1.64. 
The w/W ratio for wholesalers that trade in consumer goods peaked in 1979 at 1.83. In 
2002, this metric decreased to 1.65. The most substantial decrease was recorded 
between 1991 and 1994, from 1.71 to 1.64. 
Table 12 also shows substantial differences in the w/W ratio across the various types of 
wholesalers based on the goods they handle. While wholesalers dealing with industrial 
and consumer goods have similar average w/W ratios of 1.75 and 1.74, respectively, 
the wholesale channel for capital goods is shorter, with an average of 1.45 wholesale 
steps. 
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Table 12: The w/W ratio, 1976-2002 
          
Year All  wholesalers 
Wholesalers dealing  
with producers /  
industrial goods 
Wholesalers dealing  
with capital goods 
Wholesalers dealing  
with consumer goods 
     
1976 1.71  1.92  1.56  1.80  
1979 1.74  1.90  1.52  1.83  
1982 1.72  1.82  1.43  1.80  
1985 1.60  1.68  1.42  1.80  
1988 1.62  1.70  1.44  1.75  
1991 1.65  1.77  1.41  1.71  
1994 1.62  1.70  1.39  1.64  
1997 1.54  1.63  1.42  1.66  
2002 1.56  1.62  1.47  1.65  
Ave-
rage 1.64 1.75 1.45 1.74 
Source: METI, 2005. 
Like the W/R ratio, the w/W ratio also has its shortcomings: 
• The w/W ratio does not include sales that avoid the wholesale markets, such as 
direct sales by manufacturers to consumers or retailers. Therefore, this measure is 
not entirely adequate for a complete analysis of the multi-staged structure of 
wholesale in general, but it remains helpful for analyzing trends in the circuitous 
structure of the wholesale sector (see Nishimura, 1993: 104). 
• Like the W/R ratio, the w/W ratio includes wholesale sales such as exports, direct 
sales to industrial users that do not pass through the retail market, and transactions 
between the headquarters and branch offices of a company. 
In order to correct these shortcomings, Nariu and Flath (1993) introduce a proxy for 
measuring the number of wholesale steps (NS), defined as the natural logarithm of the 
total mark-up divided by the natural logarithm of the average mark-up (for details, see 
Nariu and Flath, 1993: 83-84):  
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Note that NS is the number of wholesale steps; P0 is the price at which manufacturers 
sell a product to a primary wholesaler; PN is the price at which the last wholesaler in the 
chain sells a product to a retailer; and Pj//Pj-1 is the average mark-up.  
Nariu and Flath analyze the length of wholesale marketing channels in Japan and the 
United States by matching various kinds of wholesale businesses; they then compute 
the number of wholesale steps for 40 different kinds of businesses in Japan in 1986 and 
44 different kinds of businesses in the United States in 1982 for both durables and non-
durables (see Table 13 and Table 14) (see Nariu and Flath, 1993: 84ff). Their results 
can be summarized as follows: 
• The average number of steps across all kinds of businesses is 1.48 for Japan and 
1.36 for the United States. 
• Although the positive difference between the number of wholesale steps in Japan 
and the number in the U. S. is small, the difference is pervasive and not limited to 
specific products. It is, however, not applicable for motor vehicles, hardware and 
petroleum. 
• There is a clear tendency for products that have long marketing channels in one 
country to also have long channels in another. Products such as fresh fish have 
longer channels in both Japan and the United States 
• The types of products whose Japanese and U.S. versions exhibit the greatest 
difference in terms of the number of steps are china and glassware, curtains and 
draperies, lumber, building materials, paper, and canned goods. 
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Table 13: The estimated number of wholesale steps: Japan in 1986 and the United 
States in 1982 according to type of wholesale business – nondurables 
United States Japan 
Type of business NS* NS Type of business 
Nondurables 1.49     
Paper and paper products 1.20 1.47 Paper and paper products 
General line drugs 1.04 1.16 Drugs 
Specialty line pharmaceutical,  
cosmetics and toiletries 
1.19 1.34 Toiletries and allied products 
Piece goods 1.92 1.6 Textiles except interior decoration 
Notions and other dry goods 1.38 1.5 Miscellaneous apparel, apparel  
accessories and notions 
Men's and other dry goods 1.12 1.22 Men's clothing 
Women's, children's and infants'  
apparel 
1.17 1.31 Women's and children's clothing 
Footwear 1.31 1.14 Shoes 
Dairy products 1.81 1.67 Miscellaneous food and beverages  
including dairy products 
Poultry and meat 1.57 1.68 Meat and poultry 
Confectionary 1.51 1.45 Bakery and confectionary products 
Fish and seafood 2.27 2.56 Fresh fish, shellfish and seaweed 
Fresh fruits and vegetables 1.73 1.86 Vegetables and fruits 
Coffee, tea and spices 1.35 1.67 Tea 
Canned goods 1.18 1.76 Canned goods and bottled goods 
Farm products 1.42 1.45 Miscellaneous farm, livestock and  
aquatic products 
Chemical and allied products 1.19 1.45 Chemicals and related products  
except paints 
Petroleum and petroleum products 1.74 1.53 Petroleum 
Alcoholic beverages 1.24 1.36 Beer, wine and liquor 
Farm supplies 1.47 n.a. Fertilizers and feeds 
Tobacco and tobacco products 1.10 n.a. Tobacco products 
Paints, varnishes and supplies 1.19 1.37 Paints and related products 
*=Number of wholesale steps; refers to the number of separate title-holding intermediaries interposed  
between a manufacturer and retailers and or individual demanders. 
Source: Nariu and Flath, 1993. 
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Table 14: The estimated number of wholesale steps: Japan in 1986 and the U. S. in 
1982 according to the type of wholesale business – durables 
United States Japan 
Type of business NS* NS Type of business 
Durables 1.27     
Motor vehicles 1.87 1.14 Motor vehicles 
Automotive parts and supplies 1.59 1.51 Motor vehicles parts and accessories 
Furniture 1.61 1.29 Furniture and fixtures 
China, glassware and crockery 1.04 1.41 Chinaware and glassware 
Linens, domestics, curtains and  
draperies 
1.11 1.48 Textiles, interior decoration 
Floor coverings and other home  
furnishings 
1.26 1.48 Miscellaneous home furnishings 
Lumber, plywood and millwork 1.32 1.68 Limber and bamboo 
Brick, stone, sand, tile and cement 1.24 1.68 Cement 
Flat glass and other construction  
materials 
1.32 1.58 Sheet glass 
Construction materials n.e.c. 1.10 1.68 Miscellaneous building materials 
Sporting and recreational goods, toys  
and hobby goods 
1.27 n.a. Sporting goods, recreational goods  
and toys 
Photographic equipment and  
supplies 
1.48 1.33 Precision instruments including  
camera equipment 
Ferrous metal 1.51 1.72 Iron and stell 
Nonferrous metal 1.25 1.51 Nonferrous metals 
Coal 1.14 1.51 Coal 
Electrical goods other than house  
appliances 
1.15 1.25 Electrical machinery, apparatus and  
supplies except household appliances 
Electric house appliances, tv and  
radio sets 
1.56 1.25 Electrical household appliances 
Hardware 1.21 1.16 Hardware 
Machinery equipment, n.e.c. 1.15 1.36 General machinery and equipment 
Surgical, medical and hospital supplies 1.06 1.16 Surgical goods 
Transportation equipment and  
supplies except motor vehicles 
1.16 1.36 Transportation equipment except  
motor vehicles 
Iron and steel scrap 1.21 n.a. Iron scraps 
Waste and secondary materials 1.24 n.a. Nonferrous scraps 
Forest products except lumber 1.08 n.a. Firewood 
*=Number of wholesale steps; refers to the number of separate title-holding intermediaries interposed  
between a manufacturer and retailers and or individual demanders. 
Source: Nariu and Flath, 1993. 
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Nariu and Flath (1993) find that both consumer goods and industrial goods have longer 
wholesale channels in Japan; they conclude that the fragmentation of industrial 
customers might have a similar influence on the wholesale structure, as the ubiquity of 
retail stores. Not all wholesale marketing channels in Japan, however, have more steps. 
Goods with relatively few steps in Japan include motor vehicles and electric appliances. 
Nariu and Flath (1993) argue that the coordination of channel members through 
distribution keiretsu favors less complex wholesale channels. 
Maruyama (2004) introduces yet another ratio that can be used to determine wholesale 
circuity called the wholesaler use ratio. It is defined as follows: 
 
 
Maruyama (2004) achieves two findings: firstly, a decline in the number of consumer 
goods wholesalers; and secondly, a sharp decline in the wholesaler use ratio in the 
1990s and accelerating trend of bypassing wholesalers altogether (see Maruyama, 
2004: 31).  He also notes that like the W/R ratio, the wholesaler use ratio is just an 
approximate estimation method. This is the case because the sales of other direct 
transaction wholesalers can be excluded when determining the wholesaler use ratio for 
products sold by retailers, as their goods are sold to industrial customers and foreign 
companies. However, source wholesalers’ sales will include sales of goods that are not 
ultimately destined for retailers, while the sales of other wholesalers will include some 
goods to retailers. The magnitude of that fraction of goods is not known. 
If we review the various measures for wholesale circuity, it becomes apparent not only 
that the results yielded using the various measures differ but also these measures are 
only estimates. Therefore, we cannot reach a final conclusion regarding whether or not 
wholesale circuity has improved. 
4.2.5 An increase in direct sourcing between retailers and manufacturers 
The issue of direct sourcing attracted substantial attention when large foreign retailers 
entered Japan. It was expected that foreign retailers would not comply with Japanese 
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local customs and would avoid wholesalers whenever possible. Nishimura (2004: 168) 
writes that due to the complex distribution system in Japan, global retailers bring their 
own distribution system, trade customs and business models into the Japanese market. 
They are interested in direct trade relationships with suppliers because they believe that 
the long and multi-level channel leads to high-cost transactions. It was also expected 
that this new way of doing business would eventually spill over to key players in the 
Japanese retail industry.  
Confirming such claims is difficult because data regarding direct sourcing and supply 
between manufacturers and retailers are not available on a broad and regular basis. 
Official statistics do not include sales data for direct transactions between 
manufacturers and retailers (see Graph 8). Reports on direct transactions between 
manufacturers and retailers are mainly anecdotal, and the number of studies and their 
scope are limited.  
Graph 8: Missing data on direct sourcing 
 
Missing data is represented using the dotted line. 
Source: Based on data from METI. 
Japan’s Manufactured Imports Promotion Organization (MIPRO) published a study in 
  
90 
2002 on direct sourcing trends and the globalization of sourcing activities by companies 
active in the distribution sector. According to that study, sourcing from domestic 
wholesalers decreased by 34.0%, and 27.3% of all respondents indicated they increased 
their direct sourcing from a domestic producer (see Graph 9) (see MIPRO, 2002). 
Graph 9: Changes in the sourcing routes of Japanese retailers (expressed as 
percentages) 
Source: Mipro, 2002: 51. 
The significance of the study, however, is limited, and it is not clear how valid, reliable, 
and representative the results are. The response rate for the study was only 19%. This 
19% metric corresponds to 380 companies that are active in distribution, including 150 
retailers. The latter also include non-store retailers such as Internet companies (19 
businesses) and mail-order companies (15 businesses). Because the business models 
and industry dynamics of the Internet and mail order businesses differ significantly 
from those that are standard in traditional retailing, they may also use different sourcing 
strategies (see, for example, Wongtada and Zerio, 1993). 
Due to a lack of reliable data, claims of increased direct sourcing can be neither 
confirmed nor rejected. 
4.3 Summary 
In this chapter, we have looked for quantitative evidence for the following expected 
developments:  
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• An increase in the number of large stores. 
• A decrease in the number of small traditional retailers. 
• A decrease in the number of wholesalers. 
• Improved wholesale circuity. 
• More direct sourcing between retailers and manufacturers. 
Our quantitative findings can be summarized as follows. 
(1)  Expectation: The number of large stores (measured in terms of sales floor area) 
will increase.  
Finding: Confirmed; there is a correlation between the number of large stores 
and the revision of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law. Causality, however, is 
questionable. Also, the rate of change was slower than expected. 
(2)  Expectation: The number of small traditional retailers will decrease.  
Finding: Confirmed; however, the number of small retail stores started to 
decline between 1982 and 1985, rather than after the revision of the Large-Scale 
Retail Stores Law. 
(3)  Expectation: The number of wholesale establishments will decrease.  
Finding: Partly confirmed; there is an overall negative trend; however, between 
1994 and 2002, the number of intermediate wholesalers increased by over 30%. 
(4)  Expectation: The wholesale circuity will improve.  
Finding: Not confirmed. The ratios used to determine wholesale circuity 
produce different results, and all of them are approximate methods. 
(5)  Expectation: Large stores increasingly circumvent the wholesale level and 
source directly from manufacturers.  
Finding: Not confirmed due to a lack of quantitative data. 
These findings suggest that the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law was not the main factor 
shaping the structure of the Japanese retail market and that the large number of small 
retailers was not the decisive factor in the creation of the multi-layered wholesale sector 
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in Japan. The data also raise the question of what factors (if not legislation) did shape 
the structure of the Japanese distribution system. 
We proceed as follows: With regard to retailer size, we critically assess the associated 
changes, thereby also addressing the factors technology, shopping habits and 
geographic environment from our conceptual framework (see Graph 1). This should 
shed light on the slow increase in the large number of large retailers and the initial 
decrease in the number of small retailers between 1982 and 1985. We also assess the 
revised statute (legislation). 
In considering the issue of direct sourcing, an analysis of retailers’ resources and the 
distribution of channel power should enable us to make an assertion regarding why the 
number of intermediate wholesalers increased between 1994 and 2002 and whether or 
not direct sourcing increased after the revision of the statute. 
In summary, we address the following trends in the next chapter: 
• The slow increase in the number of large-scale retail stores after the revision of the 
Large-Scale Retail Stores Law. 
• The beginning of a decrease in the number of small retailers between 1982 and 
1985.  
• The issue of direct sourcing. 
• The greater-than-30% increase in the number of intermediate wholesale 
establishments between 1994 and 2002. 
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5 Further analysis 
5.1 The slow increase in the number of large-scale retail stores 
In this section, the revised statute and associated changes will be further analyzed with 
the aim of reporting possible explanations for the slow rate of increase in the number of 
large stores. 
5.1.1 The revision of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law 
Claim: Once the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law is revised, the number of large stores 
will substantially increase. 
It is important to note that the revision of the Large-Scale Retail Law did not produce a 
free market and that certain regulations remained in place. Under the revised statute, the 
planning process is more rapid, but it still takes one and a half years from the time of 
application to receive the proper permission (see Davies and Itou, 2001: 92-93). 
Furthermore, in 2000, the “Law Concerning the Measures by Large-Scale Retail Stores 
for Preservation of the Living Environment” went into effect in 2000 and replaced the 
Large-Scale Retail Stores Law. Under this law, all stores larger than 1’000 m2 required 
approval. Guner, Ventura and Yi (2006) argue that the new legislation is even more 
restrictive than the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law. Under the new law, the restrictions 
on size begin at 1’000 m2. While retail stores between 500 m2 and 1’000 m2 are 
unrestricted, all proposals for retail space above 1’000 m2 are considered locally. Local 
governments are unlikely to promote large retail stores because they will not see net 
benefits from a more competitive retail environment and from the taxation of 
businesses. Although the affected parties remain a critical part of the application 
process, the protection of small retail stores is no longer an explicit objective. 
Environmental protection (noise, congestion), however, is now taken into account and 
constrains retailers wishing to expand (see Davies and Itou, 2001: 92-93). The idea of 
using valuable land to build mega-stores is opposed by the The Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries and strikes a common chord with many Japanese people (see 
Riethmuller and Chai, 1999: 11). 
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The Economist (2000) has articulated concern that although the new law no longer 
explicitly protects small-shop owners, it still may be used to shield them from the big-
store chains because the responsibility for drawing up the ground rules has passed from 
MITI to Japan’s prefectural and metropolitan governments, which might give more 
power to small shop owners. 
Findings: The revision of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law did not produce a free 
market in which large stores were able to expand at will. Certain regulations remained 
in place. In addition, the new law (Law Concerning the Measures by Large-Scale Retail 
Stores for Preservation of the Living Environment) that went into effect in 2000 and 
replaced the Large-Scale Retail Law no longer explicitly protects small-shop owners, 
but it still may be used to shield small retail stores from the big-store chains. 
5.1.2 Associated changes 
5.1.2.1 The increase in car ownership 
Claim: Car ownership has increased and triggered a change in shopping behavior, with 
Japanese households now shopping less frequently and increasingly shopping in bulk. 
Because increasing numbers of households rely on cars for shopping trips, the 
attractiveness of large stores has increased. 
Two factors have discouraged the widespread use of cars for shopping purposes. 
1. Car ownership is still low in comparison with that in other nations: In 1983, 
Japan had 0.220 private vehicles per person, which is less than half the figure for the 
United States (with 0.535), even though the Japanese economy is frequently compared 
with the United States economy (see Table 15). 
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Table 15: Private and commercial vehicles per person, retail stores per 1’000 persons, 
1983* 
    
Country Cars: Private vehicles per person 
Trucks: Commercial  
vehicles per person 
Stores: Retail stores  
per 1'000 persons 
    
Brazil 0.071 0.014 6’680 (80) 
Ecuador 0.010 0.018 (81) 8’676 (80) 
Finland 0.289 0.036 7’410 (82) 
Greece 0.108 0.056 1’6229 (78) 
Iceland 0.402 0.050 7’954 (82) 
Ireland 0.205 0.021 9’146 (77) 
Japan 0.220 0.131 1’4340 (82) 
Netherlands 0.328 0.025 6'223 
New Zealand 0.438 0.089 9'345 
Norway 0.334 0.047 8'211 
Singapore 0.086 0.045 6’507 (81) 
Syria 0.013 0.011 7’637 (75) 
Turkey 0.018 0.007 5’843 (80) 
France 0.351 0.054 (82) 10’300 (82) 
W. Germany 0.402 0.026 6’600 (84/85) 
U.K. 0.286 0.041 6’200 (82) 
U.S. 0.535 0.157 6’100 (87) 
    
*Unless otherwise indicated in ()   
Source: Flath and Nariu, 1996: 189. 
By 2004, the number of private vehicles per person in Japan had increased to 0.333 (see 
Table 16). However, not only did the increase in that number significantly slow during 
the years following 1995, this figure also continues to substantially lag behind the 
United States numbers for 1985 (see Table 15). 
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Table 16: Private passenger cars in Japan, 1980-2004 
     
Year 
Total passenger  
cars for private  
use (in 1'000) 
Population  
(in 1'000) 
Passenger cars  
for private use  
per person 
Growth in % 
     
1980 21'293 117'060 0.182 - 
1985 25'595 121'049 0.211 16.2 
1990 32'177 123'611 0.260 23.1 
1995 38'846 125'570 0.309 18.8 
2000 42'108 126'926 0.332 7.2 
2004 42'506 127'687 0.333 0.3 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Japan 2006. 
The reason for this slowdown may be linked with the economic stagnation as well as 
with the limited space for and/or the cost associated with parking lots at home. Also, 
owning a car in Japan is costly. Car owners are required by law to submit their vehicles 
to comprehensive inspections (shaken). These inspections start during a car’s third year 
on the road and must be completed after every two years thereafter until a car’s 
eleventh year on the road; after that, inspections must be performed every year. 
Numerous working parts must be replaced if an older car is to pass (see Beck, 1993: 
282). 
2. Cars are not used significantly for shopping purposes: According to Takeuchi 
and Bucklin (1977: 45), cars were not significantly employed for shopping purposes in 
the 1970s for the following reasons: 
• Relatively few shopping centers had been newly constructed, and existing retailers 
were unable to provide parking facilities. 
• Japanese consumers found it much more convenient to purchase goods at 
neighborhood shops than to make a major effort to shop at a distance by car.  
• Men of a given household tended to use the automobile, and they generally used it 
for non-shopping purposes.  
Odagiri and Riethmuller (2000) find that the increase in the number of private vehicles 
per person since the 1970s did not impact shopping behavior as much as expected. As 
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can be seen in Table 17, in Fukuoka in 1996, a third of people shopped almost daily 
(30.1%) and not by car (38.3%). Overall, 42.2% shopped up to 3 times a week. 
Moreover, 45% used the car often, 39.9% used it occasionally, and 37.0% did not use it 
at all. Interestingly, of the people shopping once per week, only 24.3% indicated that 
they used their car often. 
Table 17: Shopping frequency and use of car in Fukuoka, 1996 
        
Item Almost every day (%) 
2 to 3 times per  
week (%) Once a week (%) 
    
Shopping frequency 30.1 42.2 21.2 
    
Use of car    
Often 26.2 45.0 24.3 
Occasionally 34.5 39.9 19.4 
Not used 38.3 37.0 11.1 
Odagiri and Riethmuller, 2000: 60. 
They conclude that ownership of a car does not necessarily lead to a decrease in 
shopping frequency and an increase in bulk purchases (see Odagiri and Riethmuller, 
2000: 59). 
In addition, Odagiri and Riethmuller (2000) found that the shorter the amount of time 
spent on shopping, the greater the use of private cars, as Table 18 shows.  
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Table 18: Time spent shopping and mode of transport in Fukuoka, 1996 
        
Time spent On foot (%) By bicycle (%) By private car (%) 
    
Up to 5 min. 52.9 47.9 42.1 
5-10 min. 30.4 40.7 31.2 
10-20 min. 13.1 8.8 21.1 
20-30 min. 0.5 - 3.4 
30-40 min. - - 0.2 
Other responses 3.1 2.6 2.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Food and Agricultural Policy Research Center 1997 in Odagiri and 
Riethmuller, 2000: 60. 
Shopping by car in Japan is cumbersome because roads are often congested and few 
parking lots are available. A significant portion of Japan’s land mass is mountainous, 
and habitable land is scarce. The vast majority of Japan’s 125 million people are forced 
to live and work in coastal areas, and this land is extraordinarily expensive. To 
conserve valuable land area, minimal space is allotted to roads, boulevards and other 
transportation infrastructure; for example, 3% of total land area was dedicated to these 
purposes in 2000 (see Table 19). Even in rural areas, streets are often no wider than the 
width of a typical car and are frequently unpaved (see JAMA, 1998). 
Table 19: Land area by use per 1’000 square kilometers 
        
Year Total Farmland Forest and grassland 
Inland  
water Roads 
Built-up  
land 1) Other 
        
1990 377.7 53.3 255.2 13.1 11.4 16.0 28.7 
1995 377.8 51.3 254.0 13.2 12.1 17.0 30.3 
2000 377.9 49.1 253.8 13.5 12.7 17.9 30.9 
In %  
2000 100.0 13% 67% 4% 3% 5% 8% 
        
 1) Including industrial land and other land for building. 
Source: Statistics Bureau of Japan, Japan in Figures 2006. 
Although the total United States land area is 26 times larger than that of Japan, the 
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United States has only six times the number of miles of road and three times more 
vehicles on the road (see Table 20). 
Table 20: A comparison of the total area, population, road mileage, and vehicle counts 
for the United States, Japan, and California 
    
 U.S. Japan California 
    
Total area (sq. miles) 3'787'318 145'850 155'937 
Population 266'476'278 125'449'703 31'210'750 
Total roads (miles) 3'905'834 691'637 168'328 
Vehicle count 201'530'021 66'853'500 2'241'749 
Source: JAMA, 1998. 
Odagiri and Riethmuller (2000: 59) therefore consider population density to be a 
critical factor in shaping shopping habits. The high population density in Japan leads to 
crowded roads in major population centers and congested parking areas, which then 
results in consumers shopping locally and often. 
Findings: The private car ownership rate has increased, but it remains low compared 
with that of the United States. Studies have found that increased ownership of a car in 
Japan failed to decrease shopping frequency and did not lead to an increase in bulk 
purchases. Shopping locally is more efficient because roads in major population centers 
are often crowded and parking areas are often congested (geographic environment). 
5.1.2.2 The increase in private label products 
Claim: Japanese consumer sophistication and price-consciousness increased, while 
brand consciousness decreased. Retailers responded to this trend by introducing their 
own private label products. This increased the attractiveness of retailers’ consumer 
image and reduced their dependence on branded goods and, in turn, on manufacturers 
and wholesalers. 
Private label products are not new to the Japanese consumer market. In response to a 
1967 survey of supermarkets in Tokyo, 36% of 376 firms indicated that they were 
selling merchandise under their own brand. The products most frequently sold under 
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private labels include soup, canned fruits, cooking oil, instant coffee, men’s socks, 
dress shirts, sheets, women’s blouses, stockings, and underwear (see Yoshino, 1971: 
159). 
However, the number of private label products in supermarkets was limited at that time. 
Supermarkets competed mainly by selling branded goods. In a few exceptional cases, 
conflicts of interests have led to friction between manufacturers of branded goods that 
are trying to control prices at all levels of the distribution system and supermarkets that 
wish to offer products at low prices (see Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1995: 66). 
Has the share of private label products in Japan increased significantly in recent years? 
ACNielsen (2005) compares retail sales across 38 countries for 80 categories and lists 
the value share of private label products and growth rates of private label products in 
each country (see Table 21).27 Their findings are as follows: 
1. Value share of private label products: The share of private label products was 17% 
in 2005 as compared to 15% in 2003 across all countries and categories. The share of 
private label products varied widely across the countries included in the study. 
Switzerland recorded the highest share of private label products at 45%, while the 
Philippines registered the lowest at less than 1%. The emerging markets in Asia Pacific 
and Latin America had less developed private label markets than did Europe or North 
America. Japan’s share of private label products was 4%, with no change from the 
figures in the 2003 report. 
                                                
27 This list is based on sales volume rather than on the number of products. We assume that the number of private 
label products is correlated with sales volume. 
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Table 21: Value share of private label (PL) by country, 2005 
       
Country Region PL Share  Country Region PL Share 
       
Switzerland  Europe 45%  Norway Europe 8% 
Germany Europe 30%  Ireland Europe 7% 
Great Britain Europe 28%  Czech Republic Emerging  Markets 7% 
Spain Europe 26%  Hong Kong Asia Pacific 4% 
Belgium Europe 25%  Brazil Latin America 4% 
France Europe 24%  Greece  Europe 4% 
Netherlands Europe 22%  South Africa Emerging  Markets 4% 
Canada North  America 19%  Puerto Rico Latin America 4% 
Denmark Europe 17%  Japan Asia Pacific 4% 
United States North  America 16%  Israel Europe 3% 
Sweden Europe 14%  Singapore Asia Pacific 3% 
Austria Europe 14%  Chile Latin  America 3% 
New Zealand Asia Pacific 12%  Argentina Latin  America 3% 
Italy Europe 11%  Colombia Latin  America 2% 
Portugal Europe 11%  Croatia Emerging  Markets 2% 
Hungary Emerging  Markets 10%  Thailand Asia Pacific 1% 
Slovakia Emerging  Markets 10%  Mexico 
Latin  
America 1% 
Finland Europe 10%  South Korea Asia Pacific 1% 
Australia Asia Pacific 9%  Philippines Asia Pacific >0.5% 
Source: ACNielsen, 2005: 9. 
2. Growth rate of private label markets: In the ACNielsen 2003 report, Japan ranked 
tenth among the top ten fastest-growing private label markets. Growth rates were 
highest in the Asia Pacific region, emerging markets, and Latin America (see Table 22).  
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Table 22: Top ten fastest-growing private label markets, 2003 
   
Country Region PL Growth 
   
Poland Emerging Markets 115% 
Philippines Asia Pacific 48% 
Czech Republic Emerging Markets 44% 
Hungary Emerging Markets 44% 
Thailand Asia Pacific 35% 
Colombia Latin America 31% 
Argentina Latin America 31% 
South Africa Emerging Markets 28% 
Sweden Europe 25% 
Japan Asia Pacific 23% 
Source: ACNielsen, 2003: 9. 
ACNielsen (2003: 3) attributed these growth rates to the expansion of large multi-
national retailers in these regions that are introducing private label products. Indeed, 
many large foreign retailers entered Japan around 2000. Two years later, however, 
Japan had dropped off the list of the fastest-growing private label markets (see Table 
23). 
Table 23: Top ten fastest-growing private label markets, 2005 
   
Country Region PL Growth 
   
Croatia Emerging Markets 77% 
Greece Europe 24% 
Thailand Asia Pacific 18% 
Argentina Latin America 18% 
South Korea Asia Pacific 17% 
Finland Europe 16% 
Spain Europe 16% 
Singapore Asia Pacific 16% 
Colombia Latin America 15% 
Hungary Emerging Markets 15% 
Source: ACNielsen, 2005: 11. 
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Both the value share and the market growth rate of private label products in Japan are 
still low compared with that of other nations. The brand-consciousness of Japanese 
consumers may not have diminished as much as has been reported elsewhere. 
ACNielsen (2005: 6) reports another interesting fact: that the level of retail 
concentration is closely aligned with the extent of private label development. Except 
for the United States, nine of the top ten countries exhibited retail concentrations 
(defined as the share of sales controlled by the top five retailers in the country) of over 
60% (see Table 24).  
Table 24: Retail concentration in the most well developed private label markets 
    
Country Region PL share Retailer  concentration 
    
Switzerland Europe 45% 86% 
Germany Europe 30% 65% 
Great Britain Europe 28% 65% 
Spain Europe 26% 60% 
Belgium Europe 25% 80% 
France Europe 24% 81% 
Netherlands Europe 22% 64% 
Canada North America 19% 62% 
Denmark Europe 17% 89% 
United States North America 16% 36% 
Source: ACNielsen, 2005: 10. 
Retail concentration in Japan is low in comparison with that of other nations, and the 
metric did not change significantly between 1979 and 1994. The top 10 retailers in 
Japan had a retail concentration of 8.1% in 1979 and 9.0% in 1994 (see Table 25). 
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Table 25: Retail concentrations in Japan, 1979-1994 (expressed as percentages) 
      
Year Top 10 Firms Top 25 Firms Top 50 Firms Top 100 Firms Top 200 Firms 
      
1979 8.1 13.0 16.3 19.7 23.4 
1980 8.4 13.4 16.6 20.2 24.2 
1981 8.8 14.0 17.4 21.1 25.2 
1982 8.0 12.8 16.0 19.6 23.6 
1983 8.1 13.0 16.3 20.1 24.3 
1984 8.2 13.1 16.5 20.4 24.8 
1985 8.4 13.4 17.0 21.0 25.6 
1986 8.7 13.8 17.5 21.6 26.4 
1987 8.9 14.1 17.9 22.1 27.2 
1988 8.9 13.7 17.4 21.5 26.2 
1989 9.7 15.0 18.9 23.2 28.2 
1990 9.8 15.2 19.3 23.7 28.9 
1991 9.0 14.0 17.9 22.1 27.1 
1992 8.9 13.7 17.6 22.0 27.1 
1993 8.9 13.6 17.7 22.3 27.5 
1994 9.0 13.4 17.3 21.8 27.0 
Source: Kuwahara, 2001: 113. 
Boyland and Nicoletti (2001: 258) reported a retail concentration in Japan of 4% in 
1997 for the top three firms and of 7% for the top ten firms, which is lower than the 
1994 figure in Table 25. 
Factors contributing to high retail concentration include the presence of aggressive 
discounters who sell a very limited selection of products (mainly shelf-stable food) at a 
very low price and with high purchase frequency (see ACNielsen, 2005: 7). In Japan, 
although shopping frequency is high, Japanese consumers expect a large selection, 
including a variety of fresh products. Japanese retailers have been expanding the 
number of products offered to compete on the basis of product selection rather than 
based on price (see also chapter 5.3.1.5). Both factors discourage increases in retail 
concentration.   
Findings: The value share of private label products in Japan has not significantly 
increased but instead remains low as compared to that of other nations. The reasons for 
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this can be found either in the strong brand consciousness of Japanese consumers 
(shopping habits) or the low retail concentration, or in both. Therefore, it is assumed 
that the number of private label products has not significantly increased. 
5.1.2.3 Larger dwellings  
Claim: Dwelling space has increased. Therefore, households can store more, they need 
to shop less frequently, and they can buy more in bulk. This, in turn, enhances the 
attractiveness of large stores. 
According to the Statistics Bureau of Japan (2007), the average dwelling size increased 
from 89 m2 in 1988 to 95 m2 in 2003. However, as Izuhara (2000) reported, in 
metropolitan areas where one can expect large and mega-retailers, the size of the 
average residence has fallen in recent years. In 1980, 42.4% of the total population was 
concentrated within a 50-km radius of the three top metropolitan centers: Tokyo, 
Osaka, and Nagoya. In 2000, the percentage of the national population that was 
concentrated within these three major metropolitan zones increased to 44.2% in an area 
that accounted for 5.9% of the nation's total land mass. 
Our question, however, is whether dwelling size did actually have an impact on retail 
structure in Japan. 
Studies suggest that the large number of small retailers in Japan may be due to families’ 
inability to keep large stocks of perishables in Japanese homes (see, for example, Flath 
and Nariu, 1996). However, according to Marvel (1993: 156ff), this explanation does 
not fully explain the small size of retailers selling both consumer durables and non-
durables. Store density is significantly higher in Japan not just for food stores but also 
for most other product categories, including consumer durables such as hardware, 
garden supplies, furniture, and fixtures (see Table 26). 
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Table 26: Store density by product category: Japan and the United States 
    
Kind of business Japan United States Japan/United States 
    
All retailing 45.463 23.809 2.0 
Hardware and garden  
supplies 1.502 1.096 1.4 
General merchandise 0.099 0.553 0.2 
Food 15.758 2.992 5.2 
Motor Vehicles 1.331 1.601 0.8 
Gasoline stations 1.439 1.677 0.9 
Apparel 6.409 1.968 3.3 
Furniture and fixtures 5.724 1.630 3.5 
Drugs and toiletries 2.378 0.644 3.7 
Liquor 2.978 0.514 5.8 
Source: Marvel, 1993: 157; data as reported in Flath (1990). 
There is no clear indication that people living in larger dwellings in Japan shop less 
frequently at larger stores and store more products at home. Thus, the relevance of 
dwelling size for retail structure remains questionable. 
Findings: Average dwelling size has increased only in non-metropolitan areas. In 
metropolitan areas, where almost half of the population resides, the average housing 
size has actually decreased.  The relevance of dwelling size for retail structure in Japan, 
however, is questionable. There is no clear indication that people living in larger 
dwellings prefer to shop less frequently at larger stores and stock up on products that 
they can store at home (shopping habits). 
5.1.2.4 Distributional IT 
Claim: As more and more retailers implement distributional IT, wholesalers are no 
longer needed to serve as order-processing intermediaries between retailers and 
manufacturers.  
An alleged key driver of disintermediation is the adoption of distributional IT by large 
retailers. It has been reasoned that retailers that are equipped with POS systems and a 
direct link to manufacturers need no longer depend on wholesalers for merchandising 
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expertise or order-processing capabilities. 
Miwa (2002) thus asks: 
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At least by the late 1980s, this transformation had not yet occurred, as the JFTC study 
group concluded in 1989 (see Miwa, 2002: 172). 
Miwa (2002) analyzed the impact of the 1980s IT boom on the distribution sector by 
focusing on two product groups, daily necessities and processed foods. He selected 
these two product groups because they are commonly available at general 
merchandising stores (GMS) and convenience stores (CVS) and because product bar 
codes are widely used at GMS and CVS. GMS and CVS are chains, and to most 
observers, they seem particularly well suited for computerized data processing (see 
Miwa, 2002: 172). 
In analyzing the introduction of bar code scanners, Miwa (2002) noted a rapid increase 
in the product bar code diffusion rate and the number of retailers equipped with POS 
systems. According to Miwa (2002), this increase in the demand for POS systems 
reflects aggressive expansion in terms of the number of product items channeled 
through the distribution system, creating the need for computerized information 
management systems such as POS systems. The large number of product items is in 
part a function of more differentiated and fluid consumer tastes. 
In 1987, a small food retailer in Japan displayed about 2’000 items, while a large 
supermarket had more than 10’000 items in each store on average. Kokubu, the largest 
food wholesaler at that time, distributed more than 100’000 items, of which more than 
20’000 were newly introduced to the market between January and September 1987. 
The total number of newly introduced items in 1987 was approximately 28’000. In the 
United States, by comparison, 1’700 items were newly introduced, and between 700 
and 800 disappeared from the market in 1986 (see Miwa, 2002: 176). 
The adoption of POS systems was expected to allow retailers to become independent 
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from wholesalers and manufacturers with regards to merchandising and encourage 
direct sourcing and disintermediation. Disintermediation, however, did not take place. 
Miwa (2002) identified efficiency as the main factor preventing disintermediation. On 
account of the large number of original suppliers (or manufacturers) serving individual 
retailers, trading through wholesalers was more efficient in many cases. Observed 
failures of attempts at direct trading also suggested that distribution through 
wholesalers was more efficient. It"-Y"kad", one of the largest GMS chains in Japan, 
did not increase its share of direct trade with manufacturers when it restructured its 
business in the 1980s. Rather than changing its trade flows, it reorganized its physical 
distribution channels. 
Miwa (2002) also noted that shortening the lead-time for delivery did not promote more 
direct trade between retailers and manufacturers. In addition, even though online 
ordering systems or inter-firm linked computer networks were installed, not all orders 
were placed using these systems.  
Many manufacturers installed computer networks out of fear that they would not 
survive unless they successfully exploited computers to improve overall efficiency. 
Ka", the largest manufacturer of daily hygiene products, created and implemented a 
sophisticated computerized online information system for its distribution channels. 
Competing manufacturers such as Lion followed. In 1986, Lion installed terminals at 
146 wholesaler facilities to collect data on sales to retailers. Another daily necessities 
manufacturer named Uni-Charm had terminals installed at around 40 wholesaler sites, 
with plans to add more. However, many wholesalers rejected Uni-Charm’s request 
because they already had Lion terminals and demanded a standardized system instead. 
They were afraid that too many terminals from different suppliers would lead to 
increasing operating costs (see Miwa, 2002: 182). 
The same year saw the launch of Planet, an intra-industry Value Added Network 
(VAN, also called an intra-industry Electronic Data Interchange, or EDI, system). The 
immediate objective of Planet was the online exchange of order-entry data (i.e., data on 
wholesaler orders to manufacturers). It was projected that receiving and exchanging 
these data online would substantially decrease a manufacturer’s operating costs by 
reducing both man-hour input and wholesaler-manufacturer communication errors. In 
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addition, stocking data (i.e., data on the manufacturer’s delivery of products to 
wholesalers, including information from invoices and bills of sales), data on claims 
(i.e., manufacturer payment claims to wholesalers), and sales data (i.e., the details of a 
wholesaler’s sales and its deliveries to retailers) were to be collected and exchanged. In 
July 1986, only eight manufacturers used Planet to receive ordering data. By 1989, this 
number grew to 11, and by July 1990, there were 16 manufacturers using Planet; by 
July 1994, there were 38. The number of wholesalers using Planet to send ordering data 
increased from just 1 in 1986 to 31 in 1989 (see Miwa, 2002: 183). 
During the 1990s, the number of users increased from 42 in 1990 to 128 in 1994. The 
number of users consulting Planet for stocking and sales data (85 users in 1986, 239 
users in 1989, and 250 users in 1994) remained larger than the number of those using it 
for placing orders. 
The overall impact of Planet, however, was rather small: 
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Even a small wholesaler in this sector trades with over 100 manufacturers, while a large 
wholesaler trades with 300 to 400 manufacturers. The number of manufacturers using 
Planet for ordering data exchange was too small to cover the investment cost for 
wholesalers to adjust their in-house system to Planet. Therefore, Planet’s use would not 
improve wholesalers’ efficiency.  
In the processed foods sector, the application of distributional IT was even less 
successful. Although the number of manufacturers and wholesalers greatly 
outnumbered the number of those that sold daily necessities, the number of participants 
in Finet, which is similar to Planet but for the processed foods industry, was smaller; in 
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1994, 45 manufacturers and 150 wholesalers were signed up for Finet, while 63 
manufacturers and 289 wholesalers used Planet (see Miwa, 2002: 184). There may be 
several explanations for the low adoption rate: 
1. Government interference obstructed standardization: Many observers have 
argued that the government should help to standardize information management, 
claiming that telecommunication networks and computerized information should be 
part of the social infrastructure. In reducing the costs of system construction, 
communication, and information management for private firms, the government would 
help to promote the development and use of IT (see Miwa, 2002: 192). We know that 
the Japanese government promoted inter-firm systems, but did its expected role as 
catalyst increase standardization? According to Miwa (200), it did not.  
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Prioritizing the equal treatment of all industry members, a policy reportedly often 
adopted by the Japanese government, reflects the interests of weaker members and sets 
the target speed of industry-wide system development at a rather low level. Front-
runners are asked to slow down their pace, and because they expect the government to 
intervene, they tend to postpone their own research and development (R&D) activities; 
government interference necessarily removes any first-mover advantage. 
2. There were many costs and conflicts of interest among potential stakeholders. 
• Coordination costs: The design and adoption of an IT system involves the 
coordination of a potentially large number of stakeholders. Coordination costs tend 
to increase with the number of participants. 
• Disclosure of valuable information: Demand prices for inter-firm systems vary 
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greatly because the value of any information drawn from the system differs from 
the perspective of individual firms. The demand price or value of any information 
depends on a firm’s intra-firm system for decision-making and information flow, 
the firm’s business know-how and its process for using such information. Because 
the coordination of an inter-firm system requires firms to disclose know-how and 
ideas, their value will fall as the number of firms with access to these data rises. 
This makes cooperation difficult. 
• Diverse demands on the system: Demands regarding the type of data to be 
collected differ greatly among participants. The type of information that a firm 
values depends on its products, technology, history, market position, and so on. 
Moreover, to decide which IT systems are most appropriate, a firm must first 
review its own experiences and then determine what it requires from an IT system. 
Expectations vary greatly among firms, and reaching an agreement on system 
design can be very difficult. 
• Battle for leadership: The design and function of an inter-firm system will 
influence the demand price of each firm and may lead to battles for leadership. 
• Needs for ongoing cooperation: Cooperation and coordination not only must exist 
during a system’s initial construction phase but also may be necessary when the 
system is complete and operational. Experience and business know-how will 
generate new ideas about how to improve the system. Thus, the growth and 
evolution of both intra-firm and inter-firm IT systems demand on-going 
cooperation. 
Other industries have been more receptive to inter-firm IT systems. In the airline 
industry, for example, computerized reservation systems have been widely 
implemented (see Miwa, 2002: 188ff). How did the competitive environment of the 
airline industry differ from the Japanese distribution system? When do computerized 
information systems work? Why did airline companies experience valuable gains from 
computerization? Miwa (2002) explains the success of inter-firm IT systems in the 
airline industry as follows: 
• Airline companies increased their profits by increasing the number of travel agents 
equipped with terminals. Without such a system, the increasing complexity of 
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distribution and inventory management of airline tickets would have been difficult 
to manage. 
• The costs of increasing the number of agents with access to the terminals are 
marginal, and the average cost decreases as the number of agents grows. 
• Travel agents do not need to provide any detailed information regarding airline 
service. Flight services are standardized, and the information does not need to be 
backed up by a heavy collection of samples or by a well-informed expert. 
• There was no serious contest for leadership in the development of the inter-firm IT 
system (the SABRE reservation system). American Airlines took the lead, and 
small travel agents followed. 
• Wholesalers did not play a critical role in the distribution of airline tickets. 
Otherwise, the coordination and development would likely have been more 
difficult. 
Findings: The number of retailers introducing POS systems increased substantially in 
the 1980s, reflecting the increase in the number of products they handled. In contrast, 
inter-firm EDI systems were not widely adopted. Retailers continued to place orders 
through wholesalers. The introduction of distributional IT did not lead to 
disintermediation in the Japanese distribution system (technology).  
5.1.3 Summary 
Chapter 6.1 has critically assessed the revised statute, the associated changes and their 
impact on retail structure: i.e., an increase in the number of large retail stores. The 
results can be summarized as follows.  
• Although procedures were simplified and retailers with floor space up to 1’000 m2 
were freed from regulation, restrictions on the expansion of large(r) retailers stayed 
in place even after the revision. In addition, a new law, replacing the Large-Scale 
Retail Stores Law, went into effect in 2000. While the new statute no longer 
explicitly protects small retailers, it constraints large retailers wishing to expand on 
the basis of environmental concerns (legislation). 
• The attractiveness of large stores outside the neighborhood and city centers to the 
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Japanese consumer is limited due to high population density, leading to congested 
streets and highways as well as few car-parking facilities (geographic 
environment). 
• Japanese consumers do not shop less frequently and/or buy larger quantities, even 
though it was expected that they would do so once increases in residence size and 
car ownership rates occurred. The private car ownership rate, however, in Japan is 
still low compared with that in other nations. Moreover, owning a car in Japan does 
not lead to a decrease in shopping frequency or an increase in bulk purchases. In 
addition, the average dwelling size has increased only in non-metropolitan areas, 
and there is no clear indication that people living in larger dwellings in Japan prefer 
to shop less frequently, shop at larger stores, or store more inventory at home 
(shopping habits). 
• The prevalence of private brands is still lower than in other nations, and growth 
rates have slowed. Brand consciousness might not have diminished as assumed 
(shopping habits), or the low prevalence of private brands might be due to low 
retail concentration. 
• POS systems have been widely adopted by larger retailers, but inter-firm EDI 
systems have not (technology). Retailers continue to order through wholesalers. 
5.2 The initial decrease in the number of small retailers between 1982 
and 1985 
In this chapter, we analyze the causes of the decrease in the number of small retailers 
between 1982 and 1985. 
The decrease in the number of retailers between 1982 and 1985 is also referred to as the 
“1985 shock.” It was a “shock” because the development ran contrary to the long-held 
belief that the Japanese distribution system was characterized by the presence of an 
excessive number of retail stores (see Takaoka, 1999b). 
For Matsui and Yukimoto (2004), the main reasons behind the decline include the 
proliferation of car ownership and the increase in the size of residences. The authors 
base their empirical research on the social optimality model, which determines the 
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socially optimal store density, assuming that retail stores are located in a unit-circle 
market space. They claim that the location of retail stores depends on transport and 
storing costs for households. If consumers have relatively higher transportation costs 
than do retailers, the combined costs of distribution are economized by shifting more of 
the storage and reorder costs to retailers (see Matsui and Yukimoto, 2004: 50). The 
authors conclude that the decline in the number of retail stores is due to the 
proliferation of car ownership and the increase in the average size of dwellings. When 
household costs associated with shopping and storing goods decreased, the number of 
stores needed to assure efficiency in the sense of a minimum social cost of distribution 
decreased as well. 
Another explication focuses on small stores as family businesses. Increasingly, 
members of store-owning families want to separate business and family and do not 
want their stores to be part of their own home (see Kikkawa and Takaoka, 1998: 108).  
Neither explanation, however, addresses one important question. Why did the decrease 
begin in 1985 and manifest itself in the form of a decline in the number of small-sized 
food and beverage stores? As Table 27 shows, the store categories that declined most 
notably were the categories of small stores with two or fewer employees, stores dealing 
in foods and beverages, and mom-and-pop stores that were often run as family 
businesses with sole proprietorship and without regular employees. 
  
115 
Table 27: Retail stores according to size, business category, and structure, 1970-1991 
       
Year 1970 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 
       
Number of retail stores (1'000) 1'471 1'674 1'721 1'629 1'620 1'591 
Breakdown by size (%)       
2 persons or less 63.9 61.1 60.2 57.7 54.0 53.2 
3-4 persons 22.5 24.0 24.0 25.1 26.1 26.2 
5-9 persons 9.6 10.5 10.9 11.7 13.2 13.4 
10-49 persons 3.7 4.1 4.6 5.1 6.3 6.6 
50 persons or more 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 
Breakdown by business category  
(%)       
Miscellaneous goods 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Textiles, clothing and accessories 13.8 14.2 14.1 14.1 14.6 15.1 
Foodstuff and beverages 48.3 43.9 42.1 41.2 40.4 39.1 
Automobiles and bicycles 4.0 4.4 4.9 5.2 5.5 5.9 
Furniture, furnishings and fixtures 10.6 10.9 11.0 10.6 10.3 9.9 
Other stores 23.1 26.4 27.6 28.7 29.0 29.6 
Breakdown by organizational  
form (%)       
Incorporated stores 16.1 22.8 25.3 27.6 31.1 35.5 
Individually owned stores  83.9 77.2 74.7 72.4 88.9 64.5 
Individually owned stores without  
regular employees 73.8 56.4 58.8 54.5 41.4 42.9 
Source: Kikkawa and Takaoka, 1998: 106. 
According to Kikkawa and Takaoka (1998), the explanation for the decline lies in intra-
industry competitive dynamics. The period from 1982 to 1991 saw steady changes in 
the numbers for the following retail formats (see Table 28):  
• The number of household grocery supermarkets28 increased by 150%. 
• The number of convenience stores increased by 80%. 
                                                
28 When discussing supermarkets in Japan, it is important to bear in mind that “unlike the original connotation of the 
term ‘supermarket’, which means a grocery supermarket, big stores such as Daiei or Itoh Yokado, usually regarded 
in Japan as typical supermarkets, when classified in terms of business operations are closer to department stores than 
to supermarkets.” (Kikkawa and Takaoka, 1998: 108) 
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• The number of general merchandising stores rose by 28%, while grocery 
supermarkets increased by 19%. 
• The number of other supermarkets grew by 15%. 
• The number of clothing superstores increased by 2%. 
• The number of department stores decreased by 1%, while the number of ordinary 
retail stores decreased by 10%.  
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Table 28: Retail stores in Japan according to business category, 1982-1991 
        
Year 1982 1985 
Growth in %  
compared to  
previous year 
1988 
Growth in %  
compared to  
previous year 
1991 Growth in %  1982 - 1991 
        
Department stores 461 428 -7% 433 1% 455 -1% 
General merchandising stores 1'507 1'634 8% 1'851 13% 1'924 28% 
Clothing supermarkets 606 520 -14% 571 10% 618 2% 
Grocery supermarkets 4'358 4'707 8% 4'877 4% 5'185 19% 
Household goods supermarkets 531 646 22% 949 47% 1'327 150% 
Convenience stores 23'235 29'236 26% 34'550 18% 41'847 80% 
Other supermarkets 58'777 59'643 1% 53'834 -10% 67'473 15% 
Ordinary retail stores 1'631'990 1'531'820 -6% 1'522'587 -1% 1'472'394 -10% 
Source: Based on the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Statistical Table on Commerce, various annual issues; in Takaoka, 
1999b: 8. 
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Of all of these changes associated with different retail formats, it was the increase in the 
number of grocery supermarkets and convenience stores that drove many of the small 
grocery stores out of business because they were able to establish competitive 
advantage over small retailers in handling perishable goods (see Kikkawa and Takaoka, 
1998: 109). According to Takaoka (1999b: 10-11), the competitive advantage of small 
grocery stores over supermarkets traditionally rested on the former’s ability to offer 
fresh foods. Although the popularity of Western foods increased in the high-growth 
period in the Japanese economy and the Westernization of food tastes favored the 
development of big stores and grocery supermarkets, traditional consumption patterns 
and a preference for freshness prevailed. The strong consumer predilection for fresh 
food restricted the development of grocery supermarkets because those businesses did 
not yet have the processes needed to pre-package perishable foods. The supermarket 
system could only be successful under the pre-packaging system because it centered on 
self-service operations. Therefore, it was not until the early 1980s that grocery 
supermarkets began to establish competitive advantage over traditional meat shops, fish 
stores, and other types of stores by establishing their own system for pre-packaging 
perishable foods.29 
Kansai Supermarket played a central role in developing a pre-packaging system for 
perishable foods: 
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29 Note that the efficient adoption of the open refrigerator technology requires the retailer to be of a certain size. See 
also chapter 2.1 and Graph 1. 
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In addition to open refrigerators, other innovations added to the competitive advantage 
of supermarkets. Techniques from the automobile and electric industries were 
introduced, such as that of making efficient use of part-time workers through 
simplification and standardization. The introduction of the pre-packaging system by 
Kansai Supermarket was completed in the late 1970s. However, it took almost ten years 
for the system to spread to other supermarkets throughout Japan. The countrywide 
adoption of the pre-packaging system was thus one of the underlying causes of the 
1985 shock. 
Another underlying cause was the growth of convenience stores in the 1970s and 
1980s, which affected mostly small retailers of fruits and vegetables, foods and 
household goods, and books and stationery (see Takaoka, 1999b: 13). 
The growth of convenience stores was enabled through the spread of the pre-packaging 
system and a favorable consumer environment during this period. In particular, the 
increase in preference for instant consumption options nurtured the rapid growth of 
convenience stores. Convenience stores fulfilled both the need for accessibility, which 
had previously been satisfied by traditional small retailers, and the need for a variety of 
goods, which had previously been satisfied by large retailers like supermarkets. 
Traditional small retailers competed directly with convenience stores but could not 
match the convenience stores in terms of variety of goods and/or hours of operation 
(see Takaoka, 1999b: 13). In addition, we would assume that existing owners of small-
sized food stores opened considerable numbers of rapidly growing convenience stores 
and beverage stores, thereby switching to a more lucrative form of business (see 
Kikkawa and Takaoka, 1998: 109). 
In summary, the initial decline in the number of small retailers was caused not by 
changes in the regulatory environment (legislation) but instead by technological 
innovations (technology) and changing consumption patterns (shopping habits). Both 
factors worked against small traditional grocery retail shops and in favor of grocery 
supermarkets and convenience stores. 
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5.3 The increase in intermediate wholesalers between 1994 and 2002 
and the issue of direct sourcing  
In this chapter, we address the increase in the number of intermediary wholesalers and 
outline possible arguments that speak for and against an increase in direct sourcing. We 
start with the issue of direct sourcing.  
5.3.1 The question of direct sourcing 
It is assumed that direct sourcing is positively correlated with the number of large 
retailers because large retailers, by virtue of their size, have the power to force 
manufacturers to supply them directly (see Davies and Itou, 2001: 84-85). Therefore, 
an increase in the number of large retailers in Japan should lead to more direct sourcing 
between retailers and manufacturers.  
The biggest hurdle in addressing this issue is the fact that no reliable quantitative data 
exist on direct sourcing in Japan. We therefore approach this question by reviewing the 
history of direct sourcing in Japan. An historical approach helps us to understand which 
forces played a part in producing currently existing network structures (see Kikkawa 
and Takaoka, 1998). 
Direct sourcing is usually marketed as a new, Western concept in Japan. It is, however, 
not new to Japan:  
• In 1963, 92% of all supermarkets that participated in a survey conducted by the 
MITI and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry indicated that they 
sourced exclusively through wholesalers. The other 8% sourced directly from 
manufacturers, whether entirely or in part (see Takaoka, 1999a: 15). 
• In the same year, the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry conducted a study 
involving 54 supermarkets. Overall, 42 of the supermarkets responded that over 
60% of all goods were sourced via wholesalers. It is unclear whether the remaining 
40% sourced only part or all of their goods directly from the manufacturer (see 
Takaoka, 1999a: 15). 
• Takaoka (1999a) concluded that between 1968 and 1973, a small number of 
Japanese supermarkets started sourcing less from secondary wholesalers and 
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regional wholesalers and increased direct sourcing from manufacturers. Out of 38 
supermarkets, only 17 (that is, less than 50%) sourced less from primary 
wholesalers, and only eight supermarkets sourced more than 50% directly from 
manufacturers; notably, no supermarket sourced all products directly from 
manufacturers (see Takaoka, 1999a: 15). 
• Takaoka (1999b) analyzed six supermarkets with respect to where and how they 
sourced selected processed food products in 1973 and 1980. Her findings are as 
follows: 
! In 1973, products such as processed cheese, mayonnaise, cooking oil, instant 
ramen, and instant coffee were sourced via wholesalers. 
! In 1980, except in the case of one supermarket that sourced these five products 
directly from the manufacturer, sourcing through wholesalers remained 
common.  
Direct sourcing remained a limited phenomenon, and the so-called “distribution 
revolution” that theorists had predicted failed to materialize (see Takaoka, 1999a: 17). 
When the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law was revised at the beginning of the 1990s, it 
was not the first time that a “distribution revolution” was anticipated. “Distribution 
revolutions” had already been predicted twice when two large retail formats (namely, 
department stores and supermarkets) expanded. The “distribution revolutions” never 
took place, and in the next section, we examine why. 
5.3.1.1 The expansion of department stores 
The first time a “distribution revolution” leading to disintermediation was anticipated, 
these expectations arose following the expansion of department stores in the 1920s and 
after World War II. 
Toward the end of World War I, department stores such as Mitsukoshi, Daimaru, 
Matsuzakaya, Shirokiya, Matsuya, and Takashimaya expanded. Regional department 
stores appeared. It was predicted that the expansion of department stores would 
revolutionize the distribution structure and change both traditional trading practices and 
trading routes: for example, by weakening the prominent position of wholesalers, as 
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had already occurred in the United States. However, this did not occur. Department 
stores continued to rely on wholesalers and had no intention of “revolutionizing” their 
methods of sourcing products (see Tajima, 2004: 165). According to Fukami (1953), 
competition between department stores and independent, small retail stores became 
fiercer and developed into a social problem. The government formulated a Department 
Store Law (see chapter 3.2) to protect small shop owners. Department stores refrained 
from aggressive trading methods such as conducting frequent bargain sales, opening 
circuit stores in rural towns, or establishing too many branches (see Fukami, 1953: 42). 
The Japanese postwar economy provided a favorable business environment for Japan’s 
department stores. One of the most important factors was the so-called “Westernization 
of lifestyle,” which translated into a wider acceptance of Western-style and ready-made 
clothing and into opportunities for growth (see Takaoka, 1997a: 10). Department stores 
played a major role in internationalizing Japan by introducing and disseminating 
foreign merchandise throughout the country (see Creighton, 1991: 678). 
As in the prewar period, expanding department stores did not alter their sourcing 
processes but instead continued to rely on wholesalers. They did so not because they 
wished to preserve familiar practices but rather because they lacked the managerial 
resources (i.e., know-how, manpower, and/or financial resources) to do so:  
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One result of these vertical relationships was the development and/or wider use of 
certain trade practices, later identified by Japan’s trade partners as informal barriers to 
trade with Japan. The evolution of these trade practices can be explained by analyzing 
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how managerial resources were distributed among channel members. A typical trade 
practice that served to mitigate department store shortages in managerial resources after 
World War II was that of returning unsold goods (henpin) (see chapter 2.2.3). 
The practice of henpin had already existed to a limited extent in prewar Japan, but it 
became more extensive in the postwar period as a means of addressing managerial 
shortages. In the prewar version of the system of returning unsold goods, both parties 
shared the risks involved in accordance with a certain agreed-upon rule. However, the 
postwar system was not supported by any rule explicitly stipulating how the risks 
should be shared; i.e., the system was non-institutionalized. The JFTC intervened 
because of the non-institutionalized character of the system and caused a shift from 
kaitori shiire (upfront purchasing) to itaku shiire (consignment purchases). 30  The 
suppliers welcomed the institutionalization of the transaction rules, even though 
consignment purchases were consequently associated with greater risk and were less 
attractive than upfront purchases. They accepted the disadvantages because dealing 
with department stores justified making certain concessions. Also, the practice of 
returning unsold goods was prone to be used in a very opportunistic way and, if left 
unchecked, could threaten their own operations (see Kikkawa and Takaoka, 1998: 114). 
While the system of consignment purchases addressed the managerial shortages at 
department stores in the short run, its long-term effect was to tip the balance of 
bargaining power in the transactions between department stores and suppliers in favor 
of the latter. From the point of view of the department store, the profit-to-sales ratios of 
department stores declined because goods purchased by kaitori shiire generally led to 
higher mark-up rates for department stores and merchandise expertise deteriorated, but 
department store risk was also reduced. 
From the point of view of the supplier, to reduce the risk associated with consignment 
                                                
30 There are three methods of purchasing goods: (1) Kaitori shiire (buy-up purchases): The department store bears all 
the risk for the goods once it purchases them. (2) Itaku shiire (consignment purchases): Only the goods sold are 
treated as having been purchased, and any risk of damages or losses that may arise after the inspection of the goods 
upon their receipt by the purchasing clerk are borne entirely by the department store. (3) Uriage shiire (purchases of 
goods once sold): Only the goods sold are treated as having been purchased, and any risk of damages or losses that 
may arise after the inspection of the goods upon their receipt by the purchasing clerk are borne entirely by the 
supplier. 
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purchase arrangements, suppliers dispatched their salespersons to department stores. 
Large department stores were happy to rely on these employees; they were reluctant to 
increase the number of employees due to labor disputes and difficulty of laying off 
excess employees (see Fukami, 1953: 48-49). 
Through the dispatched salespersons, the suppliers strengthened their position and 
acquired expertise in closely following and anticipating consumer trends. In this way, 
they gradually gained control of the sales operations on the floors of department stores 
(see Kikkawa and Takaoka, 1998: 114).  
Department stores that came into existence after the war suffered even more seriously 
from shortages in managerial resources. They had to address these shortages by 
depending far more extensively on the practice of consignment purchasing and the 
dispatch of salespeople (see Kikkawa and Takaoka, 1998: 115). 
Even as late as the 1990s, some department stores had failed to introduce the buyer 
function responsible for selecting merchandise and tracking the salability of the 
merchandise (see Sternquist and Ogawa, 1993: 151). The Economist (2000) explains 
this fact as follows: 
!N03%54+))JD& '#$& I5<<$-'& ,03I)$1& H+45%<& *+,+%$-$&8$,+0'1$%'& -'30$-& 5-& '#+'& '#$J&
#+K$& %$K$0& 0$+))J& I$$%& 0$'+5)$0-D& +%8& -3& #+K$& H$>& 0$'+5)5%<& -25))-F& P%)52$&
43/%'$0,+0'-& 5%& (1$054+& 30& R/03,$D& '#$J& #+K$& '0+85'53%+))J& +4'$8& 130$& )52$&
,03,$0'J&8$K$)3,$0-& 30& -#3,,5%<S1+))& 3,$0+'30-D& $+0%5%<&13-'& 3H& '#$50& 0$K$%/$&
IJ&0$%'5%<&3/'&-,+4$&'3&'$%+%'-&5%&0$'/0%&H30&+&-1+))&-)54$&3H& '#$50&,03H5'-F&;#/-D&
'$%+%'-&+%8&1588)$1$%&3H'$%&43%'03))$8&8$-5<%&+%8&,0545%<&-'0+'$<5$-FL&
In summary, department stores were able to expand their businesses after World War II 
by relying on wholesalers for financial and human resources: i.e., consignment 
purchases and dispatched salespersons that were able to deal with newly Western 
products. The trade practices that developed between department stores and their 
suppliers after the war, especially henpin, led even large department-store chains to use 
wholesalers exclusively as their source of supply (see Dowd, 1959: 261-262). Through 
consignment purchases, suppliers gradually gained control of sales operations and 
gained expertise in following and anticipating consumer trends. 
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5.3.1.2 The introduction of supermarkets 
The second innovation in the retail market that was expected to trigger a “distribution 
revolution” was the introduction of supermarkets.  
Supermarkets expanded in Japan in the 1960s. They focused on high volume, low 
margin, and high turnover, characteristics associated with American supermarkets and 
discount stores. Although they carried a broad line of merchandise, including food, soft 
goods, household goods, kitchen utensils, and consumer durables, they tended to 
concentrate on high-volume standard items within each merchandise category. Japanese 
supermarkets offered only a limited range of services and pursued an aggressive 
promotion policy. Most were operated on a self-service basis (see Yoshino, 1971: 132-
133). 
The factors that promoted the growth of supermarkets included the emergence of a 
mass consumer market, rapidly rising consumer expectations, the emergence of large-
scale manufacturing firms that could supply large quantities of merchandise of 
consistent quality, and aggressive marketing strategies (see Yoshino, 1971: 139). 
The reaction of large manufacturers to the emergent supermarkets varied widely. Some 
manufacturers initially refused to sell to them, especially to those who failed to accept 
the manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP). However, recognizing their growing 
importance, manufacturers soon normalized their relations with supermarkets. Not 
surprisingly, traditional retailers and wholesalers feared that the new retail format 
would drive them out of business.  
An imminent “distribution revolution” was again proclaimed at this point. A book by 
Hayashi Sh!ji called Ry!ts! kakumei (The Distribution Revolution) was published in 
1962 and became a national bestseller. At the time when the share of large-scale 
supermarkets was growing rapidly in the Japanese grocery retailing sector, Hayashi 
(1962) claimed that the role of wholesalers in the distribution system would 
dramatically decrease in response to the increasing trading power of large-scale 
retailers (see Azuma and Fernie, 2001: 283). He stressed two points. First, the 
development of supermarkets would be accompanied by retailers’ expanding their store 
size, thereby greatly decreasing the existence of small retailers. Second, the mass 
production and sales system would result in the elimination of wholesalers and lead to a 
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drastic reduction in the number of distributors (see Takaoka, 1999b: 9). Yoshino (1971: 
157) expected a similar development and wrote that mass merchandising firms were 
attempting to bypass wholesalers and deal directly with large manufacturers, sometimes 
out of sheer necessity, because wholesalers were often not capable of meeting the large 
demands of the mass-merchandising firms. The cost savings generated would give large 
retailers a competitive edge over their smaller competitors. 
The actual events that occurred did not match these predictions. Contrary to all 
predictions, the expansion of neither department stores nor supermarkets caused a 
“distribution revolution.” Direct sourcing remained a limited phenomenon. Despite 
their size, both department stores and supermarkets continued to rely on wholesalers 
and sourced their goods through a multi-stage distribution system as small retailers did. 
The question of why these businesses followed a pattern of business behavior that 
contradicted the predictions made is addressed in the following chapter. 
5.3.1.3 The role of secondary wholesalers in the 1960s 
According to Meyer-Ohle (1995) and Takaoka (1999a), supermarkets continued to rely 
on wholesalers for the following two reasons.  
• Consistency of supply: Supermarkets focused on the expansion of their branch 
networks and were greatly concerned about having a constant, adequate supply of 
products so as to maximize returns from the expanding economy and consumer 
spending. They abstained from setting up their own distributional networks and 
from circumventing the wholesale framework to avoid conflicts with the 
manufacturers and their designated wholesalers, which might have jeopardized the 
constant supply of products to their branches (see Meyer-Ohle, 1995: 175). 
• Dependence on branded goods: Supermarkets competed on branded goods and 
therefore needed to offer branded goods from as many manufacturers as possible. 
Good relationships with manufacturers of branded goods were thus indispensable. 
Only by constantly offering new products from well-known manufacturers could 
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supermarkets stay competitive. To reduce the risks associated with the introduction 
of new products, supermarkets started the practice of rack jobbing.31 Because this 
shifted risk to the suppliers, the supermarkets lost control of pricing and 
merchandising (see Takaoka, 1999a: 20). 
A third explanation focuses on the financing function that wholesalers provided for 
supermarkets. Within the category of stores labeled “supermarkets,” differences in size 
were substantial in the 1960s. The 1965 White Book of Small and Medium Companies 
stated that small supermarkets were comparable to average mom-and-pop stores, while 
large supermarkets were comparable to department stores. During the early expansion 
of supermarkets in Japan, regardless of their size, supermarkets required significant 
financial resources. To be able to offer low prices, they needed to buy products in large 
quantities. To sell significant quantities, they needed to rapidly expand their store 
count. Their challenge was how to obtain the funding for such rapid expansion. Banks 
were reluctant to give loans to start-up supermarkets for two reasons. On the one hand, 
funds were generally scarce after the war. On the other hand, banks perceived the due 
diligence and monitoring costs per supermarket as being too high (see Takaoka, 1999a: 
21). Careful due diligence and monitoring were necessary because the risk that start-up 
supermarkets would fail was high. In 1968 alone, 478 supermarkets failed, representing 
6.8% of the total number of supermarkets. This figure was very high compared to the 
average bankruptcy rate of 0.74% in the 1960s (see Statistics Bureau of Japan, Chapter 
6 “Business Activities” of the Historical Statistics). 
Dealing with small and medium-sized supermarkets carried considerable risk. 
Therefore, both banks and large, primary wholesalers refrained from dealing directly 
with new supermarkets. 
While primary wholesalers refused to do business with supermarkets because of risk 
concerns, secondary wholesalers did not. As smaller wholesalers, they were often 
geographically closer to the new supermarkets and could reduce their risk exposure 
                                                
31 Rack jobbing occurs when the supplier secures a number of locations in which it places racks on a consignment 
basis. The supplier maintains the inventory, moves the merchandise around to attract customers, and manages the 
bookkeeping. 
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because they had easier access to information, needed to invest less monitoring effort 
and cost, and could more easily identify supermarkets with growth potential. By 
establishing close relationships with promising supermarkets, they were able not only 
to constantly monitor supermarket performance and development but also to eventually 
profit from supermarket growth and expand themselves. Secondary wholesalers secured 
a constant supply of merchandise and provided the funds necessary for the rapid 
expansion of supermarkets, as Takaoka (1999a) writes: 
!;#$&K$0'54+)& H/%8& -/,,)$1$%'+'53%&1$4#+%5-1&I$'>$$%& '#$& -/,$01+02$'-& +%8&
'#$&>#3)$-+)$0-&$K3)K$8&+03/%8&'#$&+T5-&3H&'#$&>#3)$-+)$0-?&H/%4'53%&3H&H5%+%45%<F&
./,$01+02$'-&+'&'#5-&'51$&>$0$&/%8$0&,0$--/0$&I$4+/-$&'#$J&%$$8$8&'3&1+T515U$&
'#$&I$%$H5'-&3H&4#+5%&3,$0+'53%-D&I/'&'#$J&858&%3'&#+K$&-/HH545$%'&H/%8-F&VH&<0$+'&
-5<%5H54+%4$& 5%& 3K$04315%<& '#5-& -#30'+<$& >$0$& '#$& W'/0%3K$0& K+05+%4$& H/%8-?&
0$-/)'5%<& H031& '#$& 85HH$0$%4$-& I$'>$$%& '#$& +443/%'-& ,+J+I)$& '/0%3K$0& +%8& '#$&
1$04#+%85-$& '/0%3K$0F& ;#$& -3/04$& 3H& '#$-$& H/%8-& >+-& %3%$& 3'#$0& '#+%& '#$&
>#3)$-+)$0-F&!&6;+2+32+D&@AAA+M&./11+0J7F&
Thus, secondary wholesalers financed the early stage of supermarket development, 
during which time supermarkets expanded their store counts by using turnover variance 
funds (kaitensashiki) (see Takaoka, 1999a: 20).32 The relationship between secondary 
wholesalers and supermarkets evolved around this financing function and was a key 
reason that the multi-stage distribution system stayed in place (see Takaoka, 1999a: 
24).  
5.3.1.4 The emergence of convenience stores and their impact on the 
distribution system 
While supermarkets did not have the expected impact, but the emergence of the small-
scale store convenience store did reform the Japanese distribution system. 7-Eleven 
                                                
32 According to a report from the T"kai Bank, even large supermarkets such as Daiei continued to rely on turnover 
variance funds in the second half of the high growth period, when they could have received loans from banks or 
could have issued shares. Daiei, the largest supermarket at that time, only started to look for alternative financing 
sources in the 1970s. 
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convenience stores spearheaded this development by adopting and implementing a 
strategy called “total merchandising.” According to Kunitomo (1997: 885)‚ total 
merchandising differs significantly from the conventional way in which manufacturers 
plan, produce, and distribute their products to retailers. The convenience store leads the 
whole process from product development and production to distribution and consumer 
sales by cooperating and coordinating with both manufacturers and wholesalers. The 
actors involved share sales information that will help them to jointly design appropriate 
production and distribution systems. This was necessary because convenience stores 
competed with traditional mom-and-pop stores in terms of their assortment of goods. In 
contrast to the traditional mom-and-pop store, however, the convenience store provided 
an ample assortment of goods within the limited sales area of a small store and targeted 
a different group, namely young men and women who were fickle in their tastes. To 
respond to these customers’ needs, it was necessary to constantly introduce new 
products and eliminate slow-selling items. Approximately 70% of all Seven-Eleven 
lines are replaced within a year (see Kunitomo, 1997: 885). 
Providing an adequate assortment of goods in small convenience stores required 
innovations on the supplier side. Frequent, small deliveries of different goods from 
various suppliers are costly, and under the traditional distribution system, convenience 
stores would have had to deal with a large number of wholesalers because each 
manufacturer relied on a limited number of wholesalers to handle its products and each 
wholesaler often chose a second or third wholesaler to deliver the goods that they 
handled. Seven-Eleven introduced a new system. Goods from different suppliers were 
distributed in mixed deliveries made by the same vehicle, and this resulted in a 
reduction in the number of deliveries (see Kunitomo, 1997: 887; Takaoka, 1999b: 14-
15). 
Additional innovations on the supplier side included the following: 
• Small unit deliveries: The merchandise space of a 7-Eleven convenience store is 
approximately 100 m2. Each store carries 2’700 to 2’800 items, of which 70% are 
replaced with new products every year. Instead of ordering a whole carton for 
which the store has no storage space, a small-unit ordering and delivery system is 
used that replaces the conventional ordering system. 
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• Combined delivery system: The combined delivery system utilizes temperature-
controlled vehicles to carry different kinds of items. Products are divided into four 
different temperature zones: namely, frozen foods (-20°C), chilled foods (5°C), hot 
foods (20°C), and processed foods (room temperature). The temperature zone 
determines the frequency of delivery. Hot foods, for example, are delivered three 
times a day at the peak purchase times of breakfast, lunch, and dinner (see 
Kunitomo, 1997: 887-889). 
Convenience stores were new to Japan when the first Seven-Eleven store was built in 
Tokyo in 1974 (see Kunitomo, 1997: 887). When It"-Y"kad", Seven-Eleven’s parent 
company, outlined the new demands to be levied on its suppliers (such as frequent, just-
in-time delivery of goods from various suppliers in small quantities), the opposition 
among wholesalers was strong. In the end, however, the wholesalers complied, even 
though this meant losses in the first two to three years of collaboration with the new 
convenience stores. According to Meyer-Ohle (1995: 177), they did so because they 
feared losing business with Seven-Eleven’s parent company, It"-Y"kad", a top 20 
retailer in terms of sales at that time. Moreover, with the rapid increase in the number 
of convenience stores, the wholesaler started to benefit as well.33  
5.3.1.5 The role of wholesalers in the 1990s 
The situation in the 1990s exhibited interesting parallels to that of the 1960s. In both 
the 1960s and the 1990s, an increase in the number of large stores was expected to 
shorten the distribution channel and lead to disintermediation. 
In the 1960s, supermarkets sourced via wholesalers because they were eager to 
capitalize on the booming economy and thus aggressively expand their businesses. 
Secondary wholesalers funded that expansion. In addition, supermarkets competed on 
branded goods and wanted to remain on good terms with manufacturers, for which 
reason they continued to source through the wholesale channels designated by their key 
                                                
33 It"-Y"kad" operated 22 general supermarkets in 1971. In terms of sales, It"-Y"kad" ranked 17th among the 
Japanese retailers. 
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manufacturers. Direct supply remained a limited phenomenon. 
In the 1980s, banks rather than wholesalers funded the aggressive expansion of store 
footprints to meet the increasing consumer demand for more products during the bubble 
economy. Eventually the economic bubble burst at the beginning of the 1990s, and 
consumer demand decreased; as a result, sales space productivity fell. Retailers were 
trapped because servicing the bank loans was tied to increasing sales.34 They tried to 
increase sales by increasing sales space (see Table 29), which increased the loan burden 
even more, and hoped that consumer confidence would eventually return (see Dawson 
and Larke, 2004: 80ff). 
Table 29: Sales space for Japan’s largest retailers in 1991, 1995, and 1999 
      
                        Sales space (m2)             Change in % 
Retailer 
1991 1995 1999 1991-1995 1995-1999 
      
Daiei 1'612'770 3'825'370 2'467'076 137.2 -35.5 
Ito Yokado 1'106'930 1'357'785 1'779'498 22.7 31.1 
Jusco 895'946 1'367'878 2'554'000 52.7 86.7 
MYCAL 831'300 1'073'547 1'376'780 29.1 28.2 
Takashimaya 244'996 473'207 527'898 93.1 11.6 
Seiyu 915'458 1'076'382 1'118'798 17.6 3.9 
Uny 627'572 856'402 1'077'720 36.5 25.8 
Mitsukoshi 364'401 390'360 367'235 7.1 -5.9 
Seibu Department 
stores 421'248 453'668 494'574 7.7 9.0 
Marui 370'901 409'536 447'275 10.4 9.2 
All department  
stores 6'377'047 7'124'072 7'290'180 5.8 2.3 
All supermarkets* 9'524'750 11'394'322 12'753'392 19.6 11.9 
      
*General merchandise chain stores only    
Source: Dawson and Larke, 2004: 82. 
                                                
34 During the bubble era, many of these retail conglomerates borrowed from banks using land as collateral. After 
land prices had gone down and the economy had entered a recession, they were unable to pay back these loans. 
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Consumer confidence, however, weakened further through the 1990s; retail spending 
per household fell, as did sales space productivity. The loan burden of the retailers grew 
to massive proportions (see Table 30). As Dawson and Larke (2000) have noted, 
!;#$&5%40$+-$&5%&H)330&-,+4$&8/05%<&'#$&@AAQ-&>+-&+&0$-/)'&3H&+&-'0+'$<J&+51$8&+'&
-$0K545%<&'#$&8$I'&I/08$%&5%&'#$&-#30'&'$01&5%&'#$&#3,$&3H&5%40$+-$8&43%-/1$0&
-,$%85%<& 5%& '#$& )3%<& '$01F& ;#$& 5%40$+-$& 5%& 43%-/1$0& -,$%85%<& #+-& %3'&
1+'$05+)5U$8&+%8&5%%3K+'53%&#+-&%3'&I$$%&+,,)5$8&'3&0$K$0-$&'#$&8$4)5%$&5%&+--$'D&
5%4)/85%<&-,+4$&,038/4'5K5'JF&(-&+&0$-/)'&'#$&-'0+'$<J&3H&$T,+%-53%&3H&-+)$-&-,+4$&
#+-&I$$%&+&-,$4'+4/)+0&H+5)/0$FL&6X+>-3%&+%8&Y+02$D&ZQQ[M&\Z7&
Table 30 shows the change in profits for the 10 largest retail firms during the 1990s 
together with the amount of debt in 1998.35 
                                                
35 Sales and space figures are shown for the core business only, and these statistics must therefore be interpreted with 
care because retailers undertook considerable diversification activities and grew into large conglomerate 
corporations. The groupings provided convenient ways to move profits and losses within a group to minimize 
corporate taxes. The majority of these subsidiaries were not included in the main accounts until 2001, when new 
accounting procedures required companies to publish consolidated accounts so that all debt had to be fully reported. 
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Table 30: The largest 10 retail firms as ranked by sales in 1991 and 1999 
       
                          Sales     Pre-tax profit 
Retailer 
1991 1999 
Change 
in % 
1991-
1999 
1999 
Change 
in % 
1991-
1999 
Interest  
bearing  
debt 1998  
(in billion  
JPY) 
       
Daiei 2'025'920 2'204'823 8.83 1'147 -95.80 655'797 
Ito Yokado 1'459'590 1'508'910 3.38 51'081 -47.40 - 
Jusco 1'041'337 1'422'444 36.60 23'844 -19.40 133'314 
MYCAL 767'128 1'081'022 40.92 3'244 -88.90 289'246 
Takashimaya 8'429'781 1'021'037 21.12 1'178 -91.20 175'479 
Seiyu 1'094'978 875'369 -20.06 6'341 -60.40 310'493 
Uny 555'826 773'987 39.25 12'796 -26.50 118'889 
Mitsukoshi 876'618 675'748 -22.91 6'108 -44.40 147'421 
Seibu Department  
stores 916'915 588'779 -35.79 3'854 n.a. 437'500 
Marui 569'070 480'881 -15.50 28'628 -50.10 131'812 
Largest 100 firms 25'022'596 27'190'480 8.66 - - - 
Source: Dawson and Larke, 2004: 82.  
Most retailers were able to stay in business through the 1990s because of the attitudes 
that the banks took with respect to these debts and because of the effect that these 
retailers’ failure would have had on the Japanese banking sector (see Dawson and 
Larke, 2004: 82). 
Dawson and Larke (2004) reported that the use of consignment sales and supplier-
employed sales staff in department stores increased in the 1990s as retailers sought 
support from their suppliers and tried to reduce costs associated with directly paid 
employees. In 1999, some 3.6% of retail employees were employed by suppliers. 
Department stores had more than 37% of their staff employed by suppliers. For 
example, the Takashimaya Department Store, which opened at Nagoya Station in 
March 1999 with a sales area of 55’000 m2, had approximately 100 staff members 
employed by Takashimaya when it opened; the rest came from the suppliers and the 
owner of the site, JR T"kaid" (see Dawson and Larke, 2004: 81). 
Table 31 provides an overview of the salespeople who were dispatched to selected 
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Japanese department stores in 1988; note that this was before the bubble burst.  
Table 31: Salespersons dispatched to selected Japanese department stores, 1988 
   
Department store Ratio (%) Number (persons) 
   
1. Keihin 235.1 1'380 
2. Iyotetsu Sogo 178.5 1'294 
3. Chiba Mitsukoshi 159.8 1'200 
4. Kurosaki Sogo 151.5 1'198 
5. Tokyu 148.3 7'644 
6. Chubu Kintetsu 133.5 940 
7. Chiba Sogo 121.0 1'483 
8. Marui Imai 116.7 2'500 
9. Hiroshima Sogo 109.0 1'380 
10. Tenmaya 107.0 1'814 
11. Fujisaki 102.2 830 
12. Seibu 101.3 20'302 
13. Odakyu 78.7 2'042 
14. Hakata Daimaru 70.6 720 
15. Yamagataya 64.1 900 
Source: Ito and Maruyama, 1990: 18. 
Retailers in particular depended on wholesalers for order processing due to a sharp 
increase in the number of products handled per retailer. Jetro (2004: 11) reported that 
Japanese department stores are very similar in terms of the goods stocked. When sales 
at department stores stagnated, many department stores increased their product ranges 
to attract more customers. According to Maruyama (2004: 39-40), the number of 
products stocked by retailers increased dramatically. Large urban department stores 
carried between 1.5 and 2 million product items, while general merchandise stores 
(GMS) carried between 300’000 and 400’000 items. The household products of one 
Japanese manufacturer, on the other hand, included 100 items in 1975 and ballooned to 
more than 300 items by 1980 and 500 items by 1985. In 1980, there were 600 items in 
the beer market (400 domestic and 200 imports), 400 shampoo/rinse items, 211 types of 
televisions, and 127 types of washing machines. 
According to The Economist (1991/1992), approximately 10’000 new products are 
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launched every year in Japan. Retailers readily accept the need to introduce a large 
number of new products because there is little risk in doing so. 
This trend of launching a large number of new products is not confined to Japan. A 
similar trend is apparent in the United States. For example, in the United States in 1970, 
the number of new product items introduced was 1’365. A single store typically carried 
7’800 items. By 1985, the number of new items had risen to 7’330, and the number of 
store items had increased to 12’459. By 1990, these numbers had risen to 13’244 for 
new products and 30’000 for store items (see Maruyama, 2004: 40). 
In the United States, expansion of the number of product items led to the emergence of 
very large retail stores and direct sourcing. In Japan, because of the limited availability 
of retail store space, stores had to find other ways to cope with this development. Like 
convenience stores, large retailers started ordering their products in increasingly smaller 
units from the 1980s onwards, with units ranging from the conventional case (or dozen) 
to the half-case and even down to two or three individual units of a particular product. 
As a result of these smaller orders, delivery frequency increased from once per week to 
twice per week or more; sometimes deliveries were even made daily (see Maruyama, 
2004: 40; Jung, 2000: 2). 
Competition on product selection rather than on price would explain why only some of 
the largest retailers took advantage of the new regulatory environment by opening large 
numbers of new stores. Four of the largest retailers chose to rebuild or relocate existing 
stores. According to Davies and Itou (2001, 92-93), there was an increase in the 
average store size among large retailers, but there was less of an increase in the total 
number of large stores. Retailers sought to benefit from an increase in scope (that is, 
obtaining a wider range of products at the same location by increasing store size) rather 
than scale (i.e., generating more purchasing power from greater sales of the same goods 
by increasing store counts). 
5.3.2 The increase in the number of intermediate wholesalers 
Our final open question concerns the increase in the number of intermediate 
wholesalers between 1994 and 2002.  
While the increase in the number of intermediate wholesalers went almost unnoticed, 
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the decrease in the number of other wholesaler categories has been widely discussed. 
Interestingly, the decrease in the number of wholesalers is seldom attributed to changes 
in the regulatory environment. Instead, it is attributed to the sluggish economy and the 
need for large retailers to reduce the number of wholesalers that they source from for 
efficiency reasons. 
METI (2004) has suggested that the general decline in the number of wholesalers in the 
1990s is due to the reduction in trade volume (in terms of sales channeled through the 
distribution system) that occurred after the economic bubble burst. In 2002, annual total 
sales of consumer goods in wholesale trade reached JPY 163.6 trillion, down 18.1% 
from the 1997 survey. Between 1994 and 1997, total sales decreased from JPY 195.6 
trillion to JPY 182.1 trillion, yielding a decrease of 6.9%. Between 1994 and 2002, total 
sales decreased by 16.4% (see METI, 2004: 22). 
As a result, large retailers cut costs by reducing the number of wholesalers that they 
contracted with, but they did not increase direct sourcing (see Maruyama, 2004: 36-37; 
The Economist, 2004). This cost cutting led to a series of mergers and acquisitions 
within the wholesale industry: 
• In the processed food sector, It"ch! Shokuhin was formed by a merger between two 
companies in the It"ch! Group in 1996. Meanwhile, Sany! Koami was established 
in 2000 via a merger between Sany! Shokuhin of the Mitsui Bussan Group and the 
alcoholic beverage wholesaler Koami. 
• In the frozen and refrigerated foods industry, It"ch! Corporation merged with Yuki-
Jirushi Access in 2004. The latter company itself was formed through a merger of 
five wholesalers affiliated with Snow Brand Milk Products. In 2003, a subsidiary of 
Ry"shoku, a Mitsubishi Group company, merged with Yukiwa, a wholesale 
subsidiary of Nichirei. 
• In the alcoholic beverage sector, large wholesalers have actively engaged in merger 
and acquisition activities with regional alcoholic beverage wholesalers. The leading 
food wholesaler Kokubu integrated 20 regional alcoholic beverage wholesalers 
across the country in 1998 and 1999. Ry"shoku has been expanding into the 
alcoholic beverage division since 2000 through mergers and capital tie-ups with 
alcoholic beverage wholesalers (see Maruyama, 2004: 36-37). 
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From the point of view of the wholesalers, carrying a broad range of products is linked 
with higher costs and with a large number of newly launched products. This carries 
considerable risk unless a specific strategy is adopted. Wholesalers must carry rather 
specialized assortments to reduce the costs associated with carrying broad inventories 
and must develop expertise in a specialized merchandise line. If a customer orders 
merchandise that the wholesaler does not carry, the wholesaler can call on another 
wholesaler to supply him/her with the requested products. In this manner, wholesalers 
can sell broad merchandise lines, even though they may carry limited ranges in their 
physical inventory (see Maruyama, 2004: 36-37). 
While such a strategy might help to control the inventory costs of an individual 
wholesaler, the number of horizontal transactions in the channel increases, as do the 
potential total distribution costs associated with a product (see Pirog III and Lancioni, 
1996: 56). Here, one must keep in mind that it is not simply the number of transactions 
but also the magnitude of each margin along the way that affects the final costs of 
distribution. Note that according to Coughlan and Lal (1992: 210), retail price and 
channel length are not necessarily correlated, and having many more middleman levels 
than just one can be profit maximizing. 
As Pirog III and Lancioni (1996: 58) explain,  
!]/1$03/-& -1+))&1+0<5%-&1+J&#+K$&+&1/4#&-1+))$0& 51,+4'& '#+%&+&-5%<)$&#$H'J&
1+02S/,F&"#5)$&$43%315$-&3H&-4+)$&5%&85-'05I/'53%&4+%&40$+'$&43-'&0$8/4'53%-&K5+&
H$>$0&'0+%-+4'53%-D&$43%315$-&3H&-4+)$&4+%&+)-3&40$+'$&43-'& 0$8/4'53%-&K5+&130$&
'0+%-+4'53%-FL&
They argued that scale economies could be generated among many co-operating 
establishments at a particular channel level, resulting in lower overall distribution costs 
(see Pirog III and Lancioni, 1996: 58). To support their argument, they made a rare 
comparison of distribution cost structures in the United States and Japan.36 Table 32 
shows Japan’s distributed cost structures for consumer goods. Each row lists how much 
                                                
36 Distribution cost structure refers to how much of the end user’s dollar is allocated to the various levels of the 
channel (i.e., producer, wholesaler, retailer, and logistics specialist). 
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of a consumer’s dollar goes to the producer and to distributors. The last row labeled 
"Total" shows the average of the 18 rows. Note that 64.21% of each consumer’s yen 
goes to the producer, while 35.79% goes to distributors. This latter figure of 35.79% 
breaks down further, with 8.13% going to wholesalers, 25.83% going to retailers, and 
1.83% going to transportation. 
Table 32 also shows considerable variance in cost structures across product categories. 
Only apparel and leather goods have distribution costs of more than 50%. For the 
remaining categories, distribution costs range from 25% to 48%. 
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Table 32: The distribution cost structure for consumer goods in Japan 
      
Consumer good Producer  (%) 
Wholesale  
(%) 
Retail  
(%) 
Transportation  
(%) 
Total  
distribution  
(%) 
      
Agricultural products 55.23 13.81 28.53 2.43 44.77 
Food products 72.09 5.94 19.81 2.16 27.91 
Textiles 57.77 10.03 25.86 6.33 42.23 
Apparel and leather 
products 48.71 11.68 38.92 0.69 51.29 
Paper and wood products 62.99 8.42 25.21 3.37 37.01 
Furniture 55.38 5.55 37.04 2.03 44.62 
Publishing 58.84 1.62 38.38 1.16 41.16 
Chemical products 52.21 9.42 37.78 0.59 47.79 
Petroleum products 62.78 11.33 24.33 1.56 37.22 
Rubber and plastic products 51.23 8.04 39.74 0.99 48.77 
Glass, clay and stone 
products 71.80 10.94 12.76 4.50 28.20 
Primary metal products 74.96 15.99 7.66 1.38 25.04 
Finished metal products 63.56 4.51 31.17 0.75 36.44 
Machinery 59.12 5.33 34.90 0.64 40.88 
Electrical equipment 68.99 7.47 22.83 0.71 31.01 
Transport vehicles 71.05 4.83 23.24 0.88 28.95 
Precision instruments 64.37 7.94 26.79 0.90 35.63 
Other 70.69 12.13 16.05 1.13 29.31 
Total 64.21 8.13 25.83 1.83 35.79 
Source: Pirog III and Lancioni, 1996: 60. 
Table 33 shows the cost structures for consumer goods in the United States This table 
can be read the same way as Table 32. 64.92% of each consumer dollar goes to the 
producer, while 35.08% goes to distributors. This latter figure of 35.08% breaks down 
further, with 6.11% going to wholesalers, 27.27% going to retailers, and 1.70% going 
to transportation. 
  
140 
Table 33: Distribution cost structures for consumer goods in the United States 
      
Consumer good Producer  (%) 
Wholesale  
(%) 
Retail  
(%) 
Transportation  
(%) 
Total  
distribution  
(%) 
      
Agricultural products 56.34 7.04 28.77 7.85 43.66 
Food products 68.15 7.82 22.44 1.59 31.85 
Textiles 54.09 4.02 41.31 0.58 45.91 
Apparel and leather 
products 57.25 3.73 38.80 0.22 42.75 
Paper and wood products 57.83 3.72 36.55 1.91 42.17 
Furniture 57.91 2.11 39.45 0.53 42.09 
Publishing 68.20 3.57 26.77 1.46 31.80 
Chemical products 59.21 7.02 32.39 1.38 40.79 
Petroleum products 75.77 6.86 14.77 2.60 24.23 
Rubber and plastic products 50.88 7.31 40.02 1.79 49.12 
Glass, clay and stone  
products 49.53 5.45 43.66 1.36 50.47 
Primary metal products 56.84 3.71 36.91 2.54 43.16 
Finished metal products 53.44 6.41 39.22 0.93 46.56 
Machinery 60.29 8.70 30.54 0.47 39.71 
Electrical equipment 60.90 6.96 31.05 1.08 39.10 
Transport vehicles 76.90 2.97 17.57 2.56 23.10 
Precision instruments 51.27 5.92 42.65 0.15 48.73 
Other 54.96 7.44 36.91 0.69 45.04 
Total 64.92 6.11 27.27 1.70 35.08 
Source: Pirog III and Lancioni, 1996: 60. 
In Table 34, the United States values were subcontracted from the Japanese values. The 
table shows the differences in distribution cost structures for Japan and the United 
States. Negative numbers indicate that the cost is lower in Japan than in the United 
States. 
The bottom row, for example, shows that distributors in Japan claim more of each 
consumer dollar with respect to the yen, but the difference is very small (0.71%). 
Japanese wholesalers claim 2.02% more than their American counterparts, while 
Japanese retailers receive 1.44% less. Japanese transportation firms obtain more or less 
the same (0.13%) share as their American counterparts.  
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Table 34: Differences in distribution cost structures for consumer goods: Japan minus 
the United States 
      
Consumer good Producer  (%) 
Wholesale  
(%) 
Retail  
(%) 
Transportation 
(%) 
Total  
distribution  
(%) 
      
Agricultural products -1.11 6.77 -0.24 -5.42 1.11 
Food products 3.94 -1.88 -2.63 0.57 -3.94 
Textiles 3.68 6.01 -15.45 5.75 -3.68 
Apparel and leather  
products -8.54 7.95 0.12 0.47 8.54 
Paper and wood  
products 5.16 4.70 -11.34 1.46 -5.16 
Furniture -2.53 3.44 -2.41 1.50 2.53 
Publishing -9.36 -1.95 11.61 -0.30 9.36 
Chemical products -7.00 2.40 5.39 -0.79 7.00 
Petroleum products -12.99 4.47 9.56 -1.04 12.99 
Rubber and plastic  
products 0.35 0.73 -0.28 -0.80 -0.35 
Glass, clay and stone  
products 22.27 5.49 -30.90 3.14 -22.27 
Primary metal products 18.12 12.28 -29.25 -1.16 -18.12 
Finished metal products 10.12 -1.90 -8.05 -0.18 -10.12 
Machinery -1.17 -3.37 4.36 0.17 1.17 
Electrical equipment 8.09 0.51 -8.22 -0.37 -8.09 
Transport vehicles -5.85 1.86 5.67 -1.68 5.85 
Precision instruments 13.10 2.02 -15.86 0.75 -13.10 
Other 15.73 4.69 -20.86 0.44 -15.73 
Total -0.71 2.02 -1.44 0.13 0.71 
Source: Pirog III and Lancioni, 1996: 61. 
Based on these results, Pirog III and Lancioni (1996) concluded that taking all 
consumer goods into account, the distribution cost differences between Japan and the 
United States are smaller than the literature suggests. 
Returning to the trend of large retailers limiting the number of suppliers, Miwa (2002: 
178) argues that this phenomenon should not be overestimated. Miwa cites an industry 
specialist who explains that even the most rationalized CVS chain shop, holding 800 or 
900 food items, does not limit the number of manufacturers from which it buys. It buys 
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less than 300 or 400 items from the largest supplier and considers any further increase 
in the concentration of suppliers to be costly. 
The total number of final wholesalers that source from wholesalers and sell to retailers 
declined by about 8% between 1994 and 2002 (see Table 10). Their number decreased 
by “only” 8% because, despite the growth of large retailers, there remained a large 
number of medium-sized and small retailers that final wholesalers were able to serve 
with existing and new services. Small and medium-sized wholesalers cover those areas 
of the market that are beyond the reach of major wholesalers. This includes supplying 
small and medium-sized community-based retailers such as local supermarkets, and 
wholesaling products made by local manufacturers. Supermarkets in Japan stock an 
unusually large amount of fresh food. Serving local supermarkets requires an intimate 
understanding of local tastes and of how customers’ tastes vary according to store 
location and time of day. (see The Economist, 1999). 
Other services provided to small retailers include merchandising, product development, 
order receipt networks, sales promotion, purchases on behalf of local retailers, the 
acquisition and expansion of new channels, information gathering, and communication 
(see Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, 2005: 142-143). 
Final wholesalers also cater to the needs of regionally operating retailers. Jetro (2004) 
reported that there remain market segments with no national players. In the drugstore 
market, for example, even the industry-leading chains are still regional, and there are no 
national players. Similarly, in the home improvement industry, there are no nationwide 
chains. The industry leaders are all regional chains, although they are morphing into 
national chains (see Jetro, 2004: 21-23). Japan also still features a large number of 
department store chains, while in many Western nations, the number of department 
stores has been reduced until just a few are left. As of July 2003, there were 99 
department store operators in Japan. Only 10 out of these 99 operated nationwide, and 
the same 10 accounted for 57% of total department store sales. The remaining 43% 
were mainly regional department stores that each focused on their respective prefectural 
capital (see Jetro, 2004: 10). 
The transformation of certain retailers into national chains also explains the formation 
of national wholesalers:  
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• Paltac (headquartered in Osaka) merged with 15 regional wholesalers starting in the 
1990s and transformed itself into the industry’s foremost national wholesaler. 
• Daika (headquartered in Hokkaid"), Itoi (headquartered in Nagoya), Sanbic 
(headquartered in Fukuoka), and Tokukura (headquartered in Tokushima) merged 
into Arata, a national wholesaler covering all of Japan except Okinawa. 
According to METI (2004), the reason for the increase in the number of intermediate 
wholesalers is the same as the reason for the decrease in the number of all other 
wholesale categories: the sluggish Japanese economy following the burst of the bubble 
at the beginning of the 1990s, which led to a decline in the value of goods channeled 
through the distribution system and forced firms to increase efficiency. 
• Final wholesalers became intermediate wholesalers because it was financially more 
rewarding to serve final wholesalers than it was to serve a decreasing number of 
small retail stores. 
• New wholesalers were formed as spin-offs from manufacturers because they were 
forced to concentrate on their core business for efficiency reasons. Wholesalers that 
had previously bought from manufacturers and sold to wholesalers (i.e., source 
wholesalers) were now classified as intermediate wholesalers. 
• Wholesalers emerged specializing in buying second-hand goods from individual 
sellers, thereby serving the growing market for second-hand goods in Japan after 
the end of the bubble economy. 
It is unclear to date which development contributed the most to the increase in the 
number of intermediate wholesalers. 
In addition, the increasing imports of lower-cost overseas products offered new 
business opportunities for intermediate wholesalers to act as links between importers 
and final wholesalers. Between 1994 and 2002, the number of direct trade wholesalers 
to retailers (wholesale level 1.1.2, see Table 10) that sourced from overseas and then 
sold to retailers increased from 1’435 to 2’030, creating a 41.5% increase, while the 
number of source wholesalers sourcing from overseas and selling to wholesalers 
increased from 2’639 to 3’789, creating an increase of 43.6% (see Table 10). The 
drivers of the increase in imports were the need for retailers to offer products with a 
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better price-performance ratio (i.e., foreign products or re-imports from Japanese 
manufacturing sites outside Japan) and the need to offer foreign products that would 
appeal to the Japanese consumer and also help retailers to differentiate themselves from 
their competitors.  
5.3.3 Summary 
Chapter 6.3 opened with two questions: (1) Did the (still moderate) increase in the 
number of large retailers lead to more direct sourcing? (2) Why did the number of 
intermediate wholesalers increase after the revision of the statute? 
Regarding the first question, we note the belief that by virtue of their size, large 
retailers would internalize wholesale function and/or shift them to manufacturers, 
thereby establishing a direct link between retailers and manufacturers. However, we 
have indicated that it is questionable whether retailers were actually able to so. 
We believe that retailers had neither the power to force manufacturers to supply them 
directly nor the necessary resources to internalize wholesale functions. Burdened with 
bank loans as a relic of the bubble economy in the 1980s, when Japanese retailers had 
aggressively expanded sales footprints to meet consumer demand for more products, 
these retailers tried to further increase sales in the 1990s by expanding their sales 
footprints. This in turn only further increased their loan burden and their dependence on 
manufacturers and goods. Because their financial resources were concentrated on 
increasing sales and repaying loans, there was little money left over for them to use to 
assume wholesaler functions: 
• The focus on the expansion of sales space required that storage space be minimized, 
which translated into a need for smaller inventories. Smaller inventories required 
the frequent and reliable supply of merchandise in accurate, small quantities, which 
was a requirement that wholesalers had learned to efficiently fulfill upon the 
emergence of convenience stores. 
• The strategy of retailers was to increase sales by offering a broad product selection 
and regularly introducing new products. Ordering through wholesalers allowed 
them access to a large number of manufacturers and simultaneously allowed them 
to keep the number of suppliers that they dealt with at a comparatively low level.  
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• Retailers also depended on their suppliers for consignment selling, supplier-
employed sales staff who would help to minimize labor costs, and merchandising 
know-how. These practices developed after World War II and led to a distinct 
distribution of functions between retailers and wholesalers in Japan. 
With these findings in mind, we believe it is rather unlikely that direct sourcing 
increased considerably after the revision of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law. This 
question, however, needs further research; no reliable quantitative data addressing it are 
currently available. 
Regarding the second question, we suggest that the increase in the number of 
intermediate wholesalers has been the outcome of a number of developments that have 
little to do with the revised statute. The value of goods channeled through the 
distribution system decreased in the 1990s due to the sluggish economy. In their efforts 
to cut costs, some manufacturers spun off their distribution division. Final wholesalers 
became intermediate wholesalers because it was more profitable for them to supply 
other wholesalers than it was for them to supply small retailers. The market for second-
hand products in Japan expanded, and wholesalers began buying such products from 
individual sellers. An increasing number of lower-cost products were sourced from 
overseas, offering new opportunities for intermediate wholesalers to purchase from 
importers. Hence, the decreased values of goods channeled through the system led 
several businesses to assess their business profile, which in turn led to an increase in 
intermediate wholesalers. 
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6 Conclusions 
6.1 Key findings 
The revision of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law was expected to ease regulatory 
constraints on retail store size and unleash the power of a number of social and 
technological developments (associated changes), resulting in the modernization of 
Japan’s distribution system for consumer goods. Key expectations included the 
following:  
• More large stores: The number of large stores was expected to increase because 
regulatory constraints on size were relaxed. 
• Fewer small stores: The number of small stores was expected to decline because 
they were faced with increased competition from large stores and the loss of 
regulatory protection. 
• Shorter distribution channels: With the number of large retailers increasing, trade 
flows between manufacturers and retailers were expected to increasingly include 
one level of wholesalers only. Wholesale circuity was predicted to improve. 
• More direct sourcing: Direct sourcing between manufacturers and retailers was 
predicted to increase due to retailers’ channel power. Large retailers, because of 
their size, were expected to force manufacturers to supply them directly. In 
addition, large retailers were not supposed to depend on wholesalers anymore as 
order placing and processing nodes because of the implementation of inter-firm 
EDI (electronic data interchange) systems, which linked manufacturers and 
retailers, and POS (point of sales) systems, which enabled retailers to make the 
right sourcing decisions based on the analysis of sales-related information gathered 
by POS systems. 
• Fewer wholesale establishments: The number of wholesale establishments was 
expected to decline as a result of the decline in the number of small retailers and 
because of the existence of shorter distribution channels and more direct sourcing 
patterns. 
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The quantitative findings of this study can be summarized as follows: 
• The number of large stores increased. Based on the statistics obtained for this 
study, the growth of large retail establishments may be associated with the revision 
of the statute in question. Thus, this statute appears to have opened more 
opportunities for large-scale establishments to penetrate the Japanese consumer 
market. However, while we find a correlation between the revision of the statute 
and an increase in the number of large stores, the rate of change is found to be 
relatively small, and the causal relationship between the revision of the statute and 
the change in the structure of the retail market remains questionable. 
• The number of small traditional retailers declined. However, we find that the 
revised statute cannot be identified as the primary reason for the decline in the 
number of small retailers because the decline had already begun between 1982 and 
1985: that is, before the implementation of the revised statute.  
• We were unable to confirm whether wholesale circuity had improved. To 
assess the length of the distribution channels, we used various ratios to determine 
wholesale circuity. We found that the ratios are not adequate to determine the 
internal structure of the wholesale sector. We caution that all ratios are the result of 
approximate estimation methods and that a definitive statement on wholesale 
circuity is therefore impossible.  
• The overall number of wholesalers from all except one category decreased. We 
found that the number of wholesalers in all categories but one decreased after the 
implementation of the revised statute. However, there was a significant increase in 
the number of intermediate wholesalers, which does not support our research 
hypothesis. 
• Predictions that direct sourcing would increase could not be quantitatively 
validated. An analysis of the development of direct sourcing reveals missing data 
on the link between manufacturers and retailers. Anecdotal data are available, 
however, and we decided to study direct trends. Nevertheless, the descriptive data 
used are associated with a response rate of only 19%, and given this small 
population, the data may omit extreme values that may alter the trends. Thu, we are 
unable to quantitatively confirm that developments in direct sourcing were related 
  
148 
to the application of the statute in question. 
Below we will discuss the results obtained from our data analysis that do not support 
our research hypothesis. These include the following:  
(1) The slow rate of change in the number of large retail stores. 
(2) The initiation of a decrease in the number of small retailers prior to the 
implementation of the revised statute during the years 1982 – 1985. 
(3) The increase in the number intermediate wholesalers during the period studied. 
(4) Developments in direct sourcing. 
What follows is more insight into result (1). We have analyzed the revised statute and 
associated changes in more detail and have found that there are still a number of factors 
that limit the expansion of large stores. Based on the revised statute, although 
procedures were simplified and retailers with floor space up to 1’000 m2 were no longer 
subject to the regulations, restrictions on the expansion of large retailers remained in 
place even after the revision. In 2000, a new law replacing the Large-Scale Retail 
Stores Law went into effect. While the new statute no longer explicitly protects small 
retailers, it is understood to constrain large retailers wishing to expand based on 
environmental concerns (legislation).  
In addition, some observers argue that, because large retailers in Japan compete on 
product selection rather than price, there was an increase in the average store size 
operated by large retailers but less of an increase in the total number of large stores. 
Large retailers sought to benefit from an increase in scope (i.e., obtaining a wider range 
of products at the same location by increasing store size) rather than scale (i.e., 
generating more purchasing power from increased sales of the same goods by 
increasing store counts). This might have contributed to the moderate increase in the 
number of large retail stores. 
With regard to the associated changes, our analysis produced the following findings: 
Distributional IT: There were rapid increases in the diffusion rate of product bar codes 
and in the number of retailers equipped with POS systems, reflecting the explosion of 
the number of product items moving through the distribution networks. The adoption of 
inter-firm EDI systems, however, was limited (technology). Possible explanations for 
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the limited adoption of inter-firm EDI are as follows. 
• Government interference obstructed standardization: It has been argued that 
governments should help to standardize information management because 
telecommunication networks and computerized information systems are part of the 
social infrastructure of a country. By reducing the costs of system construction, 
communication and information management to private firms, a government can 
promote the development and use of IT. However, the policy of prioritizing the fair 
treatment of all industry members, which is one that is reportedly often adopted by 
the Japanese government, served to protect the interests of weaker members and 
sets the target speed of industry-wide system development at a rather low level. In 
this case, frontrunners were asked to move at a slower pace and, expecting the 
government to intervene, tended to postpone their own R&D activities because 
government interference naturally serves to eliminate any first-mover advantage. 
• The costs and conflicts of interest among the potential parties were too 
numerous:  
! Coordination costs: The design and adoption of an IT system involves the 
coordination of a large number of potential participants. Coordination costs 
increase with the number of participants. 
! Disclosure of valuable information: Demand prices for inter-firm systems 
vary greatly because the value of any information drawn from the system 
differs among individual firms. The demand price or value of any 
information depends on the firm’s intra-firm system for decision-making 
and information flow and the firm’s business know-how and ability to use 
this information. Because the coordination of any inter-firm system requires 
firms to disclose know-how and ideas, their value will fall as the number of 
firms with access to them rises. This makes cooperation difficult. 
! Diverse demands on the system: Demands regarding the type of data to be 
collected and information to be provided differ greatly among the 
participants. The type of information that is of value to a firm depends on its 
products, technology, history, market position, and so on. Expectations vary 
significantly among firms, and reaching an agreement regarding system 
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design can consequently be very difficult. 
! Battle for leadership: The design and function of an inter-firm system will 
influence the demand price for each firm and spark a battle for leadership in 
the construction of such a system.  
! The need for ongoing cooperation: Cooperation and coordination must 
exist not only during the system’s initial construction but also when the 
system is complete and operational. The experience and business know-how 
gained will generate new ideas about how to improve the system. Thus, the 
growth and evolution of both intra-firm and inter-firm dynamics create the 
need for on-going cooperation. 
Private label products: The share of private label products in Japan remained low in 
international comparison. There are two possible explanations for this; firstly, that 
brand-consciousness did not decline as much as expected (shopping behavior), and 
secondly, that the share of private label products was low because the retail 
concentration was low as compared to that of other nations. Discounters selling a 
limited selection of products (mainly staples) at a very low price contribute to a higher 
retail concentration. This was clearly not going to occur in Japan, with Japanese 
retailers competing on product selection rather than price and Japanese consumers 
preferring fresh foods. 
Car ownership: The private car ownership rate remained low in comparison with that 
of other nations. This might be due to the sluggish economy, limited space for and/or 
the cost associated with owning a car and parking spots at home In addition, car owners 
in Japan shop neither less frequently nor in bulk (shopping habits). Shopping by car in 
Japan is cumbersome because roads are often congested and there are few parking lots. 
The attractiveness to the Japanese consumer of large stores outside their neighborhoods 
and outside city centers is limited due to high population density (geographic 
environment). 
Larger dwellings: The average dwelling size increased only in non-metropolitan areas. 
In metropolitan areas, in which almost half the population lives, the average housing 
size actually decreased in the years studied. More importantly, the relationship between 
dwelling size and shopping behavior is unclear; there is no real indication that people 
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who live in larger residences in Japan prefer to shop less and store more surplus 
products at home (shopping habits). Some studies suggest that the number of small 
retailers is large because the Japanese need to shop frequently because there is so little 
storage space in Japanese homes. However, this explanation does not fully explain the 
small size of both consumer non-durable and durable retailers, which the former selling 
goods such as hardware, garden supplies, furniture, and fixtures. 
Regarding result (2), we note that the decline in the number of small traditional retailers 
between 1982 and 1985 was caused by certain retail formats’ establishing competitive 
advantage over the traditional small-scale businesses that had originally enjoyed such 
an edge. The number of small retailers started to decline once grocery supermarkets had 
acquired the necessary know-how and technology to pre-package and sell perishable 
food. Another factor was the proliferation of convenience stores in the 1970s and 
1980s, which was facilitated by the spread of the pre-packaging system and the 
favorable consumer environment during this period. In particular, the popularity of 
instant consumption nurtured the quick growth of convenience stores. Convenience 
stores met both the need for accessibility, which had been satisfied by small traditional 
retailers, and the need for a large selection of goods. Hence, we are able to conclude the 
initiation of a decrease in the number of small retailers was not caused by changes in 
the regulatory environment. Technological innovations (technology) and changing 
consumption patterns (shopping habits) worked against small traditional grocery retail 
shops and in favor of supermarkets and convenience stores. 
Regarding result (3), we note that the end of Japan’s bubble economy decreased the 
value of goods channeled through the distribution system. This led several channel 
participants to assess their business profiles, which in turn led to an increase in the 
number of intermediate wholesalers. 
• In their efforts to cut costs, some manufacturers spun off their distribution division. 
Wholesalers that had previously bought from manufacturers and sold to wholesalers 
(i.e., source wholesalers) were now classified as intermediate wholesalers. 
• Final wholesalers became intermediate wholesalers because it was more profitable 
for them to supply other wholesalers than it was for them to supply small retailers.  
• The market for second-hand products in Japan expanded. Wholesalers buying these 
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second-hand products from individual sellers were classified as intermediate 
wholesalers. 
• An increasing number of lower-cost products were sourced from overseas, offering 
new opportunities for intermediate wholesalers to purchase from importers. 
Interestingly, the decrease in the number of all other wholesaler categories is generally 
not attributed to changes in the regulatory environment. One explanation is the reduced 
trade volume in terms of sales channeled through the system. Some wholesalers were 
simply driven out of business, while others merged as large retailers cut costs by 
reducing the number of wholesalers they contracted with in search of greater efficiency. 
The transformation of regionally operating chains such as department stores or 
drugstores into national chains contributed further to the wave of mergers and 
acquisitions. 
Regarding result (4), we note that direct sourcing does not appear to have significantly 
increased after the implementation of the revised Large-Scale Retail Store Law. Large 
retailers were neither in a position to force manufacturers to supply them directly 
(power), nor did they have the resources necessary (resources) to internalize wholesaler 
functions. In the 1990s, large retailers were burdened with bank loans, a relic of the 
bubble economy in the 1980s, during which they aggressively had expanded their sales 
footprints to meet consumer demand for more products. After the bubble burst at the 
beginning of the 1990s, Japanese retailers tried to further increase sales by further 
expanding their sales footprints and expanding product selection, which in turn further 
increased their loan burden and their dependence on a constant flow of new products 
and manufacturers. Because their financial resources were concentrated on increasing 
sales and repaying loans, there was little money left for these firms to use to assume the 
functions performed by wholesalers. 
• Storage and distribution function: The focus on the expansion of sales space 
required that storage space be minimized, which translated into a need for smaller 
inventories. Smaller inventories required the frequent and reliable supply of 
merchandise in accurate, small quantities, which was a requirement that wholesalers 
had learned to efficiently fulfill upon the emergence of convenience stores. 
• Order function and access to manufacturers: Retailers tried to differentiate 
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themselves by offering a broad product assortment and regularly introducing new 
products. Ordering through wholesalers allowed them access to a large number of 
manufacturers, and it kept the number of suppliers that they dealt with, and thereby 
their costs, at a comparatively low level.  
Retailers also depended on their suppliers for consignment selling, supplier-
employed sales staff (who would reduce their personnel costs), and merchandising 
know-how. These practices, which had developed after World War II, led to a distinct 
distribution of functions between retailers and wholesalers in Japan wherein even large 
retailers continually included wholesalers in their sourcing arrangement. 
With these findings in mind, we suggest that the optimistic evaluations were based on a 
number of misconceptions regarding the Japanese distribution system. 
• Legislation was not the main factor shaping the structure of the Japanese retail 
market and its large number of small traditional retailers. The decline in the number 
of small retailers, which manifested itself in the form of a decline in traditional food 
shops, started after grocery supermarkets had established a countrywide competitive 
advantage by adopting a new technology (selling pre-packaged perishable foods in 
open refrigerators). The spread of the pre-packaging system, along with a favorable 
consumer environment, also triggered the growth of convenience stores, which 
catered better to consumers’ needs than did small traditional retailers.  
• The conventional explanation for the multi-layered wholesale sector, namely the 
large number of small retailers, needs to be questioned. As our analysis has shown, 
the multi-layered wholesale sector remained in place despite the expansion of 
supermarkets from the 1960s onwards. Supermarkets, despite their size and against 
all predictions, sourced through secondary wholesalers because they provided them 
with the necessary resources for their expansion and efficient access to a large 
number of manufacturers. Secondary wholesalers also provided supermarkets with 
access to local products and an understanding of local tastes. Hence, supermarkets 
lacked resources and power to alter their sourcing routes. As we have shown 
further, the intermediate wholesalers (the type expected to decline most with the 
increase in the number of large stores) actually increased in number between 1994 
and 2002, despite a continuous decrease in the number of small retailers. This 
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increase was caused by manufacturers’ and wholesalers’ searching for greater 
efficiency and new business opportunities. 
• Retailer size and direct sourcing are not necessarily correlated as is generally 
assumed. We suggest that even though the number of large retailers increased, 
direct sourcing remained a limited phenomenon in Japan. We believe that large 
retailers (size) continued to include wholesalers in their sourcing arrangement (i.e., 
wholesale circuity # 0) during the timeframe studied for the following reason. 
Given their strategy of maximizing sales floor space, minimizing inventory and 
competing on product selection, and because of their loan burden, retailers did not 
have the necessary resources (in terms of financial resources and know-how) to 
internalize wholesaler functions such as merchandising or dispatching sales 
personnel. In addition, they did not have the necessary power to shift wholesaler 
functions to manufacturers because they depended on manufacturers for their 
constant flow of new products and consignment selling. Hence, the prerequisites for 
direct sourcing arrangements, retailer resources and power, were not fulfilled. The 
question of direct sourcing, however, requires further research; no reliable 
quantitative data seem to be available. 
These findings underline the importance of this study to our understanding of the 
Japanese distribution system. The study sheds new light on the impact of legislation on 
the formation of the Japanese distribution system and highlights the importance of 
taking into account country-specific and historical factors as well as considering the 
distribution of resources among channel participants when analyzing distribution 
systems. Last but not least, it contributes to the body of research on direct sourcing in 
Japan and offers an economic explanation for the perceived low level of direct 
relationship between retailers and manufacturers in Japan. 
6.2 Further research 
This study concludes by highlighting two areas for further research. 
• Future studies should aim to quantitatively verify the arguments put forward here 
with regard to direct sourcing, specifically addressing the claim that direct sourcing 
did not substantially increase after the revision of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law 
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because of the following considerations: 
! Wholesalers are highly efficient in ordering, storing, and delivering goods, 
thereby allowing retailers to focus on how to most comprehensively utilize their 
sales space. 
! Retailers depend on their suppliers for their merchandising expertise, goods and 
additional employees. 
• Furthermore, because there exists a certain degree of direct sourcing, using 
empirical data to answer the following questions will increase our understanding of 
direct sourcing in Japan: 
! What share of products is sourced directly? Since when and why? Has this share 
changed over time? 
! What kinds of products are sourced directly? Since when and why? Have these 
types of product changed over time? 
! What are the characteristics of retailers that source goods directly?  
! What are the characteristics of manufacturers that supply directly vs. 
manufacturers that supply via wholesalers only? 
The results will also be highly relevant for foreign retailers entering Japan with the aim 
of seeking direct-supply arrangements with Japanese manufacturers, helping them to 
understand what blocks retailers from buying directly from suppliers. 
*** 
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